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The study is based on "Abd al-Jabbär's understanding of Christian doctrine of 
God with special reference to his al-Mughni, Vol. V. 
It starts with an introduction containing a biographical account of 'Abd al- 
Jabbär and his works, a survey of Christian sects mentioned by 'Abd al- 
Jabbär in his al-Mughni and Muslim Christian literature before 'Abd al- 
Jabbar which is available. 
Part I of the thesis is an annotated translation of the section on 
Christianity in al-Mughni, Vol. V, PP. 80-151. 
Part II is concerned with an exposition of ýAbd al-Jabbär's treatment 
of Trinitarian and Christological doctrine. 
Chapter I presents a commentary on the Christian doctrine described 
by 'Abd al-Jabbar together with evidence about them from Christian and 
Muslim sources. 
Chapter U is devoted to Muslim-Christian views about the meaning of 
two terms jawhar (substance) and aaanim (hypostasis) when describing the 
essence of God. 
In Chapter III, there is a comparative study of sif it (attributes of God) 
in the light of Christian and Muslim theology and how the use of the term 
sifdt affected the whole debate. 
Chapter N discusses and analyses '(Abd al-Jabbär's criticism of Trinita- 
rian doctrines and his approach toward them in the light of Christian 
literature written in Arabic and Muslim sources. 
Chapter V provides a description and explanation of union of incarnati 
on as it was presented by early Church Fathers, the nature of that union and 
Christian heresies in the eastern church, such as Nestorians and Jacobites 
and finally an expression presented by Christian scholars who lived within a 
Muslim environment. 
Chapter VI discusses 'Abd al-Jabbär's Critique of Christological Doctr- 
ine and their analysis in the light of Christian literature in Arabic and other 
Muslim sources. 




I would like to express my gratitude to my supervisor Dz L K. A. Howard, who 
first introduced me to 'Abd al-Jabbär and devoted his precious time 
generously. His knowledge and keen interest in this work make this thesis 
possible. I am also grateful to all members of teaching staff of this 
department for their guidance and assistance. My thanks also to Dz M. F. al- 
Shayyäl who helped me to provide some books from Egypt. 
I am also grateful to the Ministry of Education, Government of Pakistan for 
granting me a scholarship for higher education abroad. 
I am indebted to Mr Muräd 'All Khan Nizämäni, former education attachi, 
embassy of Pakistan in London and Mr Syed M. Salim, education officer in 
the embassy for their assistance in continuing this research. 
I would also extend my thanks to Islamia University Bahouralpur authorities 
for providing facilities to pursue my studies. 
I also owe great debt to all my friends here in UK and in Pakistan for their 
best wishes and moral support, especially Dr. Qibla Ayäz (Peshawar) who was 
kind enough to help me in settling down in Edinburgh. 
My thanks are also due to all staff of University library in general and inter 
library loan section in particular. I owe a special debt to the departmental 
secretary Miss I. Crawford. 
I am also grateful to Mr Akhtar 'Ali who made arrangements of typing the 
thesis and Mrs J. Porteous for typing the manuscript. 
Finally, I must thank my wife and children who stayed with me for a long 
time who is waiting patiently back home. 
V 
Transliteration 
The system of transliteration used in this thesis is that of U. S. Library of 
Congress, Cataloguing Service, Bulletin 49, November 1958. 
Textual Notes 
All Biblical quotations are from the revised standard version of the Bible, 
London 1952. 
All QuAnic quotations are from Egyptian standard version, and translation 
from, The Koran interpreted" by A. J. Arberry (OUP) 1964. 
Abbreviations 
E. I1 - Encyclopedia of Islam, First edition 
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Leiden and London, 1960 continuing. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this study is to demonstrate how 
ýAbd al-Jabbär was able to 
understand Trinitarian and Christological doctrines and to determine his general 
structure and methodology and his intellectual approach towards the refutation 
of a non-Islamic religion. It is a comparative study through the reference of 
Christian scholars, especially writing in Arabic to present their Christian 
doctrine. This means that an attempt is made to understand 
ýAbd al-Jabbir's 
section on Christianity, within framework of the general apologetic and 
polemical literature which was produced by both Christians and Muslims up to 
the time of 'Abd al-Jabbär, i. e., eleventh century and even later up to 
thirteenth century. This thesis will also be concerned with a comparison of his 
understanding of the Christian doctrine with the doctrine as generally presented 
by Christian scholars. 
After this introduction which will also discuss {Abd al-Jabbär's life and work and 
a summary of Christian doctrines and sects, and earlier Muslim-Christian 
discussions which 4Abd al-Jabbär dealt with, there will be an annotated 
translation of the section on Christianity in al-Mughni fi Abwäb al-'Adl wa al- 
Tawhid, vol. V which is devoted for non Islamic faiths. 
Background of 'Abd al-Jabbär 
Brief summary of his life 
Abü al-Hasan ýAbd al-Jabkiar b. Ahmad b. 4Abd al-Jabbär b. Ahmad b. Khalil b. 
'Abd-Alläh al-Hamadäni, 
1 frequently preceded by honorific title Qädi al-Qudät. 
The Mu'tazilite usually refer to him as Qädi. 
Z 
As regards the details of al- 
Hamadän, most writers consider it as the region where 'Abd al-Jabbär was 
probably born. But Mustaf ä al-Sädiq in the introduction to part XIV of al- 
Mughni, traces this name back to Hamdän, a Yemeni tribe. 
3 
1. Kahhäla, Mu jam al-Mu iallifin, Vol. V, P. 78, Ibn al-Amid, Shadhrät, 
Vol. III, PP. 202-3, Ibn Murtadä, Ta_ bagät al-Mu'tazila, PP. 112 Encyclopedia 
of Islam, Vol. I, PP. 59 _60 (New edition). 
2. Subki, Ta 
-6 
bagat al-Shafi 4iyya, Vol. III, PP. 219-220, Zarkaly, al-A'läm, 
Vol. III, P. M. 
3. Peters, God's Created Speech, P. 8. 
1 
Some of the biographers have added the title (lagab) al-Asad Abädi4 to his 
name; this may be his birth place, but there are a number of variations. 
5 
His biographers are not sure about his date of birth. The year of his death is 
given as 414,415 and 4166/1023-5. It is stated that he had lived a long life of 
about ninety years, so one can conclude that his birth goes back to between 320 
and 330/932-941. 
After elementary studies in his home town, he went to Iraq, where he continued 
his theological studies first in Basra and later in Baghdad. He also visited 
Qazwin to join the circles of famous traditionists there.? In about 340/951, he 
went to Hamadan and Isfahan, where he became a follower of the theological 
school of the Ash1arites and Shafi'ite in jurisprudence. 
8 
Later he went to Basra, where he became influenced by the teaching of the 
Mu1tazilites and decided to join the Mu'tazilite circle. 
9 For a while he studied 
with famous Mu'tazilite scholar, Abü Ishäq Ibrahim b. 'Ayyäsh (d. "" 9 o), the pupil 
and successor of Basrian master Abü Häshim al-Jubbäli (d. 320/932). Afterward 
he went to Baghdad where he became a disciple of Abü 4Abd-Allah al-Basri (d. 
369/969), another Abü Häshim's pupils and even stayed with him in his house. 
10 
According to Ibn Murtadä, when asked his master Abü AAbd-Allah to teach him 
something about Hanafi law, his teacher suggested that he must stay as Shäfi'i 
l 
and he himself as Hanafi. 
l In about 360/970 he left Baghdad to stay in 
Rämhurmuz, a small town in southern Persia, where there seemed to be many 
Muýtazilites. There he started to dictate his famous book of twenty volumes, 
i. e. al-Mughni. 
In the meantime (about 362/972-3) the Chief Minister of Buwayhid ruler, Sahib 
b. 'Abbäd, (d. 385/990) invited him to come to Rayy and gave him the 
opportunity of teaching Mu'tazilite theology and religious law. Sähib b. 'Abbäd 
himself was a learned man and influenced by 4Abd al-Jabbär's ability and talent. 
4. Asad Abäd is a city, very near to Hamadän, popula-L. ed by Asad b. dhi al- 
Sarw al-Himyari. (Yäqüt, Mu5am al-Buldän, Vol. I, P. 25. 
5. A. K. (Uthmän, Qädi al-Qudät, P. 11. 
6. Ibn Murtadä, Ta, bagät, P. M. 
7. A. K. ýUthmän, Qädi al-Qudät, PP. 55-57. 
8. Ibn Murtadä, Taba ät, P. 112, Subki, Tabagät al-Shäfiliyya, Vol. III, P. 220. 
9. Khatib Baghda i, Týrikh Baghdad, Vol. II, P. 113. 
10. Ibn Murtadä, Ta, bagät, P. M. 
11. Ibid., P. M. 
2 
In about 365/975 Sähib b. 'Abbäd appointed him to the office of Qädi al-Qudät 
for Rayy. The holder of this post was chief of all judges in Rayy, Qazwin, 
Zanj in and Jurjän and Tabaristän. 
It seems that 'Abd al-Jabbär held the post of Qädi al-Qudät until the death of 
Sihib b. 'Abbäd. In 385/990, tAbd al-Jabbär was asked to leave the post by anti- 
Mu'tazilite authorities who come to power. He spent the rest of his life 
concentrating on studies and teaching until his death in Rayy in 414,415 or 
416/1023-25.12 
During 'Abd al-Jabbär's lifetime, the central and eastern parts of Islamic world 
were theoretically under Abbasid rule, while in fact the Buwayhid regime was 
controlled large areas of the Islamic state. 
No doubt the period in which 4Abd al-Jabbär lived can be characterised by 
outstanding scientific, scholarly and literary achievements. The encyclopedic 
epistles of Ikhwän al-Safä were written in tenth century as Ibn Nadim arranged 
his bibliography of the knowledge in Baghdad about 988 AD. It was the time of 
famous essayist Abi Hayyän al-Tawhidi (d. 1023), the historian philosopher 
Miskawayh (d. 1030), the scientist Ibn al-Haytham (d. 1035) and al-Birüni (d. 
1050). Along with that we see in this period Ab-u Ishäq al-Isfrälini (d. lezi) as 
head of Ash'arite school and Shaykh al-Mufid (d. 1022) as head of Shi'ites. 
ý 
There was also political writings of al-Mäwardi (d. 1058) theological work of 
al-B-agilläni (d. 1013) and Abd al-Qi hir al-Baghdadi (d. 1037). 
1Abd al-Jabbar himself was famous throughout the Islamic state as the leader of 
the Mu'tazilites in his lifetime, and has been credited by his amazing and 
original productivity. 
Watt expressed his view about him and said, "Even in the period of the decline 
of the Mu'tazilites there were still some first class mind among them notably 
the Qädi 4Abd al-Jabbär. " 
13 
During his lifetime 4Abd al-Jabbar composed numerous writings. He was very 
active intellectually, and his work virtually covered most of the different kinds 
12. Subki, Tabagät al-Shäfifiyya, Vol. III, P. ZZO, Ibn Murtadä, Ta_ bagät, P. 112. 
13. Watt, Formative Period of Islamic Thought, P. 303. 
3 
of Islamic sciences. Ibn Murtadä records al-H. Aiim as saying that he had heard 
that the work composed by iAbd al-Jabbär came to a total of 400,000 sheets of 
paper. 
14 A. K. Uthmän has described the list of his works to be sixty nine. 
l5 
The list of his works reflects the fact that 1Abd al-Jabbär was very well known 
during his lifetime through the Islamic world. His works contained answers to 
many questions which were sent from many places in Persia, Iraq and even 
Egypt. l6 
Of the numerous books mentioned by al-H-Kim, twelve are directly concerned 
with the subject of speculative theology (kaläm), among them the famous work 
of al-Mughni, al-Muhit and Sharh al-Usül al-Khamsa are remarkable. He also 
wrote many books in which he argued against other sects like the refutation of 
al-Lum', and the refutation of Imama. 
17 
In his famous and important work, al-Mughni fi Abwäb al-Tawhid wa al -Adl, 
1Abd al-Jabbär has presented the doctrine of the MuFtazilites in great detail. 
When it was first discovered and published, it created an enthusiasm among the 
Islamists of this century. The importance of the work does not lie in the great 
amount of information it contains about the Mu'tazilite ideas, but also it is an 
attempt to present their doctrine in a comprehensive manner. In his Sharh al 
usül al-Khamsa, he has discussed five famous principles of Mu'tazilites in detail. 
We are not sure that ýAbd al-Jabbar was able to write a separate and 
detailed book about the refutation of Christianity. Hajji Khalifa, while 
describing the books written about the refutation of Christianity, reported that 
t-1R 
there was a book by 'Abd al-Jabbär. '., It seems that Hajji Khalifa was 
confused. As a matter of fact, there is a chapter about the Christians in his 
three books. In the same way A. K. 4Uthmän mentioned such book in the list of 
tAbd al-Jabbär, through the reference of Hajji Khalifa and Ibn Taymiyya. That 
is 
14. Ibn Murtadä, Ta, bagät, P. M. 
15. A. K. 'Uthmän, Qädi al-Quciät, PP. 57-7 
16. The treatises like al-Khawä. rizmiyyät, al-Tarmiyyät, al-Ashýariyyät, 
al-Qäshäniyyät, al-Küwfiyyat and al-Misriyyät do indicate that those 
were written as answer in response to the enquiries sent from these cities. 
All these are listed by A. K. tthmän in his Qj4i al- PP-66-69. 
17. A. K. Uthman, Qädi al-Qudat, P. 71. 




., In the volume V of al-M=, he refutes the doctrines of the opponents who do 
P 
not accept the Unity of God, with special reference to non-monathist religions. 
It is noteworthy that while criticising and analysing different religions and their 
doctrines, he paid much attention toward Christianity. The longest chapter is 
about the Christian doctrine. The annotated translation of this section on 
Christianity is main part of this thesis. By including Christianity as a non- 
monothestic religion, he shows that he regards the Trinity as polythism. 
2. In his Sharh al-Usül al-Khamsa, while discussing the tawhid (Unity of God), 
he has endeavoured to refute what the Christians believe with regard to the 
Trinity and Union of Christ in the Godhead in a very much shorter discussion 
than the one in al-Mughni. 
2° 
3. A1-Majmü' fi al-Muhit bi-al-Taklif, also contains a very small section about 
Christianity. Its contents and arguments are very similar to above mentioned 
books. 21 
4. Finally, Tathbit DalVil Nubuwa Sayyidinä Muhammad, in two volumes is 
quite different in style and arguments. Contrary to his three above mentioned 
books, Tathbit's sources seem to be scriptural and Apocryphal Gospels. These 
have been subject to much study and debate among modern Western scholars 
notably Stern and Pines. 
22 
Christian Doctrines and Sects 
In his al-Mughni Vol. V, while discussing the Christians, 4(Abd al-Jabbär seems to 
have been concerned with the doctrines of three main sects of the oriental 
Christianity. He specifically mentions them by names as the Melkites, 
19. No doubt that Ibn Taymiyya knew 'Abd al-Jabbär through the reference of 
his books, but he did not mention any book of 'Abd al-Jabbär about the 
refutation of the Christians. In his al-Radd 'ala al-Mantigiyyin, he 
described the books of early scholars who refuted Greek logic and 
philosophy. Here he mentioned 4Abd al-Jabbär without naming his book 
Ibn Taymiyya, Kitäb al-Radd 'ýalä al-Mantigiyyin, P. 142. 
20. '4Abd al-Jabbär, Sharti al-Usül al-Khamsa, PP. 291-8. 
21. Idem, Al-Majmü` Fi al-Muh-it, Vol. 1, PP. 222-225. 
22. For further study see the Appendix. 
about Christianity. 
5 
Nestorians and Jacobites. He does, however, also refer to the Maronites on 
occasions. In addition to that, he described a doctrine of an obscure Christian 
sect which he named Walyäniyya, 
23 
which have been identified as the 
Julianists. 
Consequently, in his al-Mughni, Vol. V, these five sects are described. On the 
other hand, he mentioned only two sects in his Sharh, 
Z4 i. e., the Nestorians and 
Jacobites, and he criticised the Christians in his al-Majmü' fi al-Muhit, 
25 
ý 
without naming any sect. As far as his Tathbit is concerned, he mentioned only 
the three famous sects i. e., Melkites, Nestorians and Jacobites, where he called 
them a1-Tawä'if al-thalathaZ6 three groups. He also claimed in his Tathbit that 
Rome is the origin of these Christian sects. First the Jacobites separated and 
after them the Nestorians. 
27 
ýAbd al-Jabbär's reporting is incorrect, because according to the history of 
C' 
Church, Nestorians was declared heretic in 431 AD, while the Jacobites were 
separated from the orthodox in 451 AD. 
Z8 
The main problem referred to by 'Abd al-Jabbär in his discussion, is the 
Christian doctrine of God, i. e. Trinity, divinity and the nature of Christ. In 
order to understand his criticism and arguments, it will be necessary to present 
some idea of Christian doctrines with the reference of oriental sects on the 
subject within the area concerned. 
The fourth and fifth centuries were famous for prolonged controversies, mainly 
in the eastern churches. These were, how the Son of God was Himself God (the 
doctrine of Trinity) and how Christ was both man and God (the doctrine of 
person of Christ). 
Numerous councils of bishops were held as in Nicaea (325) Constantinople (381) 
Ephesus (431) and Chalcedon (451). Their decisions were rejected in some parts 
of eastern Christianity. Concerning these councils, technical terms without 
biblical origins were made key words in authoritative statements of belief. 
23. `Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, Vol. V, P. 146. 
24. Shark, PP. 291-298. 
25. Al-Maimal fi al-Muhit, Vol. I, PP. 222-25. 
26. Tathbit, Vol. I, P. 91. 
27. Ibid., P. 164. 
28. John Henry Blunt, Dictionary of Sects, Heresies, P. 347 and 332. 
6 
Their use, sometimes led the Latin-speaking west and Greek-speaking east to 
misunderstandings and misrepresenting one another. Consequently these 
disputes contributed to major discussion in the Christian world. 
As far as the orthodox doctrine is concerned, they believed that the incarnate 
Christ was a single person at once God and man. The doctrine of the deity of 
Christ and his human nature were unknown to the earlier generations of the 
Christians, but in their simple faith they never had to met these philosophical 
and theological difficulties. 
It can be said, that Arius (d. 336) first of all claimed that the Father alone was 
really God while the Son was essentially different from his father. He did not 
possess by nature or right any of the divine qualities of immortality, 
sovereignty, perfect wisdom, goodness and purity. The Father produced him as 
a creature. Nevertheless he did not share in the being of God, the Father and 
did not know Him perfectly. 
29 Nor can he be called the true and natural Son of 
God, at best, he is the adopted Son. 
30 
The Nicene Creed was the first dogmatic definition of the Christian Church and 
through the ages has served as a sign of the orthodoxy. It was held to defend 
true faith against Arianism. In it, Arius was condemned by his own word. The 
Council produced its own creed, that is a Trinitarian statement stressing the 
consubstantiality of the Son (that is the Son and the Father are one and the 
same in substance), his incarnation, redeeming death and Resurrection. 
31 It 
was decided that the Son was no less divine than the Father. 
On the other hand, Apollinarius (d. 390) denied the human soul in Christ. The 
principle thesis of his doctrine arose as a result of his anti Arian polemic. 
However in attempting to defend the divinity of the Word, he actually accepted 
the Arian postulate minimizing the human nature in Christ. 
32 He maintained 
this by the same argument as were afterwards used by the Monophysites. 
This heresy was condemned in east and west and conclusively at the Council of 
Constantinople in 381, through the argument that if God in Christ had not laid 
Z9. D. F. Wright, Councils and Creeds, P. 154. 
30. The New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, P. 431. 
31. Ibid., P. 437. 
32. New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I, P. 666. 
7 
hold of full humanity, then man was not saved. Appollinarius had made the 
incarnation seem like a mere appearance of God and Christ's humanity was not 
real. 
The theology of the early Christian Church of Antioch was considered as 
opposed to that of Alexandria, because it emphasized the humanity of Christ. 
Consequently it clashed with the Alexandrian tendency to stress the divine 
nature of the incarnate Christ. 
33 Nestorius was one of the representatives of 
Antiochene theology. 
Nestorians 
Nestorius is claimed to be the founder of the Nestorians. He was a famous 
preacher at Antioch, before being made bishop of Constantinople by Theodorius 
II in 4Z8. Nestorius introduced a new theological debate by preaching against 
the title "Theotokos" or mother of God, given to virgin Mary, claiming she 
would be called rather mother of Christ. 
34 He argued that Mary was a woman, 
and it was impossible that God should be born of woman. 
On the other hand, he did not deny the deity of Christ and never spoke of "two 
Sons" nor he considered Christ simply as a man. But he defined a nature in the 
sense of ousia or substance, and distinguished precisely between the human 
nature and the divine nature, applying in his Christology the distinction between 
nature (ousia) and person (hypostasis). Nestorius refused to attribute to the 
divine nature the human acts and suffering of Christ. 
While distinguishing between the natures, Nestorius still affirmed their union. 
He would not consent to speak of two sons, but he spoke of a conjunction, a 
voluntary union. 
However, Nestorius was unable to reduce the two to the unique and clearly 
undifferentiated one Jesus Christ of the Gospel. In 431 AD. Collestine, bishop 
of Rome, held a synod in that city and Nestorius was declared a heretic. It can 
be called heresy in terms of the denial of what is called in theology the 
Hypostatic Union. 
35 
33. Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, PP. 65-66., New Catholic 
Encyclopedia, Vol. I, P. 625. 
34. Ibid., Vol. X, P. 348. 
35. J. H. Blunt, Dictionary of sects Heresies, P. 368. 
8 
After his exile in 431, he wrote his apology which surmises in Syriac under the 
title "The Barzar of Heraclides". It was translated and published in 1910 by 
Bedjan. Some modern historians such as A. Harnack, F. Loofs, Bethune-Baker 
asserted that he was not necessarily a Nestorian. 
36 
Bethune-Baker who has studied his book thoroughly, declared that 'two persons' 
was not the teaching of Nestorius. In rejecting the theory he said, 
"Though he persistently maintains that there are two substances, in the one 
Christ, who is the one Son and Word of God. "37 
He also argued and justified that the charge might equally fairly be brought 
against all who believe that Christ was in two natures. 
38 
In other words one can say that Nestorius did not think of two distinct persons 
joined together, but of a single person who combined in himself the two distinct 
things (substances) Godhead and manhood with their characteristics (natures) 
complete and intact though united in him. 
39 
However, whether or not the doctrine originated with Nestorius, it clearly 
became the doctrine of those who were called Nestorians, and they believed 
that they were following his doctrine. 
It can be concluded that opinions are divided, as to what the doctrine of 
Nestorius really was and how far it was heretical. But one must not overlook 
the fact, that he repeatedly affirmed the oneness of Christ, though he preferred 
to speak of conjunction rather than of union. 
Melkites: 
Abd al-Jabbär described them as Malakiyya, 
40 
member of the religion of the 
king, and sometimes as al-MalWiyya. Al-Shahristäni also mentioned them as 
Malkä)iyya which is incorrect. Whereas the normal form is Malakiyya or 
Milkiyya, from which "Melchite" is derived. 
41 
36. Ibid., P. 3lo. 
37. Bethune-Baker, Nestorians and his teaching, P. 83. 
38. Ibid., P. 84. 
39. Ibid., P. 87. 
_ 40.4Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, Vol. V, P. 81, P. 13 
41. Watt, A Muslim account of Christian doctrine, Hamdard Islamicus, 
Vol. VI, P. 67.9 
According to some scholars, the word Melchite comes from Syriac malaka or 
Arabic malik, both meaning king or emperor. 
42 The term was applied to the 
Christian of Syria and Egypt who rejected Monophystism and Nestorianism and 
accepted the decision of Ephesus and Chalcedon. 
43 The term applied also to 
Arabic speaking Catholic of the Byzantine rite in Syria, Palestine and Egypt. It 
was adopted by the Jacobites as the ordinary name for the Orthodox. 
wu 
p ka ¢, - 
jC' ly 
d w, 
The Council of Chalcedon represented a culmination in the history of the dogma 
of the incarnation, because a formula of faith was prepared and approved. The 
Council defined one Christ, perfect God and man, consubstantial with the 
Father and consubstantial with man, one sole being in two natures without 
division or separation and without confusion or change. The union does not 
suppress the difference in natures, however, their properties remain untouched 
and they joined together in one person or hypostasis. 
45 
Jacobites: 
The Jacobites are the representatives of monophysitism in the Syrian church. 
The Monophysites separated from the orthodox eastern church upon the 
condemnation of the Eutychian heresy in the year 451 by the Council of 
Chalcedon. Eutyches maintained that the union of Christ's divine and human 
nature in the incarnation resulted in the ultimate extinction of the latter, so 
that the glorified saviour is wholly and only Divine, while the Monophysites 
held that the two natures were so united, that although the 'one Christ' was 
partly human and partly divine, His two natures became by their union only one 
nature. 
46 According to them Christ's divinity absorbed the humanity. The 
leaders of theological thought among the Monophysites were as Aelurus, Peter 
Mongus, Peter the Fuller and Jacob Baradeus. The title Jacobites, which 
appears after 575 AD comes from the Jacob Baradeus who organized his group 
within the Monophysite Church. 
47 
Jacob Baradeus (d. 587) was brought up in a monastery, where he was educated 
in Monophysite theology and Greek and Syriac literature. Although he was 
offered a life of luxury as a helper of Empress Theodores, he preferred to retire 
42. New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IX, P. 627. 
43. Dictionary of Christian Church, P. 647. 
44. J. H. Blunt, Dictionary of Sects, Heresies, P. 305. 
45. New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. III, PP. 425-6. 
46. J. H. Blunt, Dictionary of Sect, Heresies, P. 332. 
47. New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VII, P. 795. 
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to a monastery near the city where he remained for fifteen years living the life 
of a complete recluse. Later on he changed his way of life and travelled on 
foot through Asia Minor, Syria and Mesopotamia, as far as Persia. 
48 
As a matter of fact in the 5th century at the request of the Arab tribe of Band 
Ghassän, two Monophysite bishops were consecrated specifically for the 
Christian Arabs. One of them was Jacob Baradeus. He reorganised and 
extended the Monophysite Church of Syria, which was in fact decreasing in 
numbers due to strong opposition from the Byzantine emperors. It was because 
of his efforts that the Syrian Monophysites became known as Jacobites. 
49 
Jacob Baradeus was a greatest propagator of its distinctive principles in Syria 
and Egypt. 
He spent the rest of his life secretly organising the Monophysites in Syria. He 
died in 578 AD and after his death the Monophysites were driven from Antioch. 
As a matter of fact, Jacobites are not only the representatives of the 
Monophysites, because Monophysites later on consolidated themselves in three 
great Churches. 
1. The Copts and Abyssinians. 
Z. The Syrian Jacobites. 
3. The Armenians. 
They believed in the doctrine that in the person of incarnate Christ, there was 
but a single nature, ie, divine nature, as against the orthodox teaching of two 
natures, divine and human, after the incarnation. 
a 
The Jacobites strongly believed in the absorption of the humanity of Christ in 
his divine nature. They think, that in the incarnation, from two natures there 
resulted one. They have explained it by an example: 
Glass is made of sand, but the whole is only glass, no longer sand, thus the 
divine nature has absorbed the humanity so that the two are one. 
48. De L. O'Leary, The Syriac Church and Fathers, PP. 119-120. 
49. D. Attwater, The Christian Churches of the east, P. 204. 
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'Abd al-Jabbär while discussing the doctrines of the Christian sects, is not 
precise about the Christian sects, especially when we examine his long 
discussion in his al-Mughni. He only described the doctrines and gave his 
refutations in detail without naming any specific sect. 
On the other hand, we see in his Sharh: where he mentioned the- doctrine of 
Jacobites, that they believed in the union through the essence. 
50 This is 
probably a reference to the Monophysite's argument that the nature of Christ 
subsumed into the divine nature at the moment of incarnation and this was a 
union of essence. However his reference to conjunction (Mujäwara) seems to 
indicate that he has muddled the doctrine of Monophysites with the Nestorians, 
by using the term which Nestorians applied instead of union. 
Along with that, it is also noticeable that while describing the summary of 
Christian doctrines, in his al-Mughni, he mentioned two doctrines about union5l 
without naming any sect. It is obvious that one of them was Jacobite and 
other Nestorian . In his detailed discussion, he mixed both these doctrines52 
and refuted them in a single argument, that indicates "Abd al-Jabbär had not 
given proper attention to the sects. His only purpose was to try to criticise and 
invalidate the doctrines. 
Maronites: 
'Abd al-Jabbär mentioned this sect twice in his discussion in al-Mughni Vol. V as 
Märiiniyya. 53 The scholars have different opinions about its name. Some of 
them maintained that it was named after the hermit Maron, who 
4' 
the 
heresy of one will in Christ. Others say that it was a city near Antioch. 
54 The 
historian preferred the first option. Consequently Maronite means a group of 
the disciples who gathered around Maron during his lifetime, and after his 
death, around the monastery erected to his memory, that was called Maronite 
Church later on. 
During the. early 6th century the Maronite monks were defenders of the 
50.4Abd al-Jabbir, Sharh, P296- 
51. 'Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, Vol. V, P. 83. 
52. Ibid., P. 123. 
53. Ibid., P. 84, P. 146. 
_ 54. Istif än al-Duwayhi, Tarikh al-Tä? if a al-Mä. rüniyya, P. 3. 
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doctrine of Chalcedon Council. In 8th century, they were declared as heretic 
along with Monothelitism (that is the doctrine of one will). But they had never 
been informed about it. 
55 Some scholars justified their doctrine about one will, 
that according to them, as ontologically speaking, there were two wills in 
Christ. On the other hand, when they speak of one will, they mean one 
practical will, which is equivalent to action in the terminology. What was 
regarded as heresy was merely controversy over semantics. 
56 But according to 
Sacd b. Bitriq, ý 
Maronites 





,, h , 
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attributed to Martin, a priest in . He 
'4t 'L`_ 
one will and two natures in Christ. 
57 
Julianists: 
The fifth and last Christian sect, mentioned by 4Abd al-Jabbär is Julianist, 
which he called it as Walyäniyya, 
58 
while the correct pronunciation is 
Yüliyäniyya. 59 
Actually, they are called in Western language as Julianist or Aphthartodocetae. 
It is one of the two groups, into which the Monophysites were divided. From 
the name of their leader they were called in Armenia and its neighbourhood as 
Julianist, in Egypt Gaiamitae and in general as Aphthartodocetae. 
60 
Julian of Halicarnassus, leader of the sect, (d. after 527), was a Monophysite. 
After being expelled from Halicarnassus in Caria by the Byzantine emperor I, 
he took refuge to Alexandria, and became the preacher of so called 
Apthortodocetism. 
61 (teacher of the incorruptibility of the body of Christ. ) 
62 
As far as his doctrines are concerned, he maintained that Christ's body was 
essentially incorruptible and that His passion and death were real, but were the 
result of a free and extraordinary choice of His will. 
63 
55. New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. IX, PP. 245-6. 
56. Ibid., P. 246. 
_ 57. Istifän al-Duwayhi, Tärikh al-TWifa al-Marüniyya, PP. 9-11. 
58. For further detail see translation footnote 6o, P. 24 ). 
59. 'Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, Vol. V, P. 146. 
60. Dictionary of Sects and Heresies, P. 38. 
61. New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VIII, P. 48. 
62. Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, P. 766. 
63. New Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. VIII, P. 48. 
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He further argued that because Christ was not subject to the effects of original 
sin, while Christ's suffering was real, that was due to an act of his will which 
made it possible for his body to experience death, though it was naturally not 
subject to suffering or corruption. 
64 
On the other hand, there was another sect, that also separated from 
Monophysites which maintained the corruptibility of Christ's human nature. 
Their leader was Severus and they were called as Severianists. 
65 
It can be concluded that the Julianists believed that from the moment of 
incarnation, the earthly bodyof Christ was in its nature incorruptable, 
immortal, though this fact did/prevent him from accepting suffering and death 
by a free act of his will. 
66 
It is interesting to note that (Abd al-Jabbär while describing the doctrine of this 
sect, maintained that they believed that Christ is a deity in terms of his being a 
human being. 
67 
So He would be adored in reality. It does reflect that 'Abd al- 
Jabbär's knowledge about an obscure sect is accurate and sound. Because we 
see in the Dictionary of sects and heresy, where the writer attributed to them 
same doctrine as 'Abd al-Jabbär has mentioned. So he described under the 
Aphthortodocetae that one part of them maintained that after the incarnation, 
Christ ought not to be spoken as a created being as regards his humanity, but 
even as human he should be designated God and Creator, and must therefore 
have been a proper object of worship from the very beginning. 
68 
Muslim-Christian discussions: 
The earliest recorded polemical debate took place by correspondence between 
the Umayyad Caliph 'Umar II (682-720) and the Byzantine emperor Leo III69 
64. Ibid., PP-50-1- 
65. Dictionary of Sects and Heresy, P. 334. 
66. Oxford Dictionary of Christian Church, P. 69. 
67. Al-Mughni, Vol. V, P. 146. 
68. Dictionary of Sects and Heresy, P. 39., see also - D. K. Crow, The death of 
al-Husayn B. Ali and early Shi i view on the Imämate, in al-Serät, Vol. 
XII, (1984) P. 80. 
69. The letter to Umar II is supposed to be the answer by Leo III to the caliph 
Umar II, in which the Emperor refuted the claims of Islam. An American 
version of this letter has been preserved and translated by A. Jeffrey, 
Ghevond's Text of the Correspondence Between Umar II and Leo III., 
Harvard Theological Review, Vol. XXXVII, (1944) PP. Z69-332. 
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(C. 680-741)., dlthough its authorship has not been established with absolute 
certainty. 
About 781 AD Timothy I, the Nestorian patriarch of the eastern Christians and 
Mahdi the third caliph of Baghdad (775-785) debated with each other. The full 
report records the debate from the Christian side in Arabic and Syriac. 
70 
Another famous religious discussion that took place between two friends, the 
Nestorian Christian al-Kindi and the Muslim al-Häshim and was later written 
down about 215/830.71 However, this is essentially a propagandist piece of 
work. 
In ninth century we see for first time that Muslims approach towards Christian 
doctrine turned from a simple debate to a more systematic method. Among 
them are those polemics that belong to the rationalist group of Mu1tazilites. 
1. Al-Qäsim b. Ibrähim al-Hasani, a Zaydie, but inclined toward the 
Multazilites. He died in 246/860. He wrote al-Raddall al-Nasärä, and it can be 
said that it is the earliest surviving anti-Christian polemic. 
72 
2. 'Ali b. Rahban al-Tabari, a Nestorian Convert to Islam, wrote two 
treastises73 defending Islam. The longer work, Kitab al-Din wa al-Dawla, was 
written during the reign of al-Mutawakliil, around the year 240/854. It contains 
a large number of Biblical references, and one can say the Muslim scholars were 
70. It was translated by A. Mingana from Syriac to English, as an official 
Apology of Christianity. See John Ryland library Bulleton, Vol. XII (1928), 
PP. 147-226 and its Arabic version in Trois Traites (ed) by P. L. Cheikho, 
PP. 1-9. Hamdi Bakri, an Egyptian scholar has suspected its authenticity. 
For detail see Muhäwara al-Mahdi ma'Timiitäwis, Majalla Kulliyya al- 
Adäb, Vol. XII, Part 2, (1950) PP. 41-57. 
_ 71. Its Arabic text was published as, Risäla'Abd al-Masih b. Ishaq al-Kindi, in 
London 1870 and its translation was done by William Muir under the title 
of, The Apology of al-Kindi, London, 1887. Hamdi Bakri also claimed that 
actually it was written in late ninth century and attributed to third 
century. For detail see, Risäla al-Häshimi ilä al-Kind-i, Majalla Kulliyya 
al-Adäb, Vol. I, Part 9, (1947) PP. 29-49. 
72. It was first published by I. Di. Matteo, who edited it and translated in 
Italian. in Rivista Degli Orientali, Vol. IX (1921-3), PP. 301-364. 
73. First book was translated by A. Mingana, as The Book of Religion and 
Empire, Manchester, 19ZZ and its Arabic text was edited by A. Mingana 
and published at Manchester, 1923. 
The shorter one, Al-Radd falä al-Nasärä, edited by I. K. Khalife and 
W. Kutsch, in Melanges de L Universite St Joseph, Vol. XXXVI, (1959), 
PP. 113-148. 
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able to know the references of old and New Testament through these converts. 
3. Abü tIsä al-Warräq (d. around 861) was basically a Mu'tazilite and later on he 
became a dualist. 
74 He wrote Al-Raddali al-Thalath firaq min al-Nasärä, 
75 
which is preserved in Yahyä b. ýAdi's refutation of it. There are attacks on the 
Trinity and incarnation in this work. 
4. Abi 'Uthmän ýAmr b. Bahr al-Jahiz, a very well known scholar of the 
Mu'tazilites (d. 869), wrote a small treatise at the request of caliph al- 
Mutawakrfil, al-Radd 'ala al-Na§ärä. 
76 It is used frequently by 'Abd al-Jabbär in 
his al-Mughni, while discussing the Christians. 
S. Abü Yüsuf Ya4qüb b. Ishäq al-Kindi (d. 864), who wrote al-Radd '(alä al- 
Nasärä. Although he was not a theologian but famous as a philosopher, le was 
able to write an attack on Christianity and the approach is quite philosophical. 
It is preserved in the refutation made by Yahyä b. 'Adi, a tenth century 
Jacobite scholar who analysed it in eleven short sections. 
77 
6. Abü al-oAbbäs 'Abd-Alläh b. Muhammad al-Anbäri, generally known as al- 
Nashi al-Akber died in 193/905.78 He was a Multazli. His famous book, Kitab 
al-Awsat fi al-Magälät, 
79 is a small encyclopedia of the doctrines of Muslim 
and non-Muslim sects, together with critical remarks. It contains a small 
section about the Christian sects, but it is important as he has described twenty 
one sects of the Christians, most of whom are unknown. 
7. Abt 'Ali al-Jubbäh (d. 933) and Abu- al-Hasan al-Ash'ari (d. 935) are more . 
important and leaders of their own theological school. Unfortunately their 
works about the Christian doctrines have t, but the former's work can be 
seen in 'Abd al-Jabbär's work especially in his al-Mughni. 
74. Ibn Nadim, al-Fihrist, (Dodge, PP. 419,804, Khayyät, Intisir, PP. 108, 
110. -'" 
75. This text is edited and translated by Armand Abel, for his doctral degree 
from Bruxelles in 1949, o*lthough Arabic handwriting is not good. 
PP. 1-68. 
76. It was edited by J. Finkel and published from Cairo, 1926, PP-10-38- He 
also wrote an introduction and translation of its few parts. See Journal of 
Americana Oriental Society, Vol. XLVII, (1927) PP. 311-334. 
77. It is edited and translated in French by A. Perier, as Un Traite De Yahja 
Ben'Adi, Revue de L'Orient Chretien, Vol. XXII, (1920-1), PP. 3-21. 
78. Watt, Formative Period, P. 224. 
79. This book was first edited by J. V. Ess, who wrote a preface in German 
and published from Beirut, 1971. Section about the Christian sects, 
PP. 76-87. 
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8. Abu Mansiir Muhammad al-Mäturidi, (d. 333-944) the author of Kitäb al- 
Tawhid. 80 He devoted two and a half pages to the opinion of the Christians 
about Christ and its refutation. 
9. Al-Hasan b. Ayyüb, a converted Muslim, in the early fourth century, 
81 
wrote 
a letter to his brother 'Ali, because of his misunderstanding about Islam. It is 
preserved in al-Jawäb al-Sahih82 by Ibn Taymiyya. He criticised severely the 
83 Jacobites and declared that Arius's view is very close to Islam. 
10. Abü Jalfar Muhammad b. Bäbawayh al-Qummi, the son of well known Shi'ite 
authority, died about 381/991. In his book Kitäb al-Tawhid, 
84 there are two 
sections containing discussion between Muslims and Christians. It does not look 
like a substantial criticism, rather than Shiite propaganda. 
11. Abi Bakr Muhammad b. al-Tayyib al-Bägilläni, (d. 403/1013) an Ashtarite 
theologian. His book Kitib al-Tamh3d, 
84 
that is devoted to Muslim and non- 
Muslim's theological views. It has a section about Christianity. Although it is 
not so lengthy, it is a very comprehensive summary. Some discussions are 
similar to 'Abd al-Jabbär's discussion and others are quite new. 
12. IfAbd a1-Jabbär's (d. 1025) four extant workfon Christianity. 
80. Kitab al-Tawhid was first edited by Fath-A11"ah Khulef as a doctral thesis 
and latter published from Beirut, 1970. 
Section about Christianity, PP. 210-212. 
81. Ibn Nadim, Al-Fihrist, P. Z46- 
82. For this letter see Ibn Taymiyya, al-Jawäb al-Sahih, Vol. H, PP. 312-363 
83. Kitäb al-Taw] id, was edited by Häshim al-Husayni, published from Iran, 
1957. See its section about Christianity, PP. 270-275 and PP. 417-427. 
84. Kitäb al-Tamhid was first edited by R. J. McCarthy and published from 





An Annotated translation of al-Mughni, Vol. V, PP. 80-151 
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DISCUSSION ABOUT THE CHRISTIANS 
- Section 
Summary of their doctrines 
Our venerable scholar, Abü Alit has mentioned that it is one of the doctrines of 
all Christians except a small group of them, that God Almighty is the Creator 
of everything and the Creator is a living entity with speech; and His life is the 
spirit whom they call the Holy Spirit and His speech is knowledge. Among them 
are those who say that life is power. 
They alleged that God, His Word and His Power are Eternal. The Word is the 
Son who is the Messiah Himself according to them, who manifested (zahm) in a 
body which was on the earth. They differed about what is entitled to the name 
of Messiah. 
Among them are those who maintained that it is the word and body united with 
each other. Among them are those who alleged that it is the Word not the 
body. Among them are those who alleged that it (the Messiah) is the created 
body (al-jasad al-muhdath) and the word became a created body when it was in 
1. Abu- 'Ali Muhammad b. 'Abd al-Wahhäb al-Jubbä' i, one of the most 
celebrated of the Mu'tazila, was born at Jubba in Khuzistän. He attended 
the school of Abü Ya`qüb Ydsuf al-Shahhäm at Basra, who at that time 
occupied the chair of Abü al-Hudhayl al-Älläf. He succeeded al-Shahhäm 
and it can be said that he was able to add a final brilliance to the 
tradition of the masters. He died in 303 A. H. /915 A. D. 
He thus held a place in the line of the Basra Muýtazila who differ from the 
Baghdäd Multazila especially over the question of human action. In Basra 
itself, he was particularly at variance with al-Nazzäm (whom he opposed) 
and al-Jähiz. ' 
Al-Jubbäi had two pupils who later became celebrated. His son Abü 
Häshim (the teacher of Abd al-Jabbär, died in Baghdad in 3Z1 A. H.; 933 
A. D. His ideas and views can be seen in the writing of 'Abd al-Jabbär). 
Secondly, Abü al-Hasan al-Ash `ari who, after breaking away, was to 
devote himself to refuting Mu4tazilism and become the "founder" of the 
so-called school of Ash4ariyya. (Encyclopedia of Islam, Vol. II, p. 569-570) 
New edition. Watt, Predestination in Early Islam, p. 83-7,136-7. 
Kahhala, Mu 'am al-Mu1allifin, Vol. X, p. Z69. 
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the womb of Mary and became visible for mankind. 
They all allege that the Word is the Son and whatever has the Spirit and the 
Word is the Son. They allege that all these three are one God and one Creator 
and they are from one substance. This is a summary of what they said. 
You must realise that only some of the Christian doctrines can be discussed, 
and there can be a distinction [which is possible to understand] between what 
they agree on and ý what they disagree upon, and between the elements 
of their doctrines w- e, t. / . agreed c, - disagreed upon which can be 
understood. 
It is difficult to be exact about all their doctrines, because their arguments are 
based upon irrational principles and incomprehensible statements. 
The famous sects among the Christians are as follows: 
1. The Jacobites, the followers of Jacob. 
Z. The Nestorians, the followers of Nestorius. Sometimes they are 
called followers of Nistür. I 
3. The Melkites, members of the religion of the king. 
They also have further sects, some of which are old or more recent. Their 
doctrines which are in conflict with those three sects have been reported. 
We will now report those of their doctrines which must be reported and which 
the three sects are in agreement upon. 
Firstly, the Creator deity is one substance of three hypostases (agänim). One of 
these hypostases is the Father. The other is the Son and the third is the Holy 
Spirit. The Son is the Word and the Spirit is the life, and the Father is Eternal, 
living and speaking. All these three hypostases are the same in substantiality 
and different in hypostasy. The Son is always in a state of being begotten by 
the Father and the Father is always begetting the Son, and the Spirit is a state 
which proceeds from the Father and the Son. The being of the Son as Son of the 
Father is not in terms of offspring but rather like the generation of the word 
from the intellect and heat of the fire from the fire and the light of the sun 
from the sun. 
20 
They agreed that the Son was united with the person whom they call Messiah. 
The person manifested himself for the people, was crucified and killed. 
There is some disagreement about parts of the summary which we have given. 
In their doctrine the Jacobites and the Nestorian maintained that the 
hypostases are the substance and the substance is the hypostases. Some 
attributed this also to the Melkites. Others have attributed to the Melkites the 
doctrine that the Eternal is one substance in three hypostases, and hypostases 
are the substance, yet the substance is different from the hypostases and there 
is no fourth one. They maintain that the hypostases are a simple substance and 
deny that it is a compound substance. 
Then they differed regarding the hypostases. Some of them maintained that the 
(Ki"' wrtis) 
hypostases are actually characteristics. CY-thers considered them 
persons (ashkhäs) and the others thought that they were aspects (wu'üh) and 
attributes (sifät). (This was) as if they were saying a single substance (existed) 
for three (khawäss) and for three persons. 
Then they further differed. Some of them maintained with regard to the 
hypostases that they were different in hypostasy and the same in substantiality. 
Some of them said, "We do not say that they are different but we do say that 
they are three hypostases which are the same in the fact that they are only one 
substance. " They differed again. Some of them alleged that each of these 
hypostases is a living and speaking God. This is a doctrine of some of the 
Nestorians. And the rest said that each of the hypostases on being mentioned 
individually is not a God nor living nor speaking. 
They also differed: some of them maintained that the Word is knowledge itself. 
Some of them said that the meaning of Kalima (the Word) is knowledge. It was 
only named Kalima (the Word), because it manifests itself through speech. On 
the other hand, the doctrine of others is that the Word and speech are not 
knowledge. It is reported by others that they maintained that spirit is power. 
They also differed: some of them reported from them that they said the 
hypostases are heterogeneous and His knowledge (Father's knowledge) and His 
life are different from Him. Some of them reported that the hypostases 
themselves are substance and nothing else. Even though in terms of being 
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hypostases, there is a distinction which is not made regarding terms of 
substance. They illustrated an example of charcoal when it becomes an ember, 
without seeing what it was before, for it acquired an attribute which it did not 
have in terms of being simply charcoal. 
They vary regarding the nature of Christ and the union. The Nestorians claimed 
that Christ is a man and God. An anointing (aspect) and unanointed (aspect) 
('t tOL 
which both united and became one Messiah. The sense of united pis 
that He became one out of two. According to them in reality the Messiah is 
two substances and two hypostases. One of the hypostases of the deity, i. e., the 
Word, is Eternal substance, everlasting and the other is a created substance 
which came into existence after it had not existed. Sometimes they use the 
word to ' ad/ (incarnated) instead of ittahada (united) and sometimes they said 
taaannasa (became man) and tarakkaba (compounded). 
The Melkites believed that Christ had two substances, one of them is Eternal 
and other is Created. 
The majority of the Jacobites alleged that Christ has one substance, except 
that He is (formed) out of two substances. One of them is the substance of 
Eternal deity and the other is the substance of human being. They united and 
became one substance and one hypostasis. Some of them said, "He has one 
nature. " 
L 
After agreeing that the union was an event which occurred in time (amr hid-th) 
by which Messiah became Messiah, they differed on what the incidental event 
was and according to what aspect it existed. Some of them maintained that the 
Word (Kalima) united with that human being by means of intermingling. Some 
of them asserted that it (the Word) adopted the form of a human person as a 
temple and locus. Some of them maintained that (the Word) inhered in him and 
Word was covered by him and his body. Some of them said that it is nothing of 
that kind but it is as a picture of a human being appears in a polished mirror 
when he looks into it. Some of them maintained that it is in accordance with 
the appearance of the design of a seal in clay which has been stamped (by the 
seal) without the (actual) design being removed from the seal, and the inherence 
(of the design) in the clay. 
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There are doctrines of those who could not make the Word and the body one 
thing. 
As far as the Jacobites are concerned, they believed that two substances have 
become one substance. 
Some of them reported that the union is in the meaning of the will, not that the 
two subsisting entities (dhät) have united in reality. They differed about it in 
another way. Some of them believed that the general substance (i. e. nature) 
united with the totality of mankind and others said: He united with a personal 
human being. Then they differed about that on the basis of these two 
statements. Some of them saying, "He united with the whole of humanity" and 
W-10) 
some of them believed his Union/ with a part of mankind. Sometimes they 
considered that the Son united with the whole of humanity so that He will cause 
the redemption 
of 
all. Some of them said that He united with part of 
humanity, so that He will cause the redemption for part (of humanity). 
They also differed about the nature of Christ as we described their 
controversies about the union. So, those who believed regarding the union, that 
two substances (natures) became one substance ands 
created 
(muhdath) became 
Eternal, maintained that Christ is Eternal. On the other hand, those who 
explained the union differently maintain that Christ is Divine and human. 
They differed about the crucifixion and death (gatl) after they agreed that 
Christ was crucified and died. The Nestorians maintained that the crucifixion 
took place with the human part of Christ, not the divine parts. The majority of 
the Melkites believed that the crucifixion took place with the entire Christ 
(where) Christ is a divine and human being at the same time. The majority of 
the Jacobites alleged that the crucifixion and death took place on one substance 
(nature) that is formed out of two substances (natures) which were God and 
mankind. He was the Messiah in reality and He was God. The pains were 
inhered in Him, so the Melkites and Jacobites believed that He who was born of 
Mary was God (deity) in reality. Some of them believed that Christ is one 
substance, Eternal in one aspect 'iha) and created in another aspect, born in 
one aspect and unborn in another aspect, crucified, died c, n one aspect, non 
crucified, died in another aspect. Some of them said that death, crucifixion and 
pain were in the terms of phantasy not in reality. The nature which is united 
Z3 
with Him is endowed with grace ; latif) that pains do not inhere in it. It is 
narrated by a small group of the Jacobites. 
They agreed that Christ should be worshipped and He is entitled to that. They 
have different opinions that either He is adored entirely or worshipped 
divine aspect 
we 
have quoted i their controversy about union and 
nature of Christ. Among the categories of the Christians there is a class called 
Marüniyya. Z They maintained that Christ is two substances (natures) and one 
hypostasis in the sense that he has one will. The deity was really crucified for 
the sake of our salvation. 
Some of the people say of them that one of their doctrinesis that the Word used 
to enter Christ during the time of performing the miracles and depart:. from 
Him in the rest of his actions. Some of their earlier scholars alleged that the 
Word at the time of union passed into the womb of Mary as the arrow crosses 
the air and water into the water pipe. It is said by some of their scholars who 
came earlier that God is one and they name Him Father and claimed that Christ 
is the Word of God and His Son through (God's) will. (Istifäý. 
3 
He is a 
creature who vLas created before the Creation of the universe and the creation 
of everything was carried out through Him. For this reason, they call him deity 
(God). 
They said and alleged that Christ united with a human being through Mary and 
2. Maronites: The only fully Roman uniate Church in the East. The name is 
derived from Maron, a Syrian solitary who died around 423. By their own 
theologians it is claimed that their existence can be traced back to St 
Maro, a friend of St Chrysostom. According to this tradition Maronites 
have always been orthodox and in union with Rome, but in fact they were 
originally Monothelites who followed Sergius of Constantinople. 
As a unite body they possess their own liturgy, which is in essence an 
Antiochence rite in the Syriane language in parts modified by Latin 
influence. 
Since 1926 the Maronite faith has been the Chief confession of the 
Lebanese state. 
Douglas, J. D. The new international Dictionary of the Christian Church, 
P. h 
633. 
Cioss, F. L. The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church P. 876. 
3. Watt, while translating al-Shahristäni s section about the Christian 
doctrines, translated word Istifä'uas (by way of Choice), we translated it 
as the will of God, because it is very close to Christian theology. 
Watt, Ash-Shahrist5ani's account of Christian doctrine, Islamochristiana, 
Vol. IX, (1983), P. 258. 
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He was crucified. They alleged that God has a created spirit that is more 
blessed than any other spirits and it (spirit) is intermediary between the Father 
and the Son, which takes inspiration from the Father to the Son. They 
alleged that in the beginning, Christ was an intangible substance and purely 
spiritual essence, not composite and not mixed with any other of the four 
elements. He only clothed these elements during His union with the body that 
was taken from Mary and where the four elements gathered together. 
Among them( some who alleged that Christ came into existence (ibtad ýa) 
through Mary and He was a noble prophet, whom God honoured and venerated 
for His obedience, He named Him His Son by the way of adoption not by (way of) 
birth. 
The doctrines which we have presented are the famous one S(of their doctrines) 
apart from what is to be mentioned later. 
Z5 
2-SECTION 
The Invalidity of their Doctrine about the Trinity according to the argument 
which we have reported from them 
You must realise as mentioned before, the proven fact that Eternal God 
(al-Qa(Jim), is one without there being any other with Him in reality, is what 
proves the invalidity of their doctrine when there occurs in it anything on a 
basis which is contrary to common sense (ma(nä). 
However, when they say: God has three hypostases and they dn. not intend the 
three entities (dhawät) which are associated with attributes, their divergence 
only occurs in terminology, 'since they have referred by the attributes to God 
being knowing and living. 
[On the other hand when they considered that He has 
three entities. as the Kulläbiyya4 believed that He is knowing with knowledge 
and living with life, the proof which indicates that Eternal God is one, 
invalidates this doctrine. 
As said before, the fact that anything which participates with God as being 
eternal, would not be able to characterise its entity (essence) by anything which 
would differentiate it from the other, refutes their doctrine, because since 
these hypostases were eternal, it would be impossible for the Father to be 
characterised by something which was not possible for the Son and the Holy 
Spirit and nor could any of those of them do this or be characterised by what 
was not possible for the Father. Thus it would not be possible for any one of 
them to be characterised by what was impossible for the others. This requires 
that the Son must be a Father and the Father must be a Son and a spirit and the 
4. Kulläbiyya, a Sunni group of the Muslims whose leader was Abii 
Muhammad rAbdulläh b. Said b. Muhammad b. Kulläb al-Qattän al-Bari. 
Watt has introduced him as an influential Mutakallim of the period of 
Mihna. He died shortly after 854. He is reckoned as a Shäfi'ite though his 
teachers are not named. He is said to have argued against the 
Mu'tazilites at the court of al-Mä'miin. Ibn Kulläb's chief contribution to 
Kaläm, however was his elaboration of the doctrine of the attributes 
Sifät of God. He asserted that for each name such as 'powerful', 
'knowing', 'eternal' there was an attribute of 'power', 'knowledge', or 
'eternity'. These attributes were not God and not other than God. It 
seems that 'Abd al-Jabbär is referring to this argument about the 
attributes here. 
Peters, God's created speech, p. 21. 
Watt, The formative period of Islamic thought, pp. 286-7. 
Al-Ash'ari, Maq. lät, p. 169. 
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Holy Spirit must be a Father. 
According to this method, our early scholars forced them to admit this doctrine 
that the Son is a son because since the Son participates with the Father in being 
Eternal, and must be similar in His self-subsisting entity (essence), it is 
necessary, if the Father must have a son, who is ilm and Kalima, that the Son is 
in/ same situation with regard to the fact that He must have a son which is film 
and Kalima and so on. Whoever demonstrates the impossibility of need for a 
son, if there was a Son at all, , must state the same with regard to the 
Father. 
Similarly they would be required to admit with regard to the Holy Spirit that He 
had another spirit, because of what they had said, with regard to the Father, 
that He had a spirit and spirit of the spirit has a spirit and so on without end. 
They have to admit that the Son has a Spirit and the Spirit has a son as the 
a 
Father has/Son and a Spirit because they (both) participate in eternity which hJ"I" 
JhL fact that they are (of the same substance) requires the doctrine of the Son's 
participation with the Father in eternity, it is not possible for them to affirm 
that it is for the sake of. it that He (the Father) needs a Son without both Son 
and Spirit (needing Sons and Spirits). They cannot claim the fact of His being a 
to 
father and the son being a son of Him does not refer/His essence (subsistent 
being) by arguing that it refers to a cause, because, even though they referred 
by that to a cause, they have to declare that what He has in His essence 
(subsistent being) makes it possible for Him to be a knowing Father. It could be 
said that the Son, who is the knowledge and the Word, is the knowledge and the 
Word of Him. Whatever share He has in being eternal decrees that this 
attribute (sifa) will be possible for Him in the same way as it was possible for 
(the Son). In this way there is (proof of) the necessity of what we have forced 
them to accept already. We have already explained how this problem is 
repudiated during the discussion of the doctrine of Kulläbiyya that He (God) is 
knowing and that it is not knowledge which requires Him to be knowing even 
they both (God and knowledge) share in eternity insofar as the fact that God 
being knowing is necessitated by implication and not because of knowledge 
being a subsistent being (li. dhätihi). So what we mentioned there it refutes this 
problem. 
According to this method, our earlier scholars forced upon them (Christians) the 
view that every one of the hypostases is a deity because since the Son and the 
Z7 
Spirit participate with the Father in eternity, what requires His existence as a 
deity requires their existence as two deities. The existence of each one of the 
two as a deity repudiates the basis of their argument because they were led to 
that by the reasoning that since it is impossible for the Eternal and the one who 
z6 
is active, (i. e. God)) be living except through life and to be knowing except 
through knowledge, it is necessary to affirm (the same) for the two hypostases, 
Word and Spirit. Therefore since it would be necessary according to the 
argument mentioned earlier, that each of these must be a God, this method has 
been repudiated. We must also affirm two more hypostases for each of the 
hypostases. The same is required for every case. This would require the 
affirmation of numerous deities in an infinite series as we forced the Kulliibiyya 
to admit in this connection. So every aspect, by which we invalidate their 
doctrine, also refuteSthe doctrine of the Christians because their doctrines are 
similar in meaning although they do differ in language. However, the 
doctrine of Kulläbiyya is more perverted, because they attest that God has 
many macni5 as the number of attributes that He is entitled to. So they made 
the numbers of eternal entities (Qudamäl) more than the Christians. 
They might argue: We are not forced to admit that the three hypostases 
postulate three deities, because we say that they are three hypostases while 
there is one substance in reality. 
6 
We would only be forced to admit that if we 
postulated that these hypostases were different and postulated that the 
substance (for each of them) was different. 
The answer is that every argument which is brought forward to refute the 
doctrine, could not be dismissed by a difference in wording of that doctrine, 
because the basis of the refutation of the doctrine is in terms of meaning not in 
terms of wording. The variation of the words insofar as it does not affect it, is 
like the variation of expressions according to different languages which 
describe a doctrine which is invalid in terms of what makes it invalid, without 
5. The use of the term ma{nä by 'Abd al-Jabbär here seems obscure. He had 
made it synonymous with the word Qudam O in the next sentence. It 
seems to be an attempt to find a word to describe the attributes (sif ät) 
which have been existing eternally. As noted before they are not God not 
other than Him according to the Kulläbiyya. 
6. This doctrine is said and approved by Christian scholars as Elias of Nisibis, 
(Cheikho, Trois Traites, P. 19) and `Afif b. Mu'ammil (Ibid., P. 75). See also 
Cheikho, Vingt Traites, P. Z. 
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changing the nature (of the doctrine by the change of language). 
We have said that since the Christians are in .. (m a4ani) 
they have to accept affirmation of three subsisting entities (dhawät) in eternity 
i. e. Father, Son and Holy Spirit. They make Spirit the life of them, by which 
He becomes living and they make Son, knowledge, by which He becomes 
knowing. When they admit that, then the postulation of three Gods which we 
have forced on them becomesinescapable and the wording does not affect it. 
As for their doctrine: "We say that the hypostases are not different from the 
substance but they are other than the substance. " 
It is like the argument of Kulläbiyya which states that the attributes are not 
different from God. ' In the same way that this doctrine has no effect on what 
we forced them to admit, the same applies to the Christians. 
However, some of the Christians have claimed that the hypostases are different 
insofar as they are hypostases, although the substance is one. So it is not right 
for them to defend themselves from what we have forced them to admit by 
what they are claiming, -even when they maintain that they must accept that 
the deity is different in one aspect and not in another. 
This is an impossibility in terms of things differing from one aspect and 
. 
&cau4 
agreeing from another. But it is more certain than that. This is/the existence 
of things which are not different requires the abnegation of their being 
different and requires that they be one thing or several things. 
According to this aspect, our scholars forced them to admit that their doctrine 
was contradictory and based on an illogical argument, because three being one 
and one being three are illogical in reality, whether they say that it is one from 
the aspect that it is three or from other aspect. 
We say concerning the thing which comes within the totality of the group, that 
it is not other than it when you have added it to the group; and that it is other 
than each one of it when you single it out by descriptions from the point of view 
of applying a description (to it), because it is an entity which is different from 
other entities and characterised by attributes; and it could be characterised by 
them (i. e. these attributes) apart from the other entities without any 
consideration of the expressions concerning that. 
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If they followed this argument in their doctrine they would concede what we 
intended in terms of hypostases being different in an absolute sense (ma'nä). 
Then they would be forced, as we mentioned before, to confirm deities and 
eternal entities that have no end. Whenever they do not concede that, we are 
quite right in accusing them of contradiction. 
They might argue: 
"According to your point of view it is right to say that numerous units are one 
group and countless parts are one human being and one entity without your 
statement being contradictory. So why did you not allow us to say that He is 
substance in three hypostases. " 
The answer is: 
There is no doubt that we affirm that the units of the group are different in 
reality and we describe it by our statement "group" so that this group may be 
distinguished from the rest of the numbers and groups. We say one so that it 
may illustrate that it belongs to this group at one time. There is no 
contradiction since it is according to the meaning which we have given. It is 
not possible for you to do that because you do not affirm that the hypostases 
are different. You do not mean by your doctrine (of three hypostases being) of 
one substance that they (the hypostases) are a group. Similarly you do not apply 
this expression for other countable things when they total three in the same 
way as we can apply the number ten for all countables which total ten. So the 
removal of the contradiction from what we have mentioned is as obvious as the 
confirmation of such a contradiction in what you have claimed. We only meant 
by our statement about the parts of the human being that they are many (parts) 
and we meant (by it) that every part is different from the other and will be 
appropriate for that which nothing else is appropriate for. We mean by saying 
"one human being" that there is a group which consists of those parts (which 
make up a human being) which can be characterised as being one in activity and 
one in ability. That is reasonable and there is no contradiction in it. On the 
other hand you cannot attain the same position because you do not mean by 
your doctrine of "one substance" that it is a group of hypostases which are 
characterised by virtue of a structure in which the hypostases occur or 
something like that. So the contradiction remains within your argument while 
it is removed from ours as we said. 
Furthermore, we meant by the contradiction which we accused them of, a 
contradiction of meaning. It is not possible to accept it without the words 
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contradicting themselves as we accused a person of who claimed that something 
was existent and non-existent, and that one substance was black and white. It 
is already known, that even though (this contradiction) is possible in words, it is 
not possible to accept what (those words) mean. The argument is the same with 
regard to what we have forced upon the Christians, for we have claimed what 
they maintain about one thing being three in reality from one or two aspects 
cannot be accepted. There is no point in pre-occupying oneself in repudiati r% j
whatever is unacceptable, because through that thing we would reach the point 
of invalidating what is valid so that we would remove the believer from his 
belief. As we already know this belief is impossible, there is no point in looking 
for an argument by which it could be removed. 
According to this point of view, they are forced to admit that they must 
declare that God is different and the same because, in terms of the hypostases, 
it is required that He must be different and in terms of one substance it is 
required that He should be the same one. The existence of the things as being 
the same and different is impossible. They cannot say that they (the 
hypostases) are the same in the subsisting entities and different in those 
attributes which do not refer to the subsisting entities, but rather refer to those 
elements entitle them to an attribute (ma'än1)7 and whatever is like that. 
Because according to their doctrine the substance of the Father is only a Father 
who is a knowing and living. They maintain the same with regard to every 
hypostasis. So what we forced upon them to admit is correct that their 
doctrine is that they are the same in subsisting entity yet different. 
It requires rejecting something and affirming it, because there is no difference 
between one thing being similar to the other and being contradictory to it and 
between its being existent and non-existent. Because its being contradictory 
demands rejection of what requires /to be in accord in its affirmation, as we 
discussed in the Chapter of attributes. 
As for those among them who maintained that "We do not say that the 
hypostases are different in order to escape from this argument, " they have no 
protection from the consequence because it depends on meaning not the 
7. For this translation of ma äni, cf. Peters, God's Created Speech, P. 156. 
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expression. So in this doctrine they are in the same position as those who 
maintained that one thing is existent and non-existent. 
8 So we forced upon 
them to admit that it is the same and different. Therefore they wanted to set 
aside this argument by refusing to accept these. That is obvious. 
Our venerable scholar Abu- Ali forced upon them to admit that either they say 
that there are more than three hypostases or repudiate their doctrine. 
He said to them: "When you affirm that there are three hypostases, in terms of 
that, it is impossible for you to believe that whenever He (God) is acting, He 
would be living and knowing. So you have affirmed that He has knowledge 
which is the Son and the Word, and you have affirmed Spirit which is life. 
Therefore you must affirm that he has Power because action cannot be 
produced except from one who has Power, for the action has a greater need for 
its agent to have power (to do it) than it has need for him to be living and 
knowing. This will make you affirm that He has Hearing, Vision and Perception 
insofar as the living must be hearing, seeing and perceiving. You must affirm 
that He has Will, for insofar as He is the doer of actions through his knowledge 
(a; 
of them, He must be someone who intends actions. You must affirm for Him 
Might, Greatness and Unity, insofar as He is mighty, great and one. 
If they deny Him having Power, then His being living and knowing must also be 
rejected. In this way the hypostases are repudiated. If they affirm Him having 
Power not through Power but through His subsisting entity (dhdt), then in the 
same way He must be knowing and living through His subsisting entity, not 
through Knowledge and Life. On the other hand, if they affirm Him having 
Power through Power and they make His Power to be His Life or Knowledge, 
then in the same way His Knowledge must be His Life and His (Kalima) Word 
must be His Life. In this way it is necessary to make a limit of two hypostases. 
If that is conceded, even though it is contrary to the evidence, they would have 
to concede that His being knowing and living is not because of (an element) 
(rnAnä) which originally requires these attributes. 
9 If they affirm Power for 
God apart from the Knowledge and Life, Hearing, Seeing and Perceiving then 
8. The Arabic text is which makes no sense. Obviously there is a 
confusion in the text. It has been translated tentatively as -4.0,401. p' 
9. The second repet ition has no sense, so it has been dropped from the 
translation. 
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they are forced to affirm numerous hypostases. In this way, the doctrine of 
Christianity is repudiated. 
10 
It is impossible for them to say that He is living without being powerful and 
that He is living without being knowing (by arguing) that the case is the same 
for them both insofar as a living (Person) may sometimes be without both these 
qualities. 
The position of the two, regarding the evidence, which is agreed upon is that 
there is no living (person) as we understand it, which would be without 
Knowledge and Power. There is no difference between these two in terms of 
the fact that if some aspects of a living (person) is without one of them, it is 
certainly imperfection. Then it is correct that what we have mentioned is 
necessary and requires that their doctrine is repudiated. They are forced to 
admit the doctrine that He is living without Life or Life is living. This is 
because either they have to say that living is only the Father not the two other 
hypostases or it is three hypostases. They might argue: 
That He is the living, then they are forced upon to admit that He is the activity 
and Creating Deity. In this way is the repudiation of their doctrine that God 
itself is three hypostases. They might argue: 
That the living is three hypostases, so that the doctrine may be continued. 
Then it is necessary that the Life be living alongside the Father. That is 
impossible because since a cause must create an effect (hukm) for something 
else, it is impossible for it to create an effect (hukm) for itself alongside the 
other thing. For this reason it is incorrect, that the knowledge is knowing in 
itself alongside something else, .. 
lthough it is possible that it should make 
somebody else be knowing. 
14 If, concede that the Life can be living, so that this attribute is required for 
itself alongside other things, they are forced upon to concede that His being 
living is Life. So in terms of His being living, it requires Life, as they 
maintained for a living person. In terms of His being Life, it does not require 
it. In this way it would be necessary to affirm endless hypostases. It would 
require the possibility of the living (being), which is the Father being Life in 
Himself and thus it would be necessary to dispense with Life which is other than 
Him. Similarly the question can be put against them, when they argued: 
10. The word aY sihu, has no meaning, so it has been dropped from the 
translation. 
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"That the Life is the life of the two other hypostases or the Knowledge is the 
knowledge of the two hypostases. So it is pointless to repeat it. 
They are forced to admit the affirmation of three active (hypostases) because if 
they argue that whoever acts is a human being, they are forced to admit that he 
would be God. In this way, there is a repudiation of their doctrine that the 
deity is one substance of three hypostases. 
Their argument would be like the argument of Kulläbiyya, insofar as what is 
subject to the attributes is the deity apart from attributes. So they have to say 
that the action is (the action) of three hypostases. Each of them should be 
active. Its obligation requires that each of them must be living and having 
power and also each of them must be a deity. In this way, they are abandoning 
their own doctrine. 
They might argue: 
The action of three is one action so that your (i. e. 4Abd al-Jabbär's argument) is 
not necessary because when the action is only one, it does not need to affirm 
three agents, but rather one agent. 
The answer is: 
Because it is impossible that one action can be an action for more than one 
agent it follows that one of them may do it and another leave it. We mentioned 
its invalidity earlier. 
It follows that the action of each of them would be different from his fellow as 
each of them is different from his fellow. 
They might argue: 
The action is an action only of one who is three. 
The answer is: 
There is no difference between affirming that it is an action of three and 
affirming that it is an action of one who acts who is three in reality in addition 
to affirming the act to them. 
They might argue: 
Every one of them is acting with the others and not every one of them is acting 
in reality. 
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The answer is: 
Haven't you said they are three who are acting just as if one of them was acting 
with the other? 
They might reply: 
Every one of the three is part of the actor and the three of them are one actor. 
The answer is: 
This requires the possibility of dividing the deity who is acting. It also requires 
that they concede that Life is subject to division. It would require the 
possibility of the action being part of the actor the possibility of life being 
part of him (i. e. the Living Deity), because for Him to be acting and not an 
action is impossible as it would also be impossible for him to be living and not 
Life. 
They are forced to admit that it is impossible to say that Life is a part of Him 
and yet not Him. They must admit that Life is different from Him, because 
there is no fourth position about it. They must affirm that Life is different 
from God. God would be the only Creator not the Life and Knowledge. Now 
their doctrine would be repudiated by the argument which we discussed of those 
who affirmed that along with Him (God) Knowledge and Power are eternal. 
If they conceded that Life was living, they would be acknowledging the unity of 
God. 
It is correct to repudiate the argument that Life is part of God or Life is God or 
that it is different from God. Since, if they held any such argument they would 
have to abandon Christianity. 
The argument which affirms that He is active in eternity also forces them to 
say that He is a Father in Eternity, because it is reasonable to say that the Son 
was caused to be and the Father became a Father through it, just as an action is 
caused and an agent becomes an agent through that. Since according to them 
there is no contradiction between Him being a Father and a Son for all eternity, 
the same is the case with Him being an agent. 
They are forced to admit that He is a subject to division into three divisions by 
virtue of fact that He is a changing body 'ism) which is subject to differences 
and He is caused. 
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They also forced to admit that each one of these hypostases must be Eternal 
and exist because of an element which requires an attribute (ma"nä). As they 
said that the Eternal is knowing and living because of an element which requires 
an attribute, it will not be correct for them to deny that they (three hypostases) 
are eternal and exist while the Father is Eternal and exists, because (in such a 
denial) there would be the affirmation of (the Father) being caused and non- 
existent. Since they argued that He exists without cause, it is necessary in the 
same way that He be living and knowing without it being through a Spirit and a 
Son, because just as it decrees His existing in eternity, and being everlasting, so 
it is necessary that He be knowing and living. 
Concerning His Knowledge and Life, it has already been explained that they 
cannot say that they are attributes and they are not what is attributed to (Him). 
Because it will be repudiated in the same way by which the doctrine of 
Kulläbiyya has been repudiated and because they describe what distinguishes 
each hypostasis from the other. 
According to their doctrine that "the substance of three hypostases is one 
substance, " they must admit that the Son is entitled to all the attributes of the 
Father insofar as His substance is the same as the Father's. Otherwise, if it 
would be possible that the Son was different from Him, even though the 
substance of the Son is the same as the substance of Father, it would be 
possible for the Father to cease being a Father and for the Son to cease being a 
Son. If this was the case, it would only be like this because of his (Son's) 
substance; this is because to affirm an equivalent of something in its substance 
along with its contradiction with regard to its attribute is to give the attribute 
predominance11 over its substance. If that was possible, it would also be 
possible for a thing to cease being its substance. This would mean they were no 
longer sure about the (being or) non-being of the Father and the Son, and 
whether the Father would cease being an Eternal Father. 
They would have to admit that the (hypostases) are different, even though the 
cause for their differences would be the same as that which required them to be 
the same, because, if they argued that the hypostases were different without 
any reason which would require them to be different it would be impossible. 
11. We read it and translated it as "al-räji4a". 
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They might argue: i 
That the hypostases differed because of their entities (a än) and substances, 
this would necessitate that, if their substance was one substance, they be the 
same. Otherwise, they would have to be different in substantiality as they were 
different in hypostasy. The Melkites and Jacobites do not maintain this when 
they say that it is possible for them to be different from one aspect. Therefore 
they must admit the doctrine that they are different from the aspect by which 
they are the same. 
1. They are forced to admit that the son would be Father, since substance of 
the son is the same as the substance of the Father. 
2. They are forced to affirm the Son as Father because, according to them, 
Fatherhood is one of the attributes of deity and one of things which requires the 
absence of imperfection. Then it is necessary that the Son should be Father, 
otherwise He would be incomplete. It is incorrect to say that the Fatherhood is 
attribute of perfection and Divinity, otherwise being a Son is contrary to it. 
With regard to the Melkites doctrine that the substance is different from 
hypostases even though hypostases are not different from it they should be 
asked: How is it possible to say that the substance is different from them, 
while the hypostases are not different from the (substance). And how could it 
be reasonable? When is it conceded? Why is it not conceded that the substance 
would be different from them (hypostases) in reality, although these 
(hypostases) are the same as it (substance) in reality? When the (hypostases) 
being the same as the substance contradicts, the substance being different from 
them (hypostases) then it must contradict these (hypostases) not being different 
from substance and the substance being different from them (hypostases). 
Furthermore, if the hypostases are three, and they made the substance 
different from them, then they need to affirm the fourth one. In this way they 
have abandoned their doctrine. If they claim that they refer by the substance 
to one of them, they contradict their argument that the substance is something 
else from them. This would require that one thing would be different from 
itself. This is irrational. 
They cannot claim that the substance is not a fourth, while it is not one of the 
three, because that is impossible to judge as we mentioned before. There is no 
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difference between saying that is different from it and is not fourth, and yet 
not one of them, and between saying that it is different from them and it is one 
of them. 
Furthermore, God must be the substance apart from the hypostases or He must 
be the hypostases apart from the substance or He must be both of them (the 
substance and the hypostases). If God is the substance, and according to them 
the substance is different from the hypostases, they are forced to exclude the 
Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit from Divinity. If they say that God is the 
hypostases apart from the substance, they are forced to admit that the eternal 
substance is not the deity, and this would be abandoning their doctrine, because 
they claim that the deity is one substance of three hypostases. If they say that 
the deity is both (the substance and the hypostases), they are forced to admit 
that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit are not God. Therefore whoever 
adores them does not adore God, and who disbelieves in them does not 
disbelieve in the deity. If they say that God Himself is substance which has 
three hypostases, they should be told that this would require that your doctrine 
that the God is the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, would be wrong, 
because these are things which are added to the God, they are not the God. 
This would be an abandonment of Christianity and inclination towards the 
doctrine of Kulläbiyya. 
However this doctrine12 requiriLJ them to admit that three and one are not 
four. Rather they have to say that three and one is one (3 +1= 1). This would 
necessitate that someone saying "three and nothing else, " was the same as 
saying, "three and something else. " This would require that three things and 
something else are three. It would also require that to affirm and deny 
difference is the same. It would require that one and one makes one. 
Furthermore it would require the countable would not increase through the 
addition of numbers. 
According to their doctrines, it is required that the hypostases should be a 
substance because, according to them it is not correct to affirm that that which 
is not a substance can exist by itself. Therefore they must say that the 
hypostases are the substance and the substance is another substance. They 
must affirm two substances that would be the deity. In this way it is a 
Z. (God is one substance which has three hypostases) 
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contradiction of Christianity. Then they could be asked, are the two 
(substances) the same or different? If they say, they are the same, why did one 
of them become hypostas. s not the other? 
If they say they are different, they are forced to affirm two different eternals. 
The substance of one of them is different to the other substance. This 
resembles the doctrine of Dualism. 
13 
If a proponent from them argues that the Son is the Word and Speech in reality 
and he is not Knowledge, then what we have already mentioned will invalidate 
his argument. It will also be invalidated by what confirms that the speaker only 
becomes speaker by virtue of the fact that he produces speech and speech can 
only be an activity of a speaker. That would stop him being an eternal speaker 
a'"A Father and 
14 
would require that speech is a created in time. It 
explains that through that speech would only be called speech, when it took 
place in the context of sequence. Then it would be from that rational category, 
which cannot be separated from that which requires creation. This 
demonstrates the invalidity of this doctrine. Whenever they put forward an 
argument against this view, they associate themselves with total ignorance. 
According to this method, our early scholars forced them to admit that His 
speech has another speech, that speech would be a Father and that the speech 
which they affirmed is life, knowledge, motion and tranquility and it is the 
agent and creator. 
15 
Furthermore, since the word is not separated from the speaker according to 
them, why should it be more appropriate for it (word) to be a Son rather than a 
Father. Indeed the Father became more appropriate among us, because through 
13. The term is applied to a system of thought according to which there exists 
two Gods. Here is it particularly the religious dualism which is ordinarily 
considered to be the Chief Characteristic of the Zoroastrian religion. 
According to them, the Supreme God is Ahura Muzda, conceived as 
essentially good and in opposition to him is Ausa Mainyu (the destroying 
spirit). Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, vol. V, P. 111. 
14.4Abd al-Jabbär as a Muqazilite does not accept God as an eternally 
speaking God with an eternal uncreated word. The same arguments, 
although not stated apply also to begetter and Father. 
15. This argument is extremely elliptical. What 'Abd al-Jabbär's seems to be 
implying is that there is an unending chain of speech and life etc, if you 
define the Son as the Word of God, then as God, he would need another 
Word of God etc. 
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being a Father, He is the origin of the Son, through Him the Son existed. If He 
(Father) was not, the Son would not be. According to them, the Father does not 
proceed the Son, so why did he become more appropriate to be a Father than 
the Son? 
If one of their proponents said, we have claimed there to be three hypostases 
while He is one substance because things must have substance or accident 
;I 
Jct.,. I,. o 
activity (fill) is possible from accident, so (it is required), that the Deity must 
be substance. The substance is two kinds; (1) body, (2) one which is without 
body. The body is subject to division and being assembled, so the Deity must be 
without physical body. He must be living or dead. The dead have no choice or 
preference or power of discrimination or power of actions. So we have 
confirmed Him as living and living can be further divided into speaking and non- 
speaking. So he who is not speaking cannot be described as having 
discrimination and wisdom. Therefore it is required He must be speaking. Thus 
it has been confirmed that He is a living and speaking substance. Now He must 
be living and speaking because He is a substance, having life and speaking 
power. If it is so because He is a substance, then it is required that every 
substance would be speaking and living. Therefore it is confirmed that He is 
speaking and living with life and speech. It is required that both (life and 
speech) must be from the substance itself, because they are not created in Him, 
because He is Eternal not Created. 
cj They argued then it is necessary for the substance to be the Father, Life would 
be the Spirit and Speech would be the Word whom they call the Son. 
Sometimes they further say that the living is of two kinds, one kind can produce 
offspring and the other cannot do that. Then He would be incomplete. So it is 
necessary that Deity can produce offspring and it is also necessary that He 
would be the Father. So for this purpose we said, Father, Son and Holy Spirit. 
And we make the Spirit as Life and the Son as Speech and the Word. 
The answer to this is: the argument (iýtibär) which you have put forward would 
only be acceptable (yajib) if the only thing which could be an entity (ma_ 'lüm 
16. This argument quoted by 4Abd al-Jabbär, is described by many Christian 
scholars, as one can see in Sharh al-'Agida al-Nasraniyya (Cheikho, Vingt 
Traites, PP. 3-4) and by Paul of Sidon (Ibid., PP. 20,25,49,55) and by 
Elias of Nisibis, (Cheikho, Trois Traites, PP. 31-33) and 'Afif b. Mu'ammil 
(Ibid., PP. 75-76). 
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that which can be known) was either substance or accident. We have explained 
that God is not a substance nor an accident. So the basis on which you have 
based this problem is false. Your doctrine that the substance is either with or 
without (physical) body, requires that the deity is without a (physical) body 
because he is not subject to composition. Therefore you must maintain that He 
is possibly something else apart from substance and accident, because since you 
were allowed to affirm Him as an agent, having HiS Own will without evidence, 
although He had no physical body, then it is right to affirm that He is not 
substance nor accident without evidence. 
Their doctrine that it is required that He must be speaking and living, because 
if%opposite of that was affirmed, He would be incomplete, requires them to 
admit that He is existing eternal, powerful, all hearing, all seeing and 
perceiving. This requires, since it is not possible that He would be in the same 
manner for His substantiality, that He would be (such) for (ma'äni) elements 
which would carry these attributes. In this way there is an affirmation of 
numerous hypostases like what they have confirmed of speech and life for Him. 
Their doctrine (that the life and speech are required to be of the same 
substance) is impossible, because whatever is of the same substance cannot 
have need of a cause (hukm) for itself. That is only possible for something 
which is different from it. Therefore the existence of one of 
17 
them as living 
through part of the substance would not be possible because part of the 
substance would be its own substance. According to their reasoning He must be 
affirmed as Eternal generous and beneficient because whoever does not such 
qualities, would be a miser and deficient. Otherwise if He could be affirmed 
without (relying on) these two attributes (Life and Speech), it would be possible 
to affirm that He is living, without (affirming that He is) speaking. Then He 
might be speaking and delivering speech later as a result of men's need for it. 
However, if substance is Characterised by Life and Speech because it is 
substance, every substance will have to be like that on basis of their argument. 
If substance is Characterised by Life and Speech because of its own special 
quality (khässa), that would invalidate their argument. They must, then, affirm 
that life and speech would have only become special qualities for a third special 
quality. For if they had not become special qualities for a third quality but 
simply because they are two special qualities, that would require the same with 
17. We read it minhumä instead of minhä 
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regard to each special quality. This would require an endless number of special 
qualities. 
According to what they have argued . He must be movable, having parts and 
body, because the substance, when it is not something like that, would be nearer 
to defectiveness. Indeed they are required to affirm the possibility of that with 
regard to Him, _. 
for anything in which that was not possible, would not be a 
substance. Then it is required that they affirm Him as substance who eats and 
drinks, because every living being who has not such qualities would be 
incomplete. 
It is required, according to this argument, that they admit that He only became 
a Deity, because He is living and speaking, just as He was only living and 
speaking, because He was a substance. This requires the admission that every 
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living and speaking thing would be Deity so the angels, jinn and human being 
would be deities. 
Their argument that it is the necessary consequence (that) a speaker must be 
knowledgeable and wise is a matter of ignorance because the one who is 
knowledgeable and wise, arranges his speech, while a baby, sometimes, speaks 
without knowledge and wisdom. 
Their doctrine that he who cannot produce offspring is incomplete and sterile 
and therefore it is necessary to affirm that He is a Father requires the 
admission that He has adopted a female companion, because he who cannot do 
that, would be incomplete. They are required to admit that the angels are also 
incomplete because they never marry and are not fathers, in spite of their 
doctrine that they are superior to human beings and have a greater status. 
Some of them argued that He is one substance because if He was two 
substances, it would require that He was a mixture of two species and the 
intermingling of two substances. That is a sign of temporal causation. 
They argued that He is three in number, because number three consists of two 
types of the numbers, that are even and odd numbers and whatever brings 
together two types of the number is more perfect then that which does not, 
18 
because one of the two types of number does not attain numerical 
18. For this argument see, al-Kindi, Ris"Ala'Abd al-Masih, P. 30. 
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completeness, and to describe Him as incomplete is impossible. So it is 
required that He (God) should be characterised through numerical perfection 
and that is the number which brings together even and odd numbers. This 
requires them to admit that the Father by Himself brings together two kinds of 
numbers as does the hypostasis of the Son and of Spirit. This requires that the 
Father has three hypostases by Himself and then the number of the hypostases 
would be nine. Otherwise, it is required, if each does not bring together two 
types of number, each of them would be incomplete according to their 
argument. That requires that each one of the hypostases would be incomplete. 
That requires that the all would not be a Deity and the defect would be general 
to all of them. 
Furthermore, according to them, the deity is not three in its substantiality, it is 
three in its hypostasy. So it is required, according to their argumentation that 
He would be incomplete in His substantiability, because He does, not bring 
together two types of numbers. According to us, the defect is contrary to what 
they mentioned, because it must exist when He brings together two kinds of 
number or' the kind which is even, for the establishment of that in Him would 
require Him created and would prevent Him from being eternal. This is 
incomplete, not as they claimed. Their statement requires them to admit that 
anything which brings together two numbers is more complete. Therefore, if 
the odd and even in it are more, then it is more perfect and excellent. Thus 
they must affirm numerous hypostases for the deity. It is also required that 
they must attach to Him every attribute which is attested to be praiseworthy 
and perfect. This requires that He had a body that is assembled, tall and wide. 
It could be asked about their doctrine, that it is required that He should be a 
Father, so that He may not be imperfect. "Why did you not say that He is the 
Father in terms of sexual reproduction, 
19 
so that He may not be imperfect 
19. What 'Abd al-Jabbär seems to be referring here is the Christian concept 
of generation. Wolfson has discussed the mystery of generation in detail 
(see his book "The Philosophy of Church Fathers, pp. Z87-304). He 
concludes: "That still, despite all their attempts at explanation, they felt 
that generation cannot be explained. It is a unique event, a mystery 
unlike any other kind of creation or generation in the world. " 
He further supports his idea by some church Fathers: "So Irenaeus says: 
"If anyone, therefore, says to us, - "How was the Son emitted by the 
Father" - we reply to him, that no man understands that emission, or 
generation, or utterance or manifestation, or by whatever name one may 
describe His generation, which is in fact indescribable. 
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because only fatherhood could negate that imperfection not the one you 
mentioned, which is irrational. It requires that they admit that He is a body, 
which can adopt a female companion and can procreate as one of ours can. We 
are not going to argue with whoever has reached that point about Christianity. 
We have discussed it, while rejecting anthromorphism. 
If they argue that the birth of the son from the Father is as the production of 
the Word through : reason and the heat of the fire from the fire and light of 
the sun from the sun,, 
20 it would be said to them that the Word is not produced 
through the reason, because sometimes, it can be uttered by an unreasonable 
person and sometimes one who may possess reason cannot produce one word. 
Word arrangement is only possible through knowledge by means of selection by 
the one who is doing it, not by being produced by the reason. If a Christian 
argued saying, by Word he meant knowledge, it should be argued that knowledge 
itself is reason, when it refers to necessary knowledge. 
21 On the other hand, if 
you meant acquired knowledge and whatever is similar, then it is not produced 
through a reason because the intelligent person is free from that and that is 
possible with regard to him. 
He quoted Basil who had the same theory. 
"That the substance of the Father did not generate the son" by fluxion or 
by putting forth shoots, as plants put forth their fruits on the contrary, 
the method of divine generation is ineffable and inconceivable to the 
human mind. " and finally he mentioned that the statement of John of 
Damascus: "that no other generation is like the generation of the Son of 
God" and "that the nature of the generation and procession is quite beyond 
comprehension. " 
Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, P. 304. 
20. For this analogy see the description of Christian scholars, Cheikho, Vingt 
Traites, PP. 2,5,14,21 and 42. 
21. lm al--darüri (necessary knowledge) 
Some scholars translated it as 'immediate knowledge', but Peters did not 
agree and said, that it is not a correct translation. Because we see that 
Abd al-Jabbär has divided it into two categories, i. e., direct or immediate 
and indirect knowledge. So it would be better to translate it as necessary 
knowledge. 
McDermott defines it as "necessary knowledge which is established in the 
mind through no effort on the subject's part and which the subject cannot 
doubt or deny". On the other hands film al-muktasab as "knowledge that is 
acquired either by listening to revelation or by the subject's own 
reasoning. " 
Dictionary of technical terms, Vol. I, P. 880. 
Peters, God's Created Speech, PP. 53-55. 
McDermott, The Theology of al-Shaikh al-Mufid, PP. 66-67. 
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The reason that they deny him being Father in terms of sexual reproduction 
(tanäsul) is because in that there is requirement of Him (i. e. the Son) being 
created. This would necessitate the denial of Him being Father in terms of the 
generation of the word from reason, because the former would only be among 
created things. 
The production of the heat of the fire from fire, is not possible, because, if the 
heat of the fire is produced through its substance, then it is required that every 
substance would be in the place of fire in terms of heat. If a proponent of them 
argues, "that heat is produced not through its substance but in terms of it (i. e. 
the substance) being fire", it would be answered: that is just as if you said that 
heat was produced from heat and the substance, or from heat only. It requires 
that a thing is produced from itself. 
22 If they argue "that we mean by that that 
its being fire would only be understood, as it having heat. Similarly the 
doctrine of the generation of the son from the Father is the same kind. " It 
should be said to them, that it is required that you first affirm Him Father, 
then affirm that He has a Son who is generated from him. On the other hand, 
the affirmation of something as a fire is an affirmation of the heat in it, not 
that we claim that the heat is produced from it. So it is required that you 
affirm Father and Son at the same time on the basis of fact that they are two 
origins. Therefore it is possible for them to dispense with mentioning the 
generation. The argument about the production of light from the sun (can be 
treated) in the same way as the argument we have described. However, light is 
a body (ajsäm; i. e., a physical entity composed of atoms) and body is not 
produced by another body. 
23 
The sun has light because of its polished surface 
and because of its being characterised by the light which is on it. Because it is 
a necessary consequence t when a body has such a quality (polished surf ace), ZZ 
would have light; not that there is something which was produced from 
,, rho 
something else. In this situation there is no difference between one/says that 
22. He seems to be arguing that as the Christian argument is that heat and 
the fire are the same substance, then it is simply producing itself. 
23. In order to refute this argument, 'Abd al-Jabbar has resorted to arguments 
about the physical Universe. He has described light as a body 'ism) which 
here means a collection of atoms. The sun, too, is such a body and only 
God can cause atoms to come into existence. Therefore, the sun does not 
produce light. In the rest of his argument he seems to suggest that the 
sun's surface is of a kind that reflects light and thus is described by the 
light which is reflected on it. In this way, he seems to indicate that he 
understands light and sun to be separate entities. 
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the sun is produced from the light or another that says its light is produced 
from the sun. 
Some of them, in their presentation of their doctrine of the Trinity, by using 
the (image of) the sun and light, have relied on the sun and light being two 
individual elements (shakhsän) which one substance unites together and which 
are the same in substantiality but different in individuality (shakhsiyya). That 
is the case of the Eternal who is three hypostases which are the same in 
substantiality but different in hypostasy and personality (shakhsiyya). That is 
impossible, because the light of the sun is different from the sun and the 
attribute of the one differs from the attribute of other, and some parts are 
different from the other parts. 
Z4 
According to them, that is impossible to say 
this about the hypostases. 
Some of them argued: ' 
Whenever a human being is living, speaking and mortal, 
he is one human being. In the same way, the Deity is existing, living and 
speaking and He is one substance. It is wrong, because the human being is not a 
human being through his living, speaking and being mortal. He only becomes a 
human being when he is differentiated from all animals through structure. Even 
though he might be a human being as they described, it would not exclude the 
fact that what was correct with regard to him was what the structure had 
indicated. It would not refer through this description, ne thing in reality, but it 
would refer to structured things, and each single part of us is not a complete 
human being. This requires them to admit that each one of the hypostases is 
not substance and they would have to admit25 that each is a particular (khäss) 
substance although the substance is a substance common (to all of them). 
(äm m) 
However what they have maintained confirms our argument because we apply 
the same criterion (hukm) to every part of a human being which we can apply to 
the other. So it is required that they may apply such a criterion to every 
member and description of the hypostases which may be applicable to the other. 
In this is the contradiction of all that they rely upon. It is only possible to say 
that many parts are called one living human being because he lives through a 
life which inheres in him. It is the necessary consequence of the parts that they 
only require the criterion of being a man through occurrence of the numerous 
Z4. For this argument see footnote Z3. 
Z5. 'Abd al-Jabbär says according to them, but he obviously means that they 
would have to hold this after his argument. 
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parts of them which are structured in numerous parts of the substances. It is 
not possible that the Eternal Deity only became living because of His existence 
with others by being structured in a special substance, because that would 
require Him to be a physical and created body. 
It could be argued against them: Why have you come to a point that it is not 
more appropriate to say that God is one substance of three hypostases rather 
than that He should be described as three substances of one hypostasis. They 
might answer: Because hypostases are different in terms of being hypostases 
but are the same in the substantiality. 
26 It would be argued against them: Why 
do you not say that they are different in terms of substantiality, but the same 
insofar as they are hypostases? Those of them who argue: I mean by my saying 
"one substance" that He is one in absolute description and my saying "three 
hypostases" means that He is characterised by His being eternal, living and 
speaking. I only mean through these expressions what I mentioned. Then his 
statement about his meaning contradicts the doctrine of the Christians, because 
it is their doctrine, as we mentioned before, to affirm three hypostases as one 
substance in reality. That explains that one of the doctrines of the Christians is 
the view that the Son is united with Christ and they characterise the Son by the 
union. If the Eternal was one thing in reality then it is not possible for them to 
say that that which is united is not the one who unites. 
It is their doctrine that the union makes Christ of two substances, a divine 
(nature) and a human (nature), or He became one after each one of that had 
been one substance. 
So all that explains that what he (such an opponent) said is far away from the 
Christian doctrine. 
Although we have narrated this type of doctrine from some of their early 
scholars, they do not escape from the fact that they are wrong in this argument 
in two aspects. 
One of them is to apply these nouns to Him in the classical Arabic language. 
26. It is explained by Timothy I in his debate with Caliph Mahdi (see Cheikho, 
Trois Traites PP. 6-7 and Yahya b. eAdi, Magälat, PP. 36-37. 
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According to the shari'a, it is shocking. Secondly, they limited His attributes to 
Him being Eternal, living and speaking. That requires the denial of Him being 
Powerful, perceiving, willing, hearing and seeing. This is unbelief on the part of 
those who said that. 
As for those of them who maintain that He is the Father of Christ in terms of 
adoption and respect, 
Z? first of all this invalidates their argument that He is 
the Eternal Father. It requires that He would be His Father during His creation 
of Christ. The meaning of adoption is only possible with regard to one who can 
have a Son in reality or with regard to one who can be born like him and insofar 
as it falls into the category of living beings. Because of that, it is not possible 
that a dead body can adopt a living one as a son because it is impossible that it 
could have a son in reality while it is dead. It is also impossible that a young 
person may adopt a very old man as a son. In the same way he cannot adopt a 
calf or a young camel as a son. There is no similarity between our saying about 
Zayd that he adopts somebody, or our other statement that he exalts and 
respects him, because of that it is possible for one of us to respect one whom he 
cannot adopt as a son. It would be intended by that he treats him in the same 
manner as a son in educating, special association and rules which are related to 
the son and the father. That is impossible to believe, regarding the Eternal one. 
Therefore how could(be said that He adopted him as son? 
However, this argument requires regarding each one of the prophets, that he be 
His son in terms of adoption. There will be no distinction for Christ with 
anything which the others do not have. The human being sometimes associates 
somebody as brother as he adopts another in terms of respect and what is 
similar to brotherhood in reality. So there is no difference between one who 
said that He adopts some according to this meaning, and between others who 
say that He takes brotherhood with the other. Since it is invalid, it confirms 
that their doctrine that He is Father and has a Son, is not possible according to 
this aspect. 
On the other hand, those who maintained: that since it is correct to say that 
Abraham is a friend of God, so why is it not correct to say that Christ is His 
27. Such doctrine is attributed toward Photinus, Paul of Somosata and Paul 
al-Masisi, see Cheikho, Trois Traites, P. 87, and Vingt Traites, P. 36. 
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son not through the reality of sonship, but in terms of honour? Our venerable 
scholar Abt Ali said: The mentioning of khalil (friend) with God is possible 
about Abraham in reality, because khullah (friendship) is taken from Istifä a 
(specially chosen) and Ikhtisäs (special association). It is said about a human 
being that he is a friend of the other when he associated him with a special 
Characteristic with which he does not associate anybody else. So since He set 
Abraham apart through giving him revelation and giving him honour in a way in 
which He did not distinguish anybody else in his time, it is possible that he may 
be called "Friend of God". So he names himself "Friend of God". 
This analogy requires that every prophet would be characterised by being friend 
of God, because each one of them was characterised by inspiration and honour 
which was absent from other people. Because of that our prophet said: "If I 
was going to take a friend, then I would have taken Abü Bakr as a friend, but 
your master is a friend of God so he named or called himself friend of God. He 
refrained from taking anyone among his community as a friend because he 
encompassed them all in his communication and explanation of the mission. 
Therefore it was not possible to give a special place to one of them in that way 
because the special character which God had given him, apart from the rest of 
the people of his time, to convey the message. Furthermore, He had 
distinguished Abraham with that, and it became a nickname for him which is 
possible in terms of the usage of the name. Do you not understand that the 
Qu? in had characterised by this use of names Qu? än, although its significance 
can be applied also to other (books). Moses was distinguished in that he was a 
person addressed by God, although God has spoken to the angels. It is more 
appropriate than giving khalil the meaning of love or necessity, because that 
will hardly apply in both (God and Abraham). So it is a metaphorical expression. 
In terms of that, the lover distinguishes his sweetheart by that which he does 
not distinguish somebody else. The needy person needs what is needed, as a 
khalil needs a friend whom he has adopted as a friend. Because of that it will 
hardly apply to both cases so it could not be said that everybody whom he loves 
is His friend, unless He distinguished him through His prophethood and other 
things which do not characterise someone else. 
They might ask: Is; 'not as the poet said - 
If a friend comes one day to see him to ask for something, he will say my 
wealth will not be absent (from you) or prohibited (to you). 
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So he characterised him through this need. 
The lexicographers explained that if the meaning khalil is need/needed, then it 
is taken from khallah with the fatha on the khä. If its meaning is love, then it 
is taken from khullah with dam ma on the khä. So why cannot there be a literal 
meaning in both? 
The answer is that, we did not disapprove its application to these two matters. 
We only claimed that it was a metaphor not that, if it was its real meaning, it 
would disprove our opinion. This is because it is required that Abraham was 
characterised by being a friend of God either because he showed what no one 
else could show of, his need through his devotion to God in that period of time, 
or he showed a love of God which he did not show for anyone else, or he was 
distinguished by Him in a way nobody else was characterised. Then the name 
became a proper noun for him. It is not possible to say the same with regard to 
sonship, because the real meaning of the son is that it must be the offspring of 
the Father, existing from his sperm. It cannot be imagined about God. It is 
required that it is impossible that Christ may be characterised as Son of God in 
the terms of Abraham who was described as a friend of God. 
Abt ýJthmän al-Jähiz28 replied and said that Abraham was not friend because 
of a friendship between him and God because friendship, brotherhood and 
sincerity are excluded from God. He (Abraham) was friend through friendship 
which he caused to enter himself and his state, because he showed his need 
10b 
through his devotion, to God, which no one experienced before him, through his 
being thrown into the fire, through his attempt to sacrifice his own son, 
28. Abil luthmän 'Amr b. bahr al-Jähiz was one of the greatest Arabic authors 
of all time. He was a Mu'ttizili and politico-religious polemiý; st. Born at 
Basra about 160 AH/776 AD. He belonged to Bari Muftazili group. He 
stayed for a long time in Baghdad and won the compliments of ai-Mämün. 
He died in 255 AH/868-9AD. 
His encyclopedic knowledge is amazing. J. Finkel mentions that Risäla Fi 
al-Radd 4alä al-Nisärä was written at the express wish of the court, 
because he had been in close association with the Christians. According 
to J. Finkel, although this work is merely a propagandist pamphlet, no 
other work goes so directly to the vital feathers of the problems, no work 
has such a potentially deadly effect. 
E. I. 2 vol. II, PP. 385-7. 
J. Finkel, A Risäla of al-Jähiz, J. A. O. S. Vol. XLVII, P. 316. 
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through his giving away his property as a charity, through the way his people 
treated him, through his renunciation of his parents in life and death and 
through his leaving his homeland and emigration to another country and resting- 
place, so he became through these hardships friend of God. God brought him 
into relationship with Himself and named him His friend among the prophets as 
the Kaaba is called temple of God among the other temples, as the people of 
Mecca are called people of God among all the people in other countries, and as 
the she-camel of Sälh is called the she-camel of God. The same is the case for 
everything that God has magnified whether from good or evil or reward and 
punishment. Similarly the Arabs say, "leave him in the curse of God and His 
fire", as He said, the Qur'än is the Book of God and al-Muharram is the month 
of God. As it was said about Hamza that he was the lion of God and about 
Khßlid that he was the sword of God. For this reason Christ was described as 
Spirit of God, because the souls are created through the sperm (seed) of men, 
when it is put in the womb of woman as is usually the case. God created in the 
womb of Mary a spirit and body in a miraculous way. Because of that 
distinction, Christ was called Spirit of God. 
29 That cannot be applied to 
sonship, because it is well known by everyone of us that if each one of us is 
compassionate to a young puppy, and then looked after it, it is incorrect to call 
it a son and he cannot associate it to himself as a father. On the other hand, if 
he adopts a baby, and then looks of ter him, it is possible to call him a son, 
because it is similar to his own son and a similar (person) could be born to 
him. 30 Since it is not possible (to use the term Son) for someone who has body 
like another but would not be (in any way) similar to a son, if he had a son, it 
would be even more appropriate that such a thing could not be said with regard 
to God. 
They might argue: Why is it not possible to say about Christ that He is Son of 
29. From the beginning of the paragraph, up to this sentence, 'Abd-al-Jabbär 
has quoted this reference from al-Raddalä. al-Nasärä by al-Jähiz. It 
seems that he has taken the whole source of information regarding the 
explanation of khalil and khullah from al-Radd, but with changes and 
leaving a few lines and adding few sentences. It is obvious that while 
dictating this chapter he had a copy of al-Radd'alä al-Nasärä. For details 
- see J hiz al-Radd 'alä al-Nasärä, PP. 30-32. 
30. This is another reference from al-Radd 'alä al-Nasärä P. 30 without 
mentioning the source. It is quite strange that the argument stated by 
'Abd al-Jabbär, is the original argument of al-Nazzäm against the 
Christians as al-Jähiz mentioned it and then criticised it. But 'Abd al- 





God because He distinguished Him and created Him without a man as father? 
The answer is that: The same is the case with regard to Adam because He 
created him without a man as father and a woman as mother. 
They might argue: He distinguished Christ with an upbringing with which He 
did not distinguish anyone else. Therefore it is possible to describe Christ as 
His Son. 
The answer is: It exists in all of the prophets, all of them were brought up by 
God, in the sense that He provided them with the means of subsistence and fed 
them. Because the concept of taking on the task of nursing and giving them 
food and drink could not correctly apply to God with regard to anyone. Christ 
is not excluded from the fact that it was his own mother who looked after him 
like rest of the people. If it was applied to God Adam would be the most 
appropriate case, because He distinguished him by the fact that He created him 
in His heaven and dispensed with him being brought up by mother and He settled 
him in His garden. So all these facts are more amazing with regard to Adam. 
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If it is possible to say that Christ is His Son, then that would be more 
appropriate in the case of Adam. All these will invalidate what they are 
depending upon. 
Our venerable scholars explained that sonship cannot be applied in reality 
except to who is begotten by him on the basis of reason. It could not be used 
metaphorically with regard to someone who could take the place of his son, by 
virtue of the fact that he is a human being. They (further) expressed that the 
method of metaphor cannot be applied to the Eternal. If the metaphor could be 
used analogically, it would be incorrect in this place, and no advantage can be 
gained from it. So how is it possible when we know very well that the metaphor 
cannot be used analogically? They have explained that if one of our youth said 
to an old man, "My son, and oh my little son", it is quite reprehensible, although 
he is from the same species, because it is incorrect that he could give birth to 
such an old man. They (further) explained that one of us cannot say of a beast 
31. This argument against the Christians is taken from al-Radd 1a1ä-al-Nasärä 
by a1-Jähiz (pp. 32-3). But this time tAbd al-Jabbär has presented the 
summary of the argument in his own words not the exact words of al- 
J4iz as he usually does. 
Si 
that it is his son, nor of inorganic bodies. The dissimilarity of the Eternal with 
physical bodies is more intense than the dissimilarity of one of us with a beast 
or an inorganic thing. The former is dissimilar with regard to the essence and 
latter is dissimilar with regard to attributes. So it is more appropriate that it 
should not be applied with regard to Him. 
By depending upon what is said in the Gospel, "I am ascending to my Father" 
32 
and upon Christ describing himself as His Son and God as Father, and upon 
Christ asking his disciples to say in their prayers, 
"Our Father, who art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name", 
33 
and God's saying to 
David, 
"A Son will be born to you, who will be named My Son and I would be named His 
Father ", 34 (by depending on all this), they argue that it is necessary that it 
would be a decision from God who ordered us to name him by it and God should 
be worshipped through him (Christ), even though this name (Son of God) is not 
well-known in classical Arabic as your doctrine of the revealed names of God. 
This is wrong, because what they mentioned its position is like isolated reports 
(akhbär ahäd) insofar as we do not know about its authenticity. Therefore it is 
not possible to adhere to it and be absolute about its authenticity. 
It is reported from the Torah, the Gospels and the Book of Psalms that God 
said, "Thus says the Lord, Israel is my first born (Ex. 4: 22) He is the first of my 
creatures whom I adopted him as son. 
35 
That requires that Jacob would be Son of God. If it is conceded then it is 
correct that God would be a grandfather of Joseph. If it is possible to say that, 
then it is possible that He would be paternal and maternal Uncle through the 
aspect of love and respect and then it would be correct for Him to be a 
companion and friend. It is invalid because if it requires honouring Christ 
through a description, then it also requires that the Eternal would be created 
through describing Him in terms which require imperfection. How is it possible 
to say that He is Father of Christ? It is incorrect to say that He is uncle of the 
3Z. John. 20: 17 - 
33. Matt. 6: 9 - 
34. It seems a reference from the Bible, but it does not exist in the Bible. 
35. The second line does not exist in the Bible. 
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Children of the disciples or cousin in terms of the fact that Christ said to his 
disciples: "You are my brothers". 
36 
How it is possible to say that, while God has denied this phrase of (Jews and 
Christians in the Qur)än) who said: "We are the sons of God and His beloved one" 
(5: 18). He also denied the doctrine of the Arabs when they assumed that the 
angels were His daughters. 
37 He denied that. If it was not impossible to be 
used as a name and understood of Him, he would not have denied it. 
They might argue: If that was correct in the Torah or the Gospel, would it have 
been a correct deduction. 
38 
The answer is: We have no knowledge about this use of language, so we are not 
forced to admit its interpretation. It is only necessary that we know that it is 
impossible for God to adopt sons and it is impossible for us to discuss what is 
meant by that or similar things in their argument. When we became aware of 
that, we interpreted what is reported from the Torah and the Gospel, that, if it 
was correct, then its meaning in the sentence is different from sonship. It is 
possible that in their language, it might be permissible and it might mean that 
He is Eternal, Deity and Lord, although that would be impossible in our 
language. 
Languages have different conditions with regard to that. Therefore we 
maintain that whoever is going to translate one language to another must be 
well-versed about what is possible to say about God and what is impossible from 
the aspect of reason. He must be fully aware about their real meaning and 
metaphorical usage because one word sometimes is used in its literal meaning 
for one thing and as a metaphor for another, and he must know what may be put 
in their place in the second language which may be used in its real meaning, not 
in metaphor. The one who translated a metaphor from the first language into 
something which only has a real meaning in the second language, has made a 
mistake. There is no doubt that in these books the metaphors are something 
36. According to the New Testament, Christ said: "And stretching out his 
hand towards his disciples he said, "Here are my mother and my brothers, 
For Whoever does the will of my Father in heaven is my brother and 
sister, and mother. Matt. 12: 49-50. 
37. See Qu? än when it says: "What has your Lord favoured you with sons and 
taken to Himself from the angels females". (17: 40). 
38. For Christian viewpoint, see Sharh al-'Agida al-Nasranyya, (Cheikho, 
Vingt Troites, P. 5). 
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similar to the not clearly intelligible passages in the Quroan (mutashäbihät). It 
is known that when many of the commentators interpret Arabic through Persian 
they are mistaken in their method, either through the ignorance of the meaning 
from the aspect of reason or language. 
It is reported that it is in the Gospel: "I am ascending to my Father and your 
Father" (John 20: 17). This would require Him being their Father as well as His 
Father. It is said that the correct version is that: "I am ascending to my God 
and your God. " (John 20: 17). The mistake occurred in the quotation of the 
words and the change the alif for rä. 
39 (i. e. uI for uJ ). 
They might argue: When it is conceded according to you that God proclaims 
that Christ is His Word and His Spirit, why do you not allow that He can say in 
the Gospel that He is His Son. 40 I 
The answer is: Our venerable scholar Abü 'Ali said: The purpose behind 
characterising Christ, as the Word of God is that people can get guidance 
through him as their guidance through the Kalima (Word). The meaning of our 
phrase that he is the Spirit of God is that people live through him in their 
religion as they are living through their own souls that exist in their bodies. 
That is an extension and comparison of it with the kalima (word), which is 
evidence and with the spirit, which those of U4 who are alive need. It is just 
like speech which describes that which leads as a light and a healing, in terms 
of truth which would be known through it, just as the path is known through the 
light and in terms of that the salvation in religion which occurs through it, just 
as the healing occurs through the medicine. It is not necessary that, when a 
word is permitted in the usage in different places, it would have been allowed in 
another place without any evidence, because of that we could not say that 
Christ is Son of God, by analogy of our phrase that He is Spirit of God and His 
Word. In the same way it is said that Gabriel is the spirit and it is not said that 
he is the son. There is no difference between those who asked us to apply the 
word son, to him in the terms of us characterising him by the fact that he is 
spirit and between our demands that he would be called father and brother of 
God through analogy of that, because the meanings of all these in their reality 
39. For this argument, see Apology of Timothy I. P. 156. 
40. Elias of Nisibis has applied this argument and referred to the Gospel. (See 
Cheikho, Trois Traites, P. 35) 
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are not possible with regard to God, nor are the aspects, by which it could be 
said metaphorically that a human being can be a son of someone else, possible 
about God as we mentioned before. So the claim about that is invalid. 
No one can say: Why did not you concede that God adopted him as son 
according to the aspect of mercy, insofar as nobody could look after him? (The 
reason for that) is that would require that Adam would be His son and it would 
also be necessary in the case of the angels who have no father that they would 
be the children of God. It can be said about a person who took pity on another 
and adopted him as son that he can be called his father because he treated him 
as son in the same manner. These meanings are impossible with regard to God. 
We have explained (before) that the real meaning of friendship is possible with 
regard to Abraham, in terms of Him distinguishing him and trusting him with 
His revelation. It is quite right (to say) that about the rest of the prophets even 
though mostly it is used with regard to Abraham. It is not possible to say that 
about the believers because He did not characterise them with knowledge and 
revelation. Therefore all (these arguments) repudiate Christ being called the 
Son of God. 
As for their calling him the Word of God, it is incorrect in its real meaning, 
because the meaning of speech in its reality is arranged words. Christ had a 
physical body. Therefore he cannot be a speech. He was called Kalima (Word) 
' At. or God insofar as there was guidance through him and his pros-y e, s. 
, 'Abü 
'Uthmän (al-Jähiz) said: Christ was called Spirit as Gabriel is called Spirit 
of God and Holy Spirit in the same way as He named the Qur)än that when He 
said: "Even so we have revealed to thee a spirit of our bidding" (42: 52) and He 
said "He sends down the angels with the spirit of His command. " (16: 12). This 
phrase did not require that Gabriel or the Qu? än are sons of God, so in this way 
it does not require that with regard to Christ. As for the phrase of God, "So we 
breathed into her our Spirit" (66: 12), this should not be understood in its real 
meaning because it is impossible with regard to God. It is as His phrase about 
the story of Adam, "When I have shaped him and breathed My spirit in him, fall 
you down, bowing before him. " (14: 29). It does not require that he (Adam) 
would be His spirit in its real meaning or His son. The same is the case with 
Christ. All these (arguments) invalidate what we narrated from them about the 
Trinity and the rest of what they derived from that as their explanation of 
hypostases, as they have explained it, and their application of analogies in this 
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matter, because most of these are interpretations of the expression. What we 
mentioned before as evidence that God cannot be a physical body, repudiates 
most of their phrases and examples, because their external meaning would 
reflect that He was a body. Whoever considered all these (arguments) will 
understand the invalidity of the Mýj that they hold as doctrines and the 
examples which they depend on. So there is no need to pursue the matter in 
greater detail. 
3- Section ii LO 
Repudiation of their doctrine about Union and what is related to it. 
You should realise that what we are engaged in refuting is only what is 
reasonable about their doctrines in this chapter, not what is impossible to 
believe. We have narrated from them (their doctrines) in general, (now) we will 
indicate the invalidity of what comes within the bounds of reason and classify it 
as the discussion allows. 
Their doctrine about union involves several points: 
1. They may say that the Son is from the group of the hypostases that united 
with Christ. 
2. Or they may say that what united with him is the substance which has three 
hypostases. 
If they argue that the Son has united with him, then they must admit that the 
Son is a God who is creator, producer and agent or they must make God the 
Divine Creator, the Father whose Son is the Kalima (word) apart from the 
Father. 
Cj w I 
[Their doctrine (united with him) has many aspects: ] 
3. They may say that each is (in the same position) as it was, but the will of the 
Son is will of Christ or the will of Christ is His will or their wills are quite 
different from each other but what one wishes the other must wish, so that this 
is what we (the Christians) mean by union. 
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ýý, L a4JZ, 
If the essence of God and the essence of man; or the substance of both of them 
are as before; 
4. Or they may say that the union has required the removal of their essences 
from what they were before. 
************ 
Bearing in mind (all) that they would have to give (one of several expressions). 
1. They may say that He (the Son) was conjoined with Christ, ie, Christ became 
like a vessel for Him. 
This doctrine is reported from some of them. 
41 
2. They may say 
4Z that the Son mingled or merged him. 
3. They may say that the Son inhered (became incarnate) in Him, not he was 
conjoined with him. 
Those who hold the doctrine of inherence (incarnation) must maintain, 
a 
Either the Son inhered in all the parts of Christ; or the Son inhered part of him. 
************ 
These (doctrines) would apply whether they maintained that, 




or they both become one in reality - as has been reported concerning the 
majority of the Jacobites that two substances became one substance. 
************ 
Those who hold these doctrines is required to say: 
Either when He united with him, He would be united forever; 
Or that He unites with Him in certain circumstances. 
************ 
41. This is a Nestorian expression about incarnation. 
42. We read it an yaqülü. 
43. Here 'Abd al-Jabbär clearly using dhdt as a synonym for jawhar. This is 
not the way he treats it when he maintained that jawhar is a physical 
being. 
For detail see Chapter II, PP. 110-114. 
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In the same way, their doctrine about the death and crucifixion of Christ 
requires as they believe that: 
Either they may say: that He unites with him as he was; 
Or that He ceased to from being united with him. 
These are the main argument of the rational aspects about union. We shall 
explain the refutation of all these, then we shall repudiate their doctrine about 
the adoration of Christ and what is related to it. 
************ 
You must realise that the discussion of Christian doctrine shows that according 
to them that which united with the body of Christ is a divine being who is able 
to do what can only be done by God, because they rely on the view that divine 
action was manifested through him. So it is required that Son of God and His 
Word has united with him. If they maintained that the Son cannot do what God 
is characterised as having power to do, then this doctrine is impossible. That 
must be accepted by them or they must say that that which is united with the 
physical body of Christ is the Father Himself, and because of that it was 
possible for Divine action to be manifested through him. 
Their doctrine about the worship of Christ would require what we have 
mentioned through these two aspects, namely: 
1. That God united with him, so he is entitled to be worshipped from the aspect 
of his divinity not the aspect of his humanity. 
Z. The Son is the (hypostasis) which is united, but he is entitled to be 
worshipped in the same way as the Father. 
Their doctrine that Christ has two substances, divine and human nature, 
requires that that which is united with Christ is a God. They said that He is the 
Son or the Substance which consists of three hypostases that through which we 
repudiate their doctrine about the union, will repudiate both of these aspects. 
As for those who maintained that He has united with him in the sense of will, 
their doctrine will divide into three aspects. 
1. Their wills are different, but it is required that they both agree in will. 
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2. The will of the divine nature is same as the will of human nature. 
3. The will of human nature is the same as the will of divine nature. 
4- Section 
dý 
That the will of God (Qadim) is different from the will of Christ 
What indicates the invalidity of the first (argument) [Their wills are different 
but it is required that they both agree in will] is the fact that it is the 
possibility of each of two all powerful beings (ie. God (Qadim) and Christ 
(Messiah) for their will and wish to enable one of them to will the opposite of 
what the other wills. It is possible that one of them could dislike what the 
other wills, just as it would be impossible for them to have different motives 
for actions. There is no difference between those who maintained that there 
must be a concurrence of will of the God (Qadim) and Christ and between those 
who maintained that their motives must be in agreement. It is also required 
that their actions must concur so that the action of each of them may be 
possible for the other. We know that the refutation of that is through the same 
method as the refutation of their doctrine by the argument that every attribute 
which occurs for one of them must occur for the other in terms of eating, 
drinking and crucifixion etc. 
Furthermore, it is right of one who wills something that he should be one who 
knows about it or be virtually one who knows about it. [It is known that the God 
(Qadim) is a knower because of Himself. Who knows what would be in the 
future in terms of advantages and disadvantages while Christ also knows 
through a knowledge (given to him). ] As it is not required that he may know 
everything that God (Qa(1irn) knows, in the same way it is not required that he 
may will what God wills. 
Furthermore, it will involve Christ knowing everything which God (Qadim) 
knows. In the same way, it is not necessary that he may will everything which 
God wills. Furthermore, it is required that when God sent him as a prophet and 
he became Christ, he wished everything that God wished or he wished it in 
certain circumstances according to the will of God. It is impossible to accept 
the first statement because in this circumstance, God does not will everything 
which Christ wills because He wills matters which are His personal acts; 
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whereas the acts of men ('ibid) are subject to sequence (of time) in one 
circumstance after another. So how could it be said that Christ wished such 
things in all these situations? On the other hand if he wished such things 
subject to sequence (of time), in that case he would be wishing for something 
for himself only. So how could it be said that he is united in terms of union of 
will, even though both of their wills may have been united partially. 
Furthermore, this doctrine requires with regard to all of the prophets the same 
as their doctrine about Christ; that He would be united with all of them, and all 
of them would be His sons. (This is case) because Christ only agrees with Him 
in terms of will, by virtue of being a prophet and on the grounds that he has 
manifested miracles. That is also necessary for the rest of the prophets. But it 
is possible that there could be among the mukallaf44 (who is obligated to 
observe the precepts of the religion) someone who knows the welfare of the 
people and wishes another thing which God wishes in terms of acts of 
obedience. Therefore it is necessary that God would be united with him. 
However, according to them He was united with Him at his beginning of his life, 
although in that state, he did not concur with God in all of His acts of will. 
Therefore would not the same be possible for the rest of men who concur with 
Him in one will or special intentions. This refutes their special characterisation 
of Christ with what they have characterised. 
Furthermore, how could union through concurrence of will be necessary without 
concurrence of knowledge and perception of things where everyone who knows 
what He knows or realises what He realises must be united with God? If that 
(i. e. knowledge) is not necessary the same is the case with regard to will. 
5- Section , 
The invalidity of the doctrine of those who claimed that God has United with 
Christ, through the fact the will of the divine nature became the will of human 
nature. 
r 
44. Taklif is imposing a requisition or constraint upon any one, it requires an 
action in which there is difficulty and trouble. Technically it means the 
necessity which lies on the creatures of Allah to believe and act as He has 
revealed to them. On this definition, it applies only to things necessarily 
required and to things forbidden. According to Islamic teaching every 
sane human adult (ýägil, bäligh) is thus mukallaf. 
E. I., Vol. IV, P. 631. 
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What repudiates their doctrine that He has united with him, through the fact 
that the will of divine nature became the will of human nature, is that the 
evidence has indicated that God (Qadim) wills through a will without any 
limitation of location (Mahall:, y as we shall explain later on. It has become 
known that the physical body can only will, through a will that inheres in part of 
it. Since that is true, it is not possible that the will of God would be the will of 
Christ, through the fact that the divine will could not be in part of Christ. 
Similarly it is not possible to say that His act is the act of Christ, through the 
fact that it did not exist through him, because it is the requirement of an act 
that it will only be characterised by being the act of one who carries it out, 
through it occurring through him (agent). Similarly, the will can only be the 
will of the physical body through being in part of it. So anyone who allows the 
will of God (Qadim) to be the will of Christ, must concede that His action will 
be located in him. 
Furthermore, why did God's will become more appropriate to be the will of 
Christ than the will of the rest of bodies. When in fact He (only) associated it 
with Christ in the same way as He associates it with other bodies. That would 
require that all living creatures would will through His will and this is invalid, 
because this would mean that it would be impossible for God and men to will 
something repugnant as that is impossible for God. It would mean that it is also 
impossible to wish anything Contrary to what God wished and to dislike what He 
wished. The position would not differ about it, whenever God (Qadim) wished 
anything. 
Furthermore, if it is conceded that His will would be the will of him without it 
being located in any place, then it would be possible that their wills, knowledge 
and everything which characterise them, would refer to God. That requires the 
impossibility of one of them disliking whatever the other wishes, and knowing 
what the other does not know. (As a result of shared ignorance) it would 
require him being ignorant of what exist in hearts of any one of us. That would 
exclude Him from being the one who knows Himself. Likewise it would require 
Him to know about a thing without knowing about it (at the same time) as Zayd 
knew it and gAmr did not know it. It would require Him to be desiring and 
needy, because it is not possible that He would be subject to a knowledge which 
existed in our hearts without desire, through the fact that one of them (God and 
man) sometimes existed to the extent in which the other existed. The absolute 
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invalidity of that requires that the original base of the argument is invalid. 
Furthermore, this doctrine requires that He would be united with the rest of 
living persons and there would be no distinction for Christ. It is required in 
every situation that God would be united with the rest of the prophets, because 
their state (hä1) and the state of Christ are not different in anything which they 
have mentioned in this matter. 
6- Section (-a. )
The Invalidity of the doctrine of those who argued that He united with him 
through intermingling, conjunction and being unified in terms of a vessel 
(haykal) skeleton and a location 
ý What repudiates their doctrine of that God (Qadim) has united with Christ, 
through the will of Christ becoming will of God, is the fact that the will of 
Christ requires that it would be situated in part of Him (God). Otherwise it 
would not be situated in and characterised by him. What inheres in the heart 
45 
of Christ cannot be applied to God (Qadim), because that would have required 
that the rest of what inhered in him would have been subject to the same rule. 
In this way there would be the necessity of Him being ignorant through any 
ignorance if it existed in (Christ) heart and desiring, if it existed in (Christ) 
heart. It also requires His being an observer of what does exist in (Christ) heart 
and thoughtful and regretful. All of these are impossible for God. So it 
required to invalidate what they said about His will that it is His will. 
Furthermore, why should his will became more appropriate to be the will of any 
other person, by virtue of the fact that the relation of all these with God 
.. p 
(Qadim) is the same. This also requires everything that we mentioned before of 
the necessity of His being one who wishes evil things and willing and unwilling 
for one and the same thing. (For example) when Zayd wished it and tAmr did 
not 
45. Apparently galb means heart, or lump of flesh pertaining to it, but here 
'Abd al-Jabbär meant mind or secret thought, soul or intellect. 
For detail see E. W. Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, Vol. II PP. 2553-4 
(New edition). 
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wish it. It also requires the possibility of Him being knowing and ignorant at 
the same time, and whatever leads to that must be invalid. 
Furthermore, before Christ was born, created and was living, God would have 
been willing different affairs. It was known that it was impossible (to say) that 
He was willing through the will of Christ, because in these circumstances Christ 
did not exist as alive. 
Therefore, it is necessary that He would be willing through the will which had 
no location (mahall). It is impossible to say that He will wish through the will 
of another living person, because we are discussing what was before the 
creation of every living being (and) because He would have to will the creation 
of the first whom He created. In this situation His being willing through a will 
is required without any location (mahall). So it is required that He would be 
willing through a will without any location after the creation of the creature, 
because what required that in one circumstance, will require it in every 
circumstances, insofar as it is known that the relation of the causes of what 
requires it to be established will not change. However, this doctrine requires 
that He must be united with others besides in the same way as He is united with 
him, and all others would be His Sons as Christ is His son. In this way is the 
total repudiation of their doctrine. 
7- Section (a Z 3) 
The repudiation of the doctrine of these who claimed that God united with 
Christ, in the sense that He inhered in him. 
As for the doctrine of those who maintained that He united with him through 
r 
mingling, cojoining and uniting with in the form of a human and in a special 
location, it is invalidated by what we pointed in the argument that God is 
neither substance nor physical body, because since that is confirmed about Him, 
and conjunction is only possible between the substances and physical bodies, 
how could it be said that God has mingled, coined and became united with him 
in this way? 
We have explained that such doctrine about Him, requires Him to be created 
and to be excluded from being an Eternal deity. It requires the impossibility of 
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the occurrence of God in bodies. Nobody can say that He was cöjoined with him 
and mingled with him in a way that contradicted what they understood about 
the conjunction of the substances. So this doctrine will not lead to what you 
i. e. (Christians) mentioned, because conjunction is only understood on this basis. 
It is only possible with regard to the substances. There is no difference 
ri between those who affirmed Him as being coboined to Christ according to an 
unreasonable way and between those who affirmed Him as tangible, composed 
and compounded with him and being part of him in an unreasonable way. 
An opponent might argue: 
Do you not say that God is in every place not through the Conjunction? So 
concede it in the same as we argued. 
The answer is: 
We say in a metaphorical way and we mean by it that He is the organizer 
(mudabbir) everywhere and knows about every place and what occurs in it as we 
mentioned before. What we intended by using this expression is reasonable, and 
the possibility of using this word for it in a metaphorical sense is intelligible. It 
is not the case as you said, because you made Him conjoined to him in its real 
meaning and characterised Him with the body of Christ according to this point 
of view and not something else. Then You contradicted it through your doctrine 
ri that He does not conjoin with him in the same way as the conjunction of 
substances. It is a rejection of what has been affirmed. 
Furthermore, if it is possible that He is coined to Christ, then why is it not 
possible that He is coined to the rest of the prophets and others? Why do you 
distinguish Christ in that He united with him apart from others? Why do you 
x 
not concede that He might unite with him on some occasions and He conjoined 
r 
with him on some occasions? Why do you not concede that He cojoined with 
inorganic bodies and united with them? What merit does Christ have in this 
Union, in view of the f act that his condition and the condition of the rest of the 
bodies are same with regard to God. 
An opponent might argue: 
I affirmed Him united with him apart from the rest of the bodies, because 
divine actions were shown through him and by him. 
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The answer is: 
Then concede that He (God) would be united with the rest of the prophets for 
the same reason. Concede also that He would cease to be united with him when 
the miracles do not appear from him. Furthermore, the showing of the miracles 
through him does not indicate that He occupied him through conjunction or 
something else, because God is able to bring about miracles, even though He is 
without any location. Furthermore, why did it become more appropriate for 
Him to be united with Christ for this reason, than being united with the body 
that God raised through Christ. Indeed this statement would be more 
appropriate, because that is where the action occurred not in Christ. Otherwise 
if its occurrence is possible without unions with Him (ie., the dead or blind) then 
its occurrence should be possible without the union with Christ. In fact it is 
possible without God's Union with anything. In this argument is a refutation of 
this doctrine. 
n Furthermore, it is required that He could be coljoined either to all parts of 
Christ or to some of them. His being cc joined is not applicable to all of his 
parts. That would require that God is of many parts but it is proved (beyond 
doubt) by the evidence that He is one. (Being c 
joined to many parts) would 
Cl iT'- 
require God to be in many locations on one occasion. It is impossible in every 
case where conjunction might be possible. If it was not for that, then it would 
be possible for a body to be in two places. On the other hand, if He coljoined 
some of his parts, then it would require that He was united with part and this 
part would have a special particularization which the others did not have. That 
would mean, that part is a thing by which the miracles appeared, not Christ, 
consequently this doctrine is repudiated. So through all these arguments the 
invalidity of their doctrine about the union according to this point of view is 
correct. 
8- Section 1) !' 
The invalidity of the doctrine of Jacobites that Christ has a divine nature and a 
human nature, which both united and became one nature. 
As for the doctrine, that God has united with Christ, ie. inhered in him, it is 
invalid through many aspects. One of them is: that everything which inhered in 
a thing and existed there, after it had not been in it previously, must be one of 
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the two categories: either it existed in it through being created like the 
existence of accident in the substance, or it transferred to it as the transfer of 
one substance that became ccgoined to another. It could only be understood 
through these two aspects, because we have indicated that the transfer is 
impossible about a thing which has no limitation. It is impossible to say that He 
transfers and inheres in Christ, for that if God (Qadim) occurred in Christ 
through transference that would require that He was a substance. If God 
existed in him through the fact that He inhered in him and occurred (hadatha) in 
him like the inherence of the accident (in a substance), this would require that 
God was created. However if transference is impossible for Him, then it is 
more impossible to speak about His createdness, because the creation of 
something already existing is more impossible than the transfer of a thing which 
has no substance. 
They might argue: 
Is it not according to your venerable scholar Abü `Ali that speech exists on the 
tablet or tongue without having been transferred to from another place or 
without having been created. This is a rational category which You have 
ignored. So you must allow God (Qadim) to unite with Christ according to this 
point of view. You cannot reject it merely, because you do not hold it, and that 
does not stop this argument from being a rational argument. 
The answer is: 
According to Abü 'Ali speech can only take place in a location (mal}all). He 
maintained that it occurs in a ma'nä (element which carries an attribute) which 
is a voice, writing or memory of it. If God (Qadim) inheres in Christ on this 
basis, then it would be impossible that He is free from location (mahall). He 
would only exist in him because of a mafnä which occurs with it. However, 
everything which exists in something else, after it has not existed in it 
previously, must be of two categories. 
1. The first is that it existed before it was not in it. Then it went into it. 
Z. The other is that it did not exist before at all. That it was caused to be in 
.. it. It was known that God (Qadim) existed before His union with Christ. 
Whatever is like that it would be impossible for it to occur in something without 
a ma'nä which caused (it to occur in it) like speech according to Abü 'Ali. 
6' 
However, if it occurs in something else, not because of ma'nä which occurs, 
that is impossible. As we explained before it is impossible to say that it inheres 
in it, because of a reason in which that would be required and therefore it would 
dispense with a marnä because of which it inheres in it. We have already 
explained this doctrine in detail. 
They might argue: 
We say that He united with him, not on the basis of incarnation and not by the 
means of conjunction. So our doctrine is not involved in what you have 
mentioned. Granted that we said that He inhered in him, how is it forced upon 
us to admit that we treated it in the manner of inherence of the accident in 
location (mahall). Why is it not possible for us to affirm Him as inhering in him 
according to a different reason (wajh). So our doctrine is not repudiated as you 
mentioned it. 
The answer is: 
A thing existing in something else can only be established in itself on a rational 
basis. Similarly every doctrine that affirms what is irrational must be invalid. 
Likewise the doctrine of the existence of a thing in something else on an 
irrational basis (wajh lä yu'gal) must be invalid. It is already known that it is 
impossible for a thing to be understood to exist in something else, except if the 
other thing is like a container (zarf) for it or conjoining to it or inhering in it or 
its spatiality (h" ayyiz) being the spatiality of the other. What our venerable 
scholar Abt 'All put forward about speech comes within this category, because 
he affirms that it inheres in location (mahall) even though he maintained that it 
takes place in it not through creation. Since that is established, what we said 
already; that it is only reasonable for one thing to exist in another on this basis, 
is possible. 
They might argue: 
Could not the thing take place in time, without anything being cojoined to it or 
inhering in it. This is a rational argument outside the two categories which you 
mentioned. 
The answer is: 
In reality, the thing that occurs in time, has no relation with it. We only say 
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that it existed in it through a maýnä that it occurred with' it. Even though its 
existence and its occurrence was not possible in it. For that reason it is said 
concerning its time that it occurred in terms of us making it be of the same 
time as it. As we say, that the coming of Zayd existed when the sun was rising. 
Sometimes we say, that rising of the sun occurred on the occasion of the 
coming of Zayd, according to the different situation of whom we are 
addressing. So this category has no effect for what they said about the union of 
God with Christ. Therefore we do not let it come into the discussion of the 
arguments and we limit that argument to these two categories which we have 
mentioned. 
What shows the soundness of our comments, is that everything which existed in 
something else, would either be with it in its location or in another location 
n 
which was conjoined to it. So whatever took place with it through conjunction 
could only be a substance as we have mentioned before. What took place in its 
location, would only be that which inheres. To exclude a thing which exists in 
something else, from these two categories is irrational. There is no difference 
between those who claimed a third category (for that) and between those who 
claimed a fourth or fifth for it. If God was in union with Christ and it is not 
possible that He was coined with him, then He must inhere in him and become 
in his location. On the basis of what we established, anything else would be 
irrational. 
They might argue: 
It is possible that an accident may exist with other another accident only 
according to these two reasons. 
The answer is: 
One of them would not exist in the other. They would both exist in something 
else. Therefore it has no relation to what we have mentioned. If it had a 
relation with it, it would not effect it, because when both of them existed in 
one location, then the spatiality for one of them is spatiality for the other. 
They might argue: 
Why do you not concede that He did unite with Christ, not according to this 
1. We have dropped the word "innihü" from translation because it has no 
meaning in the context. 
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reason, but in the same way as a picture of human being appears in a polished 
mirror when it is looked into, 
46 
or appearance of the engraving of a seal in clay 
in which it has been stamped. It is a rational basis that does not refer to 
inherence and conjunction. 
The answer is: 
We do not maintain that a picture of a human being appears in the mirror or is 
printed in it or shows its likeness, because if it is printed in it that which 
printed must be a substance or an accident. It is known, that sometimes there 
is seen in the mirror (a reflection) which is bigger than (the actual object 
reflected), and that which is big cannot occur in that which is small. How can 
that be said when a man sees his face in the mirror according to its extended 
shape or he sees someone else's face without their being any difference (in the 
actual nature of the mirror)? Therefore why should it follow the same course if 
what he sees in it is not really his face? How can it be compared with the 
shadow of a man which may occur? The shadow is nothing more than the 
blocking of the sun's rays. Consequently it differs according to what it has 
blocked of the sun's rays. Thus it blocks much during the beginning of the day 
and a little around noon and sometimes it has no shadow at all before noon. (In 
one way) it might be possible (to say) that what he saw in the mirror was his 
face in reality, but he looked at it through the mirror, and that mirror became 
an instrument for him. In terms of that it is impossible that his face would be 
facing his eye. It needed something else by which his face would be facing it 
and that would become instrument to his eye. So we see that one of us rushes 
to use the mirror, when he intends to know the form of his own face, just as he 
rushes to use his eye to see the things which can be seen. When there is no 
fixed picture in the mirror, it is impossible to use their analogy of it with 
regard to union and the Trinity. 
As far as the appearance of the engraving of a seal in clay, there is an accident 
which occurred in it and the engraving of a seal is an impression in it. This 
happens if the engraving of a seal encounters a soft body in which it sinks and 
there will be an impression of it, just as parts of it are depressed and other 
parts of it raised. So accidents whose state (häl) differ from the seal occur in 
46. The analogy criticised here by 'Abd a1-Jabbär is a Jacobites expression as 
mentioned by Yahyä b. 'Adi and al-Shahristäni. See also Chapter I, P. 105. 
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the engraving. If God has united with Christ, according to this basis, He must 
be inhering in him or it is necessary that something else inheres in him. Since 
according to them the second argument is incorrect, the first is confirmed. 
It is only possible to speak about the union as we have mentioned it, and to 
affirm the third aspect is incorrect and irrational. It is impossible to say that 
He inheres in him without (it being) according to a rational aspect of inherence, 
namely that he comes within his spatiality. However, that47 is irrational as we 
mentioned before. Therefore the doctrine of those who claimed that He united 
with him not according to these two aspects and that that was still rational is 
(demonstrated to be) invalid. 
They might argue: 
Since the being of God exists without any location (mahall), and without the 
aspect by which substance and accident exist, allow us to posit that His being 
exists in Christ without that being through conjunction and inherence. 
The answer is: 
When we affirmed Him existing, we did not exclude Him from the reality of 
existents, we only denied Him an attribute which is separate from existence and 
n that is, that His being in cc oining or inhering, because of proof of the 
impossibility of that. Your doctrine is not like that, because you affirmed that 
He is in something else not according to the reason which is rational as being a 
thing in something else. Therefore you must affirm Him inhering in him or 
conjoining to him. Since both doctrines are invalid, their doctrine about the 
union is invalid. 
The other thing which repudiates their doctrine that He has united in the sense 
that He has inhered in him, is that everything which exists without any location 
(mahall), cannot exist in a location. It indicates that, when a substance cannot 
inhere in a location, it would be impossible in every way. When inherence of 
the accident in a location is possible, it requires its being inherent in a location 
in every situation. So their doctrine, that He inhered in Christ after He had not 
been inhering in Him, would be invalid. 
47. We read lakin instead of liana. 
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They might argue: 
Why is His inherence in him not conceded after he had not inhered in him? 
Does it contradict the rest of the accidents? 
The answer is: 
If He inheres in him, it must for one of two reasons, either His inherence is 
required in him or .-it 
is possible also and then the opposite would be possible. 
It is impossible to say that it is required in him, because when God was living 
(prior to Christ's existence) he did not inhere in the body of Christ. 
_ 
Then 
according to them (later when Christ's body came into existence) He inhered in 
it and Christ attribute (ie. of Divinity) became one and the same (as God's). 
However, since Christ came into existence (bägi) and if it was possible for God 
to inhere in hire, God would have to become subject to the substance (jawhar) 
which, in the state of Christ existence, pertained in only one aspect 'iha) 
despite the fact that God could exist with that aspect. 
However, it is not possible that He should inhere in Christ while there was the 
possibility of Him not inhering because that would require Him to be inhering in 
him by virtue of an element (within God) which demanded this (ma'nä). That is 
not the doctrine of the Christians. They maintained that God united with 
Christ and they were two substances and two separate natures, then they 
became one person which encompassed both. They do not affirm a third fact. 
(If there was the possibility of the ma'na referred to above) that mAia would 
have to leave a relationship with God. That relationship with God would require 
that either the matnä inheres in God or it inheres in His location. It is 
impossible for the ma'nä to inhere in God because God cannot be a location for 
something else. That is totally impossible for Him. Nor is it possible for the 
ma'nä to inhere in God's location because it would be more appropriate to 
require it to exist in Him than to require other things to exist in Him. If that 
ma'n did not exist, either God would not exist or God would not become united 
with Christ (because there was no ma'C*iä in God which could give effect to 
that). There is no conceivable ma4nä (by which) God could become united with 
7Z 
the body of Christ except that which we have discussed (and rejected). 
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They cannot say that He exists in him, by reason of Christ's life and when 
Christ's life does not exist, God ceases to inhere in Christ, because life in 
Christ is the same as in anybody else. Therefore, if it is by reason of life that 
He inheres in him they would have to concede that He inhered in others. 
They cannot use that argument that he (Christ) is like a voice in relationship to 
speech according to our venerable scholar Abi `Ali, because according to Abu 
'Ali voice is only possible with regard to him by virtue of the reasonable and 
accepted argument of the need of his speech for voice. They cannot provide 
any category which God would need it for. 
The other argument which invalidates this doctrine is that if God inheres in 
mankind, it would require that which is inhered in has an effect which did not 
exist before: either it becomes separate from other things through the 
realisation (of the inherence) or a state occurs; 
which did not exist before, as we 
say, in the rest of the ma'am which inhere (in mankind). 
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They might argue: 
An effect which does occur in that which is inhered (muhall) in it, is that it 
becomes one of those things from which divine action is possible and that was 
not the case before. 
The answer is: 
This would require that at (the moment of the) existence (of the union) (by 
virtue of) God being power that which is inhered in becomes capable (of doing) 
that which it would not (ordinarily) be capable of and certain things are possible 
for it which were not possible before. Since that is invalid the (whole) doctrine 
is invalidated. 
48. Here 'tAbd al-Jabbär refuted the Christian doctrine through the argument 
of ma nL As a matter of fact it is pure Muýtazilite argument presented 
against the Kullabiyya. But 4Abd a1-Jabbar applied it wrongly against the 
Christians. It can be said that according to 'Abd al-Jabbär Christians and 
Kulläbiyya are in same category, so he could not justify in his 
argumentation. 
49. Here 4Abd al-Jabbär seems to declare a doctrine that the man has a manä 
that carry the cif ät. 
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On the other hand, if God inheres in Christ, He could only inhere in him in 
terms which are (already established as) invalid because everything that has 
occurred in something else can only inhere in it through transference or through 
the invalidation of that by which it would have existed. When that thing is one 
of the things which cannot be transferred and is one of the things which remain 
(constant), it would only be separate from that which is inhered in by abolishing 
it or by abolishing what it needs. If God inheres in mankind, - and it is known 
that mankind may die or be wiped out and so God must be excluded from 
inhering in mankind - God would be required not to be separate from man 
except by contradiction which would deny that or by the abolition of what man 
needs, so that it would be contradicted through that or else he would have to 
stop existing in him through the abolition of what he needs, even though it did 
not exist, as in the case of (sound) in Abii Wi's theory of speech. All that is 
invalid, because it requires that He would be non-existent or that he had to 
have a maýnä that exist in humanity. 
They might argue: 
If God may inhere in mankind, and it is true that He may separate from it 
because He does not need what you mentioned to be separate from it, He must 
ý 
be separate from it in the circumstance (häl) of the possibility for His being 
separate from it. 
The answer is: 
It is known that God can inhere in the body of man in a circumstance in which 
man is living, not a circumstance in which it is possible that man is not living. 
Therefore, it is a possibility of His existing in him in such a circumstance, when 
it is possible that he may not exist. It requires that He may not be separate 
from him except through the aspects what we mentioned. 
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If God inheres in man, lie must inhere in one of his parts and lie would be a 
human being in reality as Mu4ammar50 said, or else they affirm the man is a 
visible body. Then their doctrine must have two aspects, either they say that 
He has inhered in his every part, although God is one, or He has inhered in one 
of his parts. Therefore, they affirm as many parts for God as man has, of which 
every part of Him (God) inheres in part of him (man). It cannot be said that 
every part of God has united with every parts of man, because that would 
require God having as many parts as the part of mankind, or the affirmation of 
many deities. Both of these are unsound. That is not as the Christians believe, 
because they maintained that He is one substance of three hypostases. They do 
not affirm for Him, many parts according to the parts of man. 
50. Mucammar b. 4Abbäd al-Sulami, a leading Mu"tazilite of the eight-ninth 
centuries. He was founder of a school of thought known as the 
Mueammariyya. He was a well known person among his contemporary 
colleagues and later authors. He born and brought up in Basra. He 
received his training there, and gained wide recognition among the leading 
theologians. Later on he moved to Baghdad. 
His influence on the Mu'tazilites can be deduced from the impressive list 
of his pupils. In addition, he is described as a very learned man who held 
independent views as an outstanding polemicist and a great seceder from 
Qadariyya. 
Ibn Murtadä asserts that Mulammar had been exposed to gnosticism and 
Zoroastrianism. A1-Sharistäni reports that he was under the influence of 
philisophers. 
In the theological sphere, Muammar was concerned with most issues 
related to the Uniqueness of God, His attributes, speech, bodies, will and 
accidents on which he had independent views and which he explained 
through his doctrine of ma'nä. While the Muttazilite in general maintain 
that God is the creator of bodies and accidents, Muammar maintained 
that God is the creator of bodies not of the accidents, which he considers 
as either natural or voluntary creations of bodies. 
The doctrine to which tAbd al-Jabbär is referring is that according to Mu_ 
Ammar atom 'uz) itself is not a body, but the eight atoms make up a 
body. As reported by al-Ash sari, accidents are not created by body. 
Mu'ammar maintained atoms are aggregated, accidents follow by 
necessity, the atoms produce them by necessity of their nature, each 
atom by itself, producing whatever accident resides in it. He died 
between 831-850 A. D. 
Zarkly, Al Aläm, vol. VII, P. 272, 
_Watt, 
Formative period of Islamic 
thought, PP. 190,232,239., Shahristäni, al-Milal, P. 89 Anwar G. Chejne, 
Mu mmar b. 4Abbäd al Sulami, M. W., Vol. LI (1961), PP. 311-320., al- 
Ash4ari, Magälät, P. 303. 
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It is also impossible to say that He inheres in one of the parts of Christ, while 
he is a man, because the evidence has indicated that a living human being is its 
totality not one part (only) as we shall point out later, because according to the 
Christians the way of union is that by he showed the divine actions. It was 
manifested through the totality of Christ not the one part of the heart. So it is 
impossible to relate the union with it. 
They cannot say that He unites with one of his parts, even though a human 
being is a totality (Collection of parts), because it is required to know its 
location and to differentiate between it and others and to show the divine 
action manifesting through it, not through the totality. It is also required that 
this part would be Christ, the powerful, active and adored one according to 
them. It could not be said that God has united with Christ, rather it would be 
required to say that he has united with one of his parts. How is it possible that 
He unites with one of his parts not the other? Why did one of his parts become 
more appropriate than the other? 
None of them can say that He inheres in one of his parts while the totality of 
Christ is characterised through it, as their argument about the ma`äni which are 
required to be applied to the whole. It is because the union which they are 
affirming is only referring to the existence of God in man, not that they are 
affirming a state (hä1) for man that is required for God. It is required that its 
application should be limited to his location and it will separate from what we 
say about the ma'äni that are related to the whole. 
They cannot say that God is one (thing) and (sometimes) unites with all the 
parts of Christ, because everything which inheres in another thing, cannot 
inhere in them, unless one and the same maanä inheres in many locations 
without requiring the existence of locations which are in concurrence with each 
other. According to us the inherence of concurrence is possible in two locations 
because their concurrence is required because its class Jins would require their 
concurrence and would prevent it being in one place. That is impossible with 
regard to God. So it is required that He must be like the rest of the accidents 
whose inherence would only possible if he inhered in something else, which was 
in one location. 
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They might argue: 
Is it not possible to be similar to the doctrine of Abtt 
'Ali, who allows the 
inherence of the speech in many locations, although it has one ma'n ? 
Therefore concede that a similar kind of inherence takes place when God 
inheres in all the parts of man. 
51 
The answer is: 
What you mentioned is not one of our doctrines. The evidence demonstrates the 
opposite. The argument by which we repudiate it is the same argument as we 
repudiate this doctrine (of yours) and to use it as an objection (to our theory) is 
not possible. 
SZ Furthermore, according to Abü 'Ali (this doctrine) was possible 
with regard to speech, because he affirmed that speech alone existed in more 
than one location. That is impossible with regard to God's inherence (in man). 
So the comparison with it is invalid. 
They might argue according to the first aspect: 
Is it not possible that all parts of man are one man? So why is it not possible 
that part of God is in every part of man and its totality is one God? 
The answer is: 
It is possible only to say that about a human being, because he becomes living 
through the. life that needs a structure, the structure through the life in it is 
one thing. It is impossible to say with regard to the parts of God, if He had 
many. parts, because some of Him would be tantamount to being from other 
f. 13S 
(parts), because of the impossibility of him being a structure and because God is 
qualified by being powerful (gädir) which is (one of the) qualities which refer to 
His essence. The essential attributes (sifät al-dhat) characterise (takhtass) 
every part of Him, not just the totality of His (parts) and they are different 
from the attributes of ma'äni. This defeats that argument. 
However, if He inheres in Christ and if that was possible for him, then the way 
of its possibility would be (through) the manifestation of divine action by 
Christ. 
51. Speech does not exist in articulated sound, but also in written letters and 
memory. 
52. One must bear in mind that Abü 'All's argument about speech is not 
accepted by 'Abd al-Jabbär. See, Peters, God's created speech, PP. 300-2. 
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It does not require his union with him (Christ) because God does not act through 
dependence or movement. He only creates the actions as he created the bodies 
and other things, because He is powerful (Qädir) in Himself and His ha-1. (state 
with regard to being powerful) differs from the state (hä1) of one who is able 
with the ability of one who needs in terms of action to use that ability in a 
location where such ability can be used. If that is true it is possible for the 
action to appear through the hands or voice of Christ even though God was not 
united with him. 
Furthermore, what they affirm by which He (God) is united with Christ, 
requires them to concede that He is united with the rest of the prophets, 
because of the divine action which appeared through their words and prayers. 
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In this way there is the repudiation of the special distinction of Christ by union 
with God as they believed. 
If it is possible that God can inhere in the body of Christ, then it is also possible 
that He may inhere in an inorganic body. There is no way by which they can 
make it impossible for Him to inhere in an inorganic body. Otherwise His 
inherence in the body of Christ must be impossible for the same reason. 
Because if they might argue: 
It is His right that He only inheres in something where there is life as (here is) 
knowledge, - They are forced to admit the impossibility of the existence of His 
essence (dhät) except in a location in which there is life as (there) is knowledge. 
They might argue: 
When He inheres in an inorganic body, it would not be able to manifest divine 
actions. The case is different when He inheres in a living body. 
The answer is: 
Since it is possible that He performs divine actions, that has resulted from him, 
so why is it not conceded that He may inhere in inorganic bodies and may 
create divine actions through the hand and voice of Christ. If it is possible that 
God exists in eternity without manifesting a divine action, why should it not be 
53. Although in the text it is Iddi1ä, we read it as du r! that makes better 
sense. 
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possible that He exists in an inorganic body without manifesting divine action. 
In this way, there is the proof for what we forced upon them about His being 
united with an inorganic body and what we required them to accept. In this way 
there is a repudiation of what they claimed about the special characterisation 
of Christ with that. According to this argument it is required that they must 
accept His inherence in every living thing as we forced upon them. Indeed it is 
required that they must approve His inherence in the location where divine 
actions have occurred, because through these (actions) He is more distinguished 
insofar as his action occurs in them. (These arguments) confirm the invalidity 
of their doctrine that He has united with Christ according to the way of 
inherence. 
9- Section 
The Repudiation of the doctrine of the Jacobites that the nature (jawhar) of 
divinity and humanity have United and they became one nature (jawhar) 
Most of the Jacobites maintained that the substance of God and humanity have 
united, then they became one substance, one hypostasis and one nature. It is 
invalid, because it is impossible that two things would be one thing in reality as 
it is impossible that one thing would be two things (in reality). We have 
described in the previous chapter that it is impossible that one thing may 
become many things. It requires the impossibility of two things being one thing. 
However, if it is possible that God can unite with mankind and become one 
thing, then it is possible that two substances would be one substance through 
the conjunction, 
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or accident would be one thing through its inherence in the 
substance with another accident, or many accidents collectively would be one 
thing in one location. If that is invalid and the relationship of one thing with 
another (within this subject) does not affect the different aspect of the 
relationship (in that), then the doctrine that God through His union with 
mankind becomes one thing is also invalid. Furthermore, if what they say was 
possible, it would require that death was impossible for mankind because 
through union with God man would become one thing with Him. Thus man 
54. This term is not a Jacobites expression, but rather Nestorian. 
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would be outside his human nature, for the possibility of death is one of the 
characteristics of human nature. 
Furthermore, it is required according to their doctrine that after the union 
every attribute which characterises a human being would be impossible for 
Christ and every action would be impossible for him, such as eating, drinking, 
crucifixion, killing, length, breadth, depth, motion and extinction, because 
through union he would be outside his human nature and its substance. 
Otherwise, there would be no meaning and benefit in their doctrine that through 
unity with God, he has become one thing, even though his situation is as it was. 
Furthermore, according to their doctrine, it is required that Christ became 
eternal (through union with God), after he had been created in time. It is 
impossible that a created (being) should become eternal as it is impossible that 
the eternal should become created. Indeed that is absolutely impossible for a 
created (being) because what existed after it had not existed, cannot become 
something which has existed eternally because that would require its existence 
in a state (häl), the non-existence of which has already been established. That 
is impossible in that regard. Since that is impossible (to believe) the existence 
of a ma4nä cannot change from being impossible to possible, nor can the non- 
existence of a main . change from being impossible to possible nor (can it do 
this) through union with God or anything else. Similarly things which have been 
established cannot become impossible because of a mania or an accident (arid). 
If God has united with man when they both became one thing, there must be 
several possible effects (wu ilh). 
1- either this one (the one being resulting from the union of God with man) has 
the quality (sifa) of God and has come out from the quality of mankind. 
Z- or it has the quality of man and has left the quality of divinity. 
3- or it is characterised by both qualities. 
1. (according to the first effect) If it has the quality of God, then it is required 
that all the things which are the speciality of mankind such as looking, length 
and the rest of the qualities that he has got such as drinking, killing, crucifixion 
would be impossible for Christ. According to that, it would be a departure from 
their doctrine because they affirm that Christ after sonship and union with God 
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was seen eating and drinking as he has done before. They affirm the crucifixion 
and killing after that, even though they differ about whether the crucifixion 
was related to God or man. 
Z- If it was through the quality of man and He left the quality of God through 
the union with man, then it is required that Christ may not show any divine 
action and that the status of Christ would be, after the union with God as it was 
before and that his condition was the same as anybody else. This would require 
that the idea of him being God was invalid and he left his own qualities through 
the union with God and that would be as if he never existed. (According to 
them) in that it would be possible for the eternal (God) or for the Son not to 
exist. Both situations are equal in impossibility because the substance of the 
God cannot be non-existent. Similarly it is impossible that they should become 
two hypostases after they were three hypostases. It requires that the God 
(Qadim) becomes created (although He was already existing) and God will leave 
his personal quality. The manifestation of miracles through Christ would be 
impossible because he has left his divine nature. Even if there had been the 
union with God, the two would have become one thing and this thing would be 
characterised by the quality of humanity and divinity. Then why is it more 
appropriate that it became one thing rather than becoming two things as they 
were before, because there is no way by which it can be said that Christ has 
two substances and two natures after the union, otherwise it would be 
established in this doctrine. It is required that their doctrine would be 
incorrect that they became one thing. 
However it is the doctrine of some of them that Christ died in reality. When he 
died, God ceased to be united with him. That requires that Christ was different 
from (Him) because of the possibility of Christ having separated from (Him) at 
the time of death. This is the sign of difference. However, this doctrine 
requires them to admit that if Christ died and repudiated the creation of 
himself, if he had become divine through the union with God, death and 
extinction must be possible for God, if through union with God, (God) and 
mankind became one thing. But this doctrine requires that God Himself was 
crucified and killed. If that is possible for Him then all suffering would be 
possible for Him and all the rest things that happened to the created bodies 
would be possible for God. 
Furthermore, if it was possible that Christ became eternal God after the union, 
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what was the criterion by which createdness of the bodies is known? Because 
when it is possible that something can become eternal, then the method by 
which bodies are demonstrated to be created becomes invalid. In this there is 
absolute invalidation of the method of knowing God, whether it could be said 
that (Christ) was one of those for whom union was possible or not. Indeed all of 
them would have to admit, according to their doctrine of union with God, that 
the one united with Christ was God who is one substance apart from the 
hypostasis of the son and word, because the way by which they affirm the union 
through the manifestation of divine actions by him requires them to admit that, 
unless each one of the hypostasis is one God in reality, and they give up the 
basis of their doctrine. Then they would be holding a doctrine which we have 
already refuted, - (namely) the doctrine of those who maintain that alongside 
God there is a second power equal to him according to the argument of mutual 
hinderence (dalälat al-tamänu) 
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and other argument. However, everything 
which inheres is something (else) must change the basis (hukm) which refers to 
it with regard to the rest of the ma'ani which inhere in location which cannot be 
perceived or comprehended; it cannot require a basis (ukm) which is separate 
from it. Therefore if the Son inheres in Christ, it would be necessary that there 
was the requirement of a basis (hukm) for him (i. e., Son inhering in Christ) was 
particular to him. The manifestation of divine action by him is separate from 
that and would not demand that it (i. e., new hukm) should be required. We only 
maintain that the power requires him to be able and because he is able, creation 
by him is possible and what is required by the power really refers to him. 
Our venerable scholar Abü 'A1i forced them to admit that they must say that 
Christ worshipped himself, if at union Christ and the Son became one thing. It 
is impossible that somebody worships himself, because worship is like gratitude 
(shukr). Just as nobody can thank himself, in the same way it is impossible for 
somebody to worship himself. He forced those who maintained the union does 
55. DalAlat al-tamänu , is a logical term used by Muslim logicians, expressing 
that God is second to none. The term is based on the fact that the object 
who is able to produce something, is able to produce the genus of that 
something and its opposite, - if there is an opposite. 
4Abd al-Jabbär's argument implies that it is possible that one hypostasis 
wants to move something, while the second one wants to keep it 
immovable. It is called mutual hindering, for the object cannot be moving 
and immovable at the same time. See Peters, God's Created Speech, 
PP. 264-5. 
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not require them to be one to admit that Christ worshipped part of himself. 
This is just as impossible as the first one. He forced them to admit that at the 
union, action of God would be the action of mankind. If this is possible, it is 
also possible that the power of both would be one power, whatever one of them 
was capable of doing, the other would be capable of doing. If the man is able 
through his own essence like God, it is required that both of them must be the 
same. The same is the case, if God is capable through a power like mankind. 
He forced them to admit that the other two hypostases can be united as was 
possible for the hypostasis of the Word, because their substance is one. So what 
can be applied to one of them, would be applied to the rest. He forced them to 
admit the difference and separate nature (taghäyur) of the hypostases insofar as 
union was positive for one of them apart from the rest. 
He forced them to admit that the Son has united with Mary, as he united with 
Christ, because Christ is part of her. According to this argument, some of 
them interpreted the verse of God: "And when God said, 0 Jesus son of Mary 
didst thou say to the men "take me and my mother as Gods apart from God. "' 
(5: 116) Arbery; that God mentioned it as the way of requiring (a denial by 
Christ) because if Christ was God insofar he Was Characterised by the fact that 
he was born without a male, so it is required that Mary would be in that 
category because she gave birth to him without sexual intercourse; even though 
our venerable scholar Abü 4Ali has interpreted it in a literal sense, and there 
were among them those who maintained this doctrine. 
He also forced them to admit this doctrine, that there would be a possibility of 
mutual hindering (dalalat al-tam'anuC) between these hypostases, because when 
their substance is one, it is required to be able. That substantiates the mutual 
hindering among them; that requires their weakness and feebleness or weakness 
of some of them. He explained that they cannot co-relate the Trinity with 
their doctrine that affirms Him as living, when it does not refer to His essence. 
Therefore it must refer by that to something else. The same applies to His 
being affirmed as knowing and speaking by his argument that every affirmation 
will refer by it to His essence, not anything else because it is possible to refer 
by many attributes to one essence. He further explained that at the time when 
they said about God that He is deity and substance and a thing and eternal, it 
was necessary that they refer through that to one essence (dhät). Therefore it 
is possible for us to say the same as we said before. He explained that the 
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knowledge and indication take the place of description and affirmation. We 
have already dealt with it in full, so there is no need to repeat it. 
(14ý 
He forced them to admit that they affirm for Him, power, sense of hearing and 
vision, insofar as they affirmed Him (to be) powerful, hearing and seeing. That 
requires the affirmation of Him as many hypostases. When they refer by all 
that to His essence, their reasoning became defective. 
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They are forced to make God as the hypostasis of the Father, who is affirmed 
as living, knowing and speaking, without (affirming) that thing, for the sake of 
which he becomes living as do the Kulläbiyya. 
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We have already discussed their different descriptions about the unity with God. 
Those among the Nestorians and Melkites who have described the union with 
God in terms of inherence and intermingling are far from the truth. Because it 
is their doctrine that they did not become one thing and they are two natures as 
they were. If it could be said that anything which is in this stage is united, it 
would require that when an accident inheres in a location the accident and the 
location must be united. That is invalid. 
Those of them who maintained the doctrine of corporal incarnation, are using 
an expression which is not correct according to the doctrine which they have 
presented. If they maintained that (i. e., God did not become a body at the time 
of union) they cannot affirm that -He becomes united with Christ, because the 
body of Christ was, after their claim of union, the same as it was before. There 
is no difference between them maintaining with regard to the rest of the 
hypostases, if they were to maintain it, that He becomes corporeal incarnate 
with the rest of bodies. What follows from that must be invalid. 
The same applies to whoever maintained that God became man (ta'annasa) 
because it is impossible for God to become man. The same applies to whoever 
56. Here tAbd al-Jabbär seems to be inconsistent, as he left the real 
discussion, i. e., incarnation and jumped into the Trinity. 
57. According to Kulläbiyya's doctrine, God is living through life that is not 
Himself, but rather than an entity. 'Abd al-Jabbär means to say that 
Christians must affirm God only through the Hypostasis of Father, by 
which He is affirmed as living, Knowing etc., but they must not be actual 
entities for Him. 
84 
said He became a composite (i. e., a mixture of God and man). 
As for those who depend in this connection following the earlier generation by 
referring to the books (i. e., books of The New Testament) and by blind imitation 
(taqlid) of the four (evangelists), their doctrine is invalid because discussion is 
about sifa of God and what is impossible for God and what is not, can not only 
refer to revelation. If what they claimed is confirmed as revelation, then it 
must be interpreted according to what it requires. How would that be possible 
when the basis (maudü') of their doctrine is blind imitation and referring to the 
reports of four (Gospels). It is impossible that such knowledge will occur 
through the reports of four. They cannot say: Since Christ is one of the 
prophets of God according to you, how can your claim invalidate our doctrine 
along with the fact that it is taken from it? The reason is that we know their 
untruth about that and we are quite sure that he (Christ) only brought what 
reason demanded in terms of the Unity of God, not the Trinity. We are also 
aware that they make a mistake from the aspect of reporting and interpretation 
and because those whose books they received were John, Matthew, Luke and 
Mark. This is one of the things which they acknowledge because when Christ 
was missing and they alleged that he and his disciples had been killed, there was 
no one left holding his religion to whom his book and his law might be conveyed 
except these four. They alleged that they dictated the Gospel in three 
languages. It has been known that it is legitimate (to accuse) the four of 
alteration, substitution and lying. So how can their reporting about what is 
possible for God and what is not be relied upon. We can rely upon only what we 
have maintained because the reporters of our book (Qurlan) and the principles of 
our religion (Islam) are a huge group (too large) to agree upon a lie. Thus 
necessary (darürl) knowledge has occurred (to support) what that group 
reported. Therefore what we maintain is true. 
Consequently, by this method we have repudiated what they reported about the 
killing and the crucifixion of Christ because the original source of their report 
is these four and even though they relied upon their blind imitation with regard 
to it. (This is the case) because if someone is crucified after having been killed, 
it may change the appearance of the person who was crucified so that he looks 
like someone else. Thus when it was reported that (Christ was crucified) it is 
quite possible that similar circumstances were involved. The true nature of 
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anything in such circumstances cannot be known through necessary knowledge 
because one of the conditions for the truth of something known by necessary 
knowledge is that it must be among those matters whose circumstance (411) has 
(no58) ambiguity. It has been suggested that it is possible that the resemblance 
of Christ was (miraculously) projected on a person who was crucified. Therefore 
the circumstances may have been ambiguous. If that is possible because that 
was the time of a prophet when ordinary events may be disturbed and became 
miraculous because of that prophet. What we mentioned first is more 
appropriate to rely upon because we know through the words of God: 
"Yet they did not slay him nor did they crucify him but it seemed like (him) to 
them. (4: 157) 
f , UI. 
that it is not possible that their report has occurred in such a way which 
requires (necessary) knowledge because that would require the repudiation of 
the source (i. e., the Qur)än) which we make as a base for reports. Because (the 
sight of) that crucified man coincided with the circumstances (hä1) of their 
missing Christ. Therefore (it seemed to them) that there was a strong 
probabilty that Christ was the crucified man. 
It was not possilbe for them despite that, to maintain the clear claim in the 
Gospels. In fact, in this, they are following blindly their leaders as Nestorius, 
Jacob and whoever held the religion of the emperor (i. e., Melkites). Therefore 
no doctrine of theirs can be affirmed by them on the basis of logical deduction, 
because the sourse of their doctrine is only blind imitation without taking into 
account the arguments on which doctrines should be accepted. When they turn 
to logical deduction, their circumstances are same in that as was reported 
about one of them, whom one of our fellows asked: 
Why have you made the hypostasis of knowledge as Son not the hypostasis of 
life? He replied, because knowledge is masculine (in gender) and life is 
feminine (in gender). 
Then the questioner asked: 
"So why did you not say about life that it is the daughter of God because life is 
feminine. " 
58. In the text, it is Yaltabisu, we translated as negative Lä Yaltabisu 
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A similar thing was reported to me about Qurra 
59 (a leader of the Melkites) is 
their leader who with regard to the Trinity, relied upon (the argument) that it is 
required that God must be master (ra4is). It is impossible to say that He is 
united through mastery (riiäsa) with His creature, because that would require 
that He has no kindness (minna) for them, if He had created them in order to be 
master over them, it would be necessary that His mastery must be eternal. Yet 
this mastery (ri'äsa) must exist over one who is subject to it. This subject of 
mastery (mar1rs) must have two aspects. 
1- Either it would be like God in substance or lower than Him in substance. 
If it is lower than Him as substance, so the mastery of God has descreased from 
its dignity, because it is the glory of mastery that it is mastery over him and 
like Him in its nature. For that reason when it is said about a man that he is 
the master of bull and ass, he gets very angry. 
Then it is necessary that the subject of mastery would be like God in substance. 
Again His mastery would be either through force or by consent or natural 
mastery. It cannot be by force, because it is impossible to say that force will 
take possession of that which is like God. It is also impossible that it would be 
through consent because whatever is like that must have a beginning. It is also 
possible that he would not give consent to it. So it is affirmed that it is a 
natural and it is like the mastery of fathers over sons and like the mastery of 
Adam over Abel. So it is affirmed that He has a Son and he is like Him. 
59. - Apparently it is a confusing name, as it is in the text. It also shows 
incompetency of the editors who could not manage to correct it or to 
write a foot note about it. As a matter of fact 1Abd al-Jabbär intended 
here Theodore Abil Qurra a famous Christian scholar. Little is known 
about him. He was a bishop of Harrän. It is said that he came under the 
literary and probably personal influence of John of Damascus whom he 
calls, his master. 
Biographers are not sure about his time, but from his connection with 
John of Damascus, Abü Räiit of Takrit and al-Mä'miin, the Abbasid caliph, 
one can say that he lived from about 740-820. 
J Waardenburg reported about him that he wrote seventeen polemical 
treatises against Islam. His Arabic work has been published, a few titles 
are below: 
I. Arendzen, Theodori Abu Kurra de cultu imaginum libellus e codice 
arabico nunc Primun editus latin versu illustration, (Boon, 1877): 
Constantin Bacha, les oeuvres arabis de Theodore Aboucora eveque d' 
Haran, (Beyrouth, 1904). 
A. Guillaume, Theodore Abi Qurra, M. W., vol. XV (1925), P. 42., 
J Waar denburg, Two lights Perceived, N. T. T., vol. XXXI Part 4. (1977), 
P. M. 
Sidney H Griffith, Habib ibn Hidmah Abli Rä'ith, oriens Christians, vol. 
LXIV, ('. 161. 
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He has informed you of what we reported about their arguments that the basis 
of their doctrine is taken from blind imitation, so that we cannot accept as an 
argument anything that follows that course. Do you see that someone who put 
forward that argument does not know that what he has said, for it requires him 
to affirm that (God) has a female companion, so that He may be master of her 
as Adam was master of Eve. This mastery (i. e., over Eve) is closer to nature 
than his mastery over Abel because that is hädith. When the female companion 
is excluded from Him by that which requires it (to be excluded), the Son is also 
excluded from Him for the same reason. 
How is it then possible that three hypostases may be affirmed through this 
argument when its reasoning only requires the affirmation of subject of mastery 
and it would be completed through two Hypostases. Furthermore, the mastery 
cannot refer to God at all. It can only be used about a person who comes 
forward from his people with a state which differentiates him from them. It is 
impossible to be said about God. 
If a proponent opposed that by saying that God must be (ma-lik) master, 
generous, noble, and mighty. Then after that he affirms for Him manä and 
hypostasis, so what would be separated from Him? We did not mention this 
specious argument, so that we may discuss its invalidity, because its situation is 
obvious. But (we brought it forward) in order to warn against the fact that the 
situation with regard to their doctrine is, as we have explained, taken from 
blind imitation. As for their calling the hypostases as characteristics (khawäss) 
and attributes (sifät), people have given much attention to discuss this. To go 
over such expression would be futile. We have put already forward the 
invalidity of whatever is connected with maonä, whether they say that the 
hypostases are changing and different or they deny that, or they say that it is 
different from the substance or it is not the substance or they say it is the 
substance because discussion about the invalidity of all that has come earlier. 
10 - Section 
Concerning the invalidity of what they believed about Christ and his adoration 
and what is related to that. 
You must realise, that all the Christians whose doctrines we have quoted are 
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among those who profess the worship of Christ. They differ about what is 
worshipped with regard to him and in what way he (Christ) is worshipped. Their 
doctrine in this matter is based upon their doctrine of union and (God) becoming 
man. 
So whoever of them maintain that Christ is one substance, one hypostasis and 
one person, say about him that he would be worshipped in reality. However 
they are two sects. The Jacobites maintained that he is human being and God, 
although he is one substance. But he is a human being in one aspect and God in 
another, like the human being who is spirit in a different way from that by 
which he is a body. The other sect who is called Walyäniyya60 alleged. that 
Christ is God insofar as he is man and the divine nature could only be 
understood through the aspect by which he is human. So these two sects 
believed that he is adored in reality. 
However the Melkites, Maronites and Nestorians maintained that Christ has two 
substances (natures), the divine one and human one, God and man, although they 
differed among themselves. Some of them maintained that their will is one. 
Some of them said that they have two wills. 
60. Walyäniyya, it is a most confusing sect, because it has many 
pronunciations, as we see 'Abd al-Jabbär mentioned it only once. While 
during the summary of the Christian doctrines, he described their doctrine 
without naming it. Al-Shahristani mentioned it as Ilyäniyya, and said 
that they were a community in Syria, the yemen and Armenia. Watt 
translated it as Julianists and commented that they belong to the sixth 
Century, none of such sects still exist and their views are studied only by 
the specialists in the history of the theological doctrine. 
Al-Näshi al-Akbar mentioned them as al-lawliyäniyya. According to him 
they differed from Jacobites only in one doctrine and they belong to 
Armenia. 
When we study Magälät dim yya aý ima, edited by P. L. Cheikho, there is a 
treatise called Maymar fi Sihha al-din al Masihi, here this sect is also 
described as lawliyäniya. But the editor who was a great scholar 
corrected it as al- --Uli äni in. It seems to me correct because their 
founder was Julian d. after 518) bishop of Hc. licarnassus in Ca-ritt. So it 
was changed from Julian to Yuwlyan. 
(See Introduction, PP. 13-14). 
Shahristani, Milal, P. 178, Watt, A Muslim account of Christian doctrine, 
Hamdard Islamicus, Vol. VI, No. 2 (1983), P. 67., A'. -Nashi al-Akbar, A1- 
Awsdt if al-Magälät, P. 81., Cheikho Vingt Traites,. P. 9., The Oxford 
dictionary of Christian Church, P. 766. 
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All of them maintain that the human nature and God was crucified and died. 
They say that Mary gave birth to God. They do not say that God was born 
because (by that) it could be imagined that she gave birth to three hypostases. 
However, the Nestorians maintained that Christ who is God and man was born 
and crucified. They do not say that God was born and crucified. As for the 
Jacobites they say, that God was killed and crucified in reality, although they 
do differ about whether the pain was felt by him or not as we maintained 
before. Sometimes they maintained that Christ had two births: one of them 
was divine from God before time (eternally), the second one was was through 
human nature from Mary in time. 
You must realise that what we have explained about the invalidity of their 
doctrine about union repudiates all they believed that Christ is worshipped, 
creates the bodies and provides them with the means of subsistence and he is 
the benefactor; that is the creator of the world and entitled to be worshipped 
individually or with the other (hypostases). Because the discussion about that is 
(from the earlier discussion) and its invalidity depends on unsoundness of that. 
The evidence that we mentioned before that a body cannot make a body, life 
and power will invalidate their doctrine about that. It is well known that the 
state of Christ was a body in reality. So how it is possible that he does such 
deeds that entitle him to be worshipped by living bodies, despite the fact that it 
is impossible for him to grant them the gifts by which he is entitled to be 
worshipped. 
There is no difference (when the situation is similar) between those who declare 
that he should be worshipped or the rest of prophets or the rest of the bodies 
(should be worshipped) because worship could only be entitled to the extent of 
benefits which would be greater than His benefits would equal. Because of that 
no human beings are entitled to be worshipped apart from any other on the basis 
of their different circumstances in being able to produce much or little benefits 
to others. Insofar as the benefits which are produced by them are not 
characterised in the same way as the benefits of God, because He is 
characterised through certain facts: 
1. He is the original source of the benefits because if He does not exist, the 
rest of the benefits would not be possible. From this aspect all benefits come 
from Him. 
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Z. He has reached such an extent that nothing can equal His gifts. 
3. Because the gifts of the others are in reality gifts from Him, He became 
their master by way of the fact that through Him giving is possible by means 
which come from God, whether with regard to the gifts or Himself or the one 
who receives the gifts. It has been known that the occurrence of all these 
aspects are impossible except because of God. Therefore He must be 
characterised by being entitled apart from anyone else, even though sometimes 
other benefactors are entitled to be thanked according to their gifts to others 
as we know through evidence. Because knowledge of the good in thanking a 
benefactor and of the fact that the benefactor is entitled to it and of the fact 
that it is the duty for the one who received the gifts to do it, is necessary 
(darüri) knowledge in most cases. 
All of that shows that the body is not entitled to be worshipped in any way. In 
this (argument) there is the disproof of their doctrine that Christ is required to 
be worshipped. However those of them who maintained that he is God in a real 
meaning and that two substances became one, must admit that God is a body 
which is limited, which eats and drinks (etc. ). Because if that is not admitted, 
they would have to maintain that all of that, i. e., eating, drinking etc., was 
impossible for Christ, despite the fact that we know that such an argument is 
invalid. We have already known that that is impossible for God, because of the 
argument we have presented about the creation of the bodies and we have 
already presented it against the corporealist (mujassima) 
61 
by the way of 
argument. 
It is well known from the circumstances of Christ that he used to worship and 
invite people to worship. How it is possible to say that he is worshipped in 
reality? How it is possible for the one who is worshipped to worship himself? If 
that is conceded, then he would be the Creator of himself, the benefactor of 
himself and God of himself. All that is contradictory and impossible. 
However, according to their doctrine, it is necessary that He would be capable 
61. Corporealist, who give bodily attributes to God. It was emphasized by 
orthodox Muslim group that god was not corporeal and not material, and 
those who held that view were sometimes called mujassima. 
E. I2., Vol. 4, P. D. 
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of suffering, death and pain. If that is possible with regard to him, it is also 
possible for him to be punished or rewarded. In these conditions worship is not 
right for him and his condition of being needy would be like the condition of 
rest of bodies. 
They cannot maintain what befell him in forms of being killed and crucified by 
claiming that it was an imaginary thing not a real thing because they made God 
as man and according to them the killing of man or his death is (something 
whose possibility) is established. It is impossible that it may befall him without 
him feeling pain, for that would require that God feels pain in reality. 
Those who maintained (the doctrine of Christ being) two substances and two 
natures must confine the worship to the divine nature apart from the human 
nature. That repudiates their doctrine that the one who is worshipped is Christ 
or else it requires that they maintain that he is a divine hypostasis. 
They might argue: Our doctrine is that Christ includes humanity and divinity, 
therefore we can worship him. 
The answer is: It is necessary that they do not allow Christ to be the adored 
one, because this doctrine includes something else together with the adored 
one. There is no difference between their saying that Christ is adored, a 
creator and provider and between their saying that Christ cannot eat, drink, be 
crucified and be killed because since it is possible to attach to God aspects of 
worship and other things which are only possible for God, it is possible to deny 
things which are impossible for God, even though they are possible for humanity 
such as eating, drinking and crucifixion etc. They are forced to admit that God 
is a product of seed or born from Mary as they believed, either according to 
some aspects or all aspects. 
Our venerable scholar Abu kUthmän al-Jähiz said, there is a need for a minute 
examination of their doctrine so that such invalidity may be explained. 
Otherwise there must not be any mention of God in these terms, may He be 
kept completely away from their doctrines. 
If one of their proponent said: We adore Christ not because he is divine or God 
united with him but because he is the intermediary between us and between 
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God, insofar as we know God through him. Because of his d eat blessing and the 
fact that it is very close to the blessing of God (Qadim), it is good for us to 
worship him. 
The answer is: According to the beginning of this section that would 
necessitate that it was good to worship all the prophets for this reason. It 
would also necessitate that we should worship our fore fathers and the rest of 
those whose kindness and gifts have been great to us on account of His kindness, 
because they cannot distinguish the blessing of Christ by anything which 
separates it from the blessing of those we have just mentioned according to the 
explanation we have given of the special nature of God's blessings through 
matters by which these blessings are distinguished from other blessings. There 
is nothing in the blessing of Christ that makes it greater than blessings of 
others. That necessitates that they (accept) the two aspects which we have 
maintained. We do not concede the prostration which God ordered to be made 
to Adam was an act of worship to him, because no one is entitled to worship 
except God. He ordered (Satan) to prostrate and other thing from the point of 
view of Adam's closeness to Him and as an act of worship to Him. This is 
evidence of the merit of Adam and worship is not one of the things whose 
condition is changed or revealed because of such a command. Thus worship is 
appropriate through revelation as we maintain with regard to the religious acts 
of worship. Since no thanks can be due without a blessing or gift, therefore no 
worship can be due without the special blessing (of God) which we have 
mentioned. If it could be possible that such order was appropriate, the same 
would be possible with regard to thanks. Therefore we said, that thanks, praise 
and honour are only appropriate where they are due. We shall mention the 
discussion that worship is only due to God (later giving) an explanation of 
worship the difference between it and thanks and (other matters) which are 
conneded with it in the chapter of waqd (threat). In the argument presented 
now, there is convincing (proof of our position). 
As for the arguments which they use against our claim that he spoke in the 
cradle and that it is genuine, it would have been as widespread among them as 
the rest of his miracles, the discussion of that will be mentioned in the chapter 
of miracles and reports (akhbär). In the same way the doctrine by which they 
r 
object to the Qur an, as their argument is that in the Qu? än, there is 
affirmation of Idris and Noah and others as prophets while they were not 
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prophets, or in it (Qu? än) that God never sent revelation (to any one) except 
men and it is not the case, and God said to Christ. 
"Didst thou, say unto men, take me and my mother as Gods apart from God. " 
(5: 116). While none of the Christians said it. And it is in it that Jews said, 
"Surely God is poor, and we are rich" (3: 181). and that "Allah's hand is fettered" 
(5: 64). 
And they said about Ezra, that he was Son of God, while (according to the Jews) 
it is known that they never said it, in addition to other similar matters, these 






Commentary on the Christian Doctrines alluded to by 
ýAbd al-Jabbär in the 
translation of al-Mu. ghni (Vol. v. pp. 80-85) 
Before going to discuss and criticise two main Christian doctrines, i. e., Trinity 
and union of incarnation, tAbd al-Jabbär has given a brief summary of the 
famous Christian sects and their differences about the person and nature of 
Christ. It is notable that during presenting the summary, 4Abd al-Jabbär failed 
most of the time to indicate the names of the sects. This adds to the difficulty 
of identifying these sects. Sometimes even in detailed discussion of the 
doctrines of various sects, he fails to identify the sects whose doctrine he is 
discussing. 
On the other hand, al-Shahristani (d. 548/1153), although later than 'Abd al- 
Jabbär, elaborated the summary in such a way that every doctrine is related to 
a particular sect. It is interesting that sometimes there is a resemblance of the 
phrases and wording between al-Sharistäni and ýAbd al-Jabbär. It seems that 
both scholars are quoting from the same source without naming it. As a result, 
al-Shahristäni's work has been helpful in identifying the sects which held the 
various doctrines and this has been supplemented by the works of Oriental 
Christian scholars writing in Arabic. 
I. In the beginning 4Abd al-Jabbär referred to a small group of Christians, 
who do not admit the doctrine of Trinity. (al-Mughni, p. 80/translation, P. 19). 
Later he gives further information about their views when he says that they 
believed that "Christ came into existence (ibt': adaa) through Mary and was a 
noble prophet, whom God honoured and venerated for his obedience and named 
him His Son by the way of adoption not by way of birth. " (al-Mughni, 
p. 85/translation, P. 25). 
Both al-Shahristäni and Ibn Hazm attribute this doctrine to certain individuals. 
According to al-Shahristäni Butinus (Photinus) and Paul of Samosata said that 
Christ was a righteous man ('abd) and was created but God honoured and 
dignified him because of his obedience and called him Son by adoption (tabanni) 
not by birth and union. 
1 
1. A1-Shahristäni, Milal p. 176. 
96 
According to Western sources, Paul of Samosata maintained "that from the 
incarnation the Word rested upon the human Jesus as one person upon another 
and that the incarnated Christ differed only in one degree from the prophets. "2 
1 According to Afif b. Mulammil, an oriental Christian scholar, there was also a 
Paul al_Masisi, an unfamiliar father who believed in a purely human nature of 
Christ. 3 
But Ibn Hazm (d. 456/1064) described at least three Christians who believed 
that Christ was a man and a messenger of God. 
4 
The first is Arius, a priest in Alexandria (c. 319 AD), who maintained that 
Christ was a created man and the Word of God. On the other hand, western 
sources gives us a clear picture that, "Arius believed that God the Father is an 
absolute unbegotten, the begotten Son is in some sense subordinate and inferior, 
because derived from the absolute unity. 
5 
It does mean that Christ, although created was an instrument for the creation 
of the world. 
6 
We find the same view attributed to Arius by {Afif b. Muuammil, 
who was a Melkite. 
7 
Later 4Abd al-Jabbär, himself gives a more detailed view of the Arian doctrine 
without actually naming. However, al-Shahristäni who set out a similar view 
does attribute it to Arius. 
8 ¶Abd al-Jabbär said, "It is said by some of their 
scholars who came earlier that God is one and they name him Father and 
claimed that Christ is the word of God and His Son through (God's) will 
(Istifa)a). (al Mughni, p. 85/Trans. P. 24). 
The second given in Ibn Hazm is also Paul of Samosata (260 AD) whose teaching 
according to Ibn Hazm, that Christ was a man and a messenger of God and 
simply a prophet like other prophets. 
9 
Z. Oxford dictionary of Christian Church. p. 1087. 
3. Cheikho, Trois Traites, pp. 87-89. 
4. Ibn Hazm, al-Fisal, vol. I, p. 48. 
S. V. A. Harvey, A handbook of Theological terms, p. 25 
6. Oxford Dictionary of Christian Church, p. 83 
7. Cheikho, Trois Traites, p. 87 
8. Al-Shahrista i Milal, p. 178, J. N. D. Kelly, Early Christian Doctrines, pp. 
226-231 
9. Ibn. Hazm, al Fisal, vol. I, p. 48. 
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The third is Macedonius (d. c. 36Z), who supported a modified version of 
Arianism and believed that Christ was a human prophet and man, but considered 
him as the Holy Spirit and Word of God. However, both of these (spirit and 
word) were created. 
10 
Again 'Afif b. Muuammil conforms that Macedonius believed that the Son and 
Holy Spirit were created beings. 
11 
There is another sect mentioned by al-Näshi al-Akbar as al-Musalliyäniyya. He 
said that there was a minor group from them who alleged that the human nature 
of the Messiah can see the divine nature and knows it. They denied that Christ 
is an incarnate deity, by they asserted that he is a human being, not God the 
l2 Almighty. Al-Shahristani called them Musallin (the worshipper) and said that 
they were a group of Nestorians. 
13 Al-Shahristäni did not mention such 
doctrine towards them as mentioned by al-Nishi al-Akbar. 
It is well known that such sects were declared by the Orthodox Church to be 
heretical. 
2. 'Abd al-Jabbär then referred to a sect who maintained that life is 
.. 
power (al-Mughni, p. 80/Trans. P. 19). 
It would seem from this exception that the Holy Spirit is being identified as 
power. This possibly refers to the Jacobites, because according to Yahyä b. 
1Adi, the well known Christian apologist and philosopher, who was himself a 
Jacobite, the property of Holy Spirit is power (qud_). 
14 However later 'Abd al- 
Jabbar reports "Others maintained that the Spirit is power" (al-Mughni, 
p. 8Z/Trans. P. Z1). It is not clear whether there is any distinction between these 
two statements. 
3. Then 'Abd al-Jabbär describes three views of the nature of Christ 
10. Ibid., p. 4 $ 
11. Cheikho, Trois Traites, p. 88 
12. Al-Näshi al-Akbar, Kitäb al-Awsat, p. 79 
13. Al-Shahristäni, Milal, p. 176 
14. Yahya while refuting al-Kindi, the philospher, maintained that according 
to the Christians, the property of Holy Spirit is power. (qurda) see "Un 
Traite De Yahya Ben 'Adi, " edited by A Perier, Revue de L'orient 
Chretien, vol. XXII, (1920-Zl) P. 5. 
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without their naming those who hold them. They are: 
i. The Messiah is the word and body united with each other. 
(al-Mughni, p. 80/Trans. P. ZO) 
According to al-Shahristani, this is a Melkite doctrine, namely that 
the Word was united with the body of Christ. 
15 
ii. The Messiah is the Word, not the body. (al-Mughni, P. 80/Trans. 
P. ZO). 
This appears to be a Nestorian doctrine because the Nestorians insisted that 
God should not be born of woman. Therefore they refused to attribute human 
birth to Divine nature. The human acts and suffering of Christ belong to the 
man Christ. 
. 
iii. The Messiah is the created body and the Word became a 
created body when it was in the womb of Mary. (al-Mughni, 
p. 80/Trans. P. ZO). 
This appears to be a Jacobite doctrine because they maintain that a third 
element is produced out of fusion and mixture, just as the fusion of fire with 
coal produce a live coal. 
16 
Al-Shahristäni said, that according to Jacobites the Word was transferred into 
flesh and blood. 
17 
4. 'Abd al-Jabbär alleged that the Spirit is a state which proceeds from 
the Father and the Son. (al-Mughni, p. 81/Trans, P. 21). His statement about the 
procession of the Spirit is not correct, because it is a western part of 
Christendom. According to Harvey, the Eastern Church protested that such 
doctrine was not to be found in Scripture. 
18 However, "(Abd al-J abbär in his 
15. A1-Shahristani, Milal, p. 173 
16. Ibn Kammüna1 Tani al Abhäth, p. 52 
17. A1-Shahristäni, Milal, p. 176 
18. V. A. Harvey, A Handbook of Theological terms, p. 86 
ý 
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ý tot Tathbit, while describing the Nicene Creed correct/ this when he says that the 
Spirit proceeds from the Father. 
19 Along with that two converts 'Ali b. 
1) n Rabb-an al-Tabari and Hassan b. Ayyub also described it in this way", it is 
obvious that they knew Christian doctrines better than 4Abd al-Jabbär. 
5. 'Abd al-Jabbär quoted the differences which arose among the 
Christians when they tried to define the hypostases (agänim). 
i. Some of them maintained that the hypostases are actually 
(khawäss) characteristics and others as (sifät) attributes. (al- 
Mughni, P. 82/Trans P. 21). 
Yahyä b. 'Adi, a Jacobite scholar said, "that this single (Divine) essence (dhät), 
is not multiplied in itself but is described by three sifät or if it is preferred 
three khaw äss. 
21 
This would indicate that this is a Jacobite viewpoint. 
22 
ii. Others considered them persons (ashkhäi), (al-Mughni, p. 
8Z/Trans P. Z1). 
This doctrine has been attributed to the Nestorians by al-Shahristäni who says, 
they sometimes change the term and use shakhs (person) instead of 
hypostasis. Z3 
Afif b. Mu'ammil condemned the use of shakhs and said that whole person who 
could be indicated is distinguishable in the external world, while it is different 
with regard to the hypostasis. 
24 
19. ¬Abd al-Jabbär, Tathbit, vol. I, p. 94 
20. Al-Tabari, al-Radd=alä al-Nasärä, Melanges d l'Universite Saint Joseph, 
Vol. 36 (1959), p. 136, Hassan b. Ayyu'b, al-Radd, in al Jawäb al-Sahih, 
Vol. H. P. 319 
21. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, p. 74. 'Ammär al-Basari (d. 845) a Nestorian 
scholar called them essential particularities (khawäss) of God's essential 
being. 
(See, S. H. Griffith, 'Ammär al-Basar-i's Kitäb al-Burhän, Le Museon, Vol. 
NC, (1983) P. 173. 
22. Another oriental scholar Ibn (Assäl gives a similar description. See Ibid., 
p. 137 
23. A1-Shahristäni, Milal, p. 176 
Z4. Cheikho, Trois Traites, p. 76 
100 
iii. Others thought that they were aspects (wuju-h) (al-Mughni, 
p. 82/Trans. P. 2-1). 
Eutychius of Alexandria (877-940) a Melkite scholar maintained that these 
hypostases are three aspects 'ihät) worshipped in the essence of one God. 
25 
However, he denied that they should be thought of as being three (separate) 
wujüh26 (aspects). 
The distinctions here are rather hard to follow. Watt in his translation of Kitäb 
al Burhin by Eutychius fails to define or translate 'ihat and wu'üh. It would 
seem that the use of the word wu'üh implies a greater separation between the 
three hypostases than a'i hät. The use of 'iý hät to describe the hypostases seems 
to be a Melkite doctrine whereas the more separate concept of wu'üh may be 
Jacobite. 
6. 'Abd al-Jabbär then turns to the differences of opinion as to whether 
the hypostases are different or the same in hypostasy and substantiality. 
i. Some of them maintained that they were different in 
hypostasy and the same in substantiality. 
ii. Some of them said, "We do not say that they are different, but 
we do say that they are three hypostases which are the same in the 
fact that they are only one substance". (al-Mughni, p. 82/Trans, 
p. 21). 
On this matter one should refer to the statements of three Christian scholars. 
Cl 
1. Timothy I, a Nestorvn; scholar, while replying to the Caliph al- 
Mahdi, said, "If we keep in mind the substance, there is no 
difference among them. On the other hand, if we look at every one 
individually, then there is distinction among them. " 
27 
In the same debate, he also declared, "They are distinguished 
through hypostases and they are the same in nature (tabi(a). 
28 
25. Eutychius of Alexandria, Kitäb al-Burhän, vol. I, p. Z7 
26. Ibid., p. 41 
27. Cheikho, Trois Traites, p. 6 
28. Ibid., p. 7 
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2. "Afif b. Muuammil claimed that the substance is same for the 
hypostases, but hypostases are not same as each other. 
29 
3. Yahyä b. Adi asserted that each hypostasis is different than the other two in 
ma'nä30. In another treatise he said, that we say that there is a separation 
(fall) among them on the one hand, and there is no separation among them on 
the other hand. 
31. Thus it can be seen that this doctrine is supported by the 
Nestorians in the person of Timothy, the Melkites in the person of 4Afif and by 
the Jacobites with person of Yahyä. 
7. lAbd al-Jabbär attributed two doctrines about the nature of hypostases to 
the Nestorians. 
!. 
i. Some of them alleged that each of these hypostases is a living 
and speaking God. This is a doctrine of some of the 
Nestorians. 
11. The rest said, each of the hypostases on being mentioned 
individually is not a God nor living nor speaking. (al-Mughni, 
P. 82, /tran, P. 21) 
The same doctrines are reported by al-Shahristani as being 
Nestorian doctrine. 
32 
8. eAbd al-Jabbär reported the differences among the Christians about 
the meaning of kalima. 
i. Some of them maintained that the word is knowledge itself. 
(al-Mughni, P. 8 2/ tr an, P. Z 1) 
Al-Shahristäni attributed this doctrine to the Melkites, when he says 
that by the kalima they mean the hypostasis of knowledge. 
Z9. Ibid., P. 79. 
30. Ya. hyä b. 'Adi, Magälät, P. 28. 
31. Ibid., PZ8. 
- 32. A1-Shahristäni, Milal, P. 176. 
33. Al-Shahristäni, Milal, P. 176. 
33 
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11. Some of them said that the meaning of kalima is knowledge. 
It was only named kalima because it manifests itself through 
speech. (al-Mughni, P. 8Z/tran, P. 21). 
A1-Shahristäni attributed to the Nestorians when he says, then the 
Nestorians interpreted knowledge as speech (nutq) and kalima. 
34 
iii. On the other hand, the doctrine of others is that the word and 
speech are not knowledge. (al-Mughni, p. 8Z. tran. p. Zl). 
This doctrine has not been identified. 
9. 'Abd al-Jabbär described about the hypostases that whether they are 
different from one another or not? 
i. Some of them reported from them that they said, the hypostases 
are heterogeneous and this knowledge (Father's knowledge) and His 
r 
life are different. (al-Mughni, p. 8Z, /tran. p. 22) 
ft 
In other words one can say, the hypostases are other than God; the 
knowledge of God and life of God are different from Him. 
ii. Some of them reported that the hypostases themselves are 
substances and nothing else. Even though in terms of being 
hypostases, there is a distinction which is not made regarding 
terms of substance. They illustrated an example of charcoal 
when it becomes ember. (al-Mughni, P. 82/trap. P. 22). 
It has not been possible to identify the first of these doctrines. 
However both al-Shahristani and Ibn Kammüna attributed the 
analogy with charcoal, as mentioned by 4Abd al-Jabbär to the 
Jacobites. 35 
10. 'Abd al-Jabbär reported the views of three Christian sects about the 
person of Christ and his union. 
34. Ibid., P-175 
35. Ibid., P. 177, Ibn Kammüna, Tq, pp. 5Z and 53 
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i. The Nestorians claimed that Christ is God and man. 
According to them in reality the Messiah is two substances and 
two hypostases. 
ii. The Melkites believed that Christ had two substances, one of 
them is eternal and the other is created. 
iii. The majority of the Jacobites alleged that Christ has one 
substance, except that he is (formed) out of two substances. 
(al-Mughni, P. 82-83/tran, P. 22). 
(Abd al-Jabbär has correctly reported these doctrines. 
However, he used the word substance (Jawhar), while Paul of Sidon 
used the word "nature" (tabiýa). 
36 'Abd al-Jabbär sometimes also 
uses the term labia. 
37 It would seem that he regards the two terms 
as synonymous as do many Christian scholars. 
38 
11. (Abd al-Jabbär goes on to say that the Christians agreed that the 
union was an event which occurred in time (amr hädith). However they differed 
on the manner in which this union took place. He then listed five methods 
without identifying the Christian groups concerned. 
i. The word (kalima) united with that human being (i. e. Christ) by 
means of intermingling. (al-Mughni, P. 83, /tran, P. ZZ). 
Al Shahristäni and Ibn Kammüna attributed this doctrine to the 
Jacobites. 39 
36. Cheiklio, Vingt Traites, PP. 28-9 
37. 'Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, Vol. V, P. 131 
38. Yahyä b. 'Adi, Magäldt, P. 21, Cheikho, Vingt Traites, P. 2 and P. 31. 
39. Al-Shahristäni, Milal, P. 177, Ibn Kammüna, Tangih, PP. 52-3. Al- 
Shahristäni also attributed this doctrine to the Melkites (See P. 175) that is 
incorrect. Watt, while translating this section by al-Shahristäni failed to 
point out this discrepancy. 
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11. The word (kalima) adopted the form of a human person as 
temple and locus. (al-Mughni P. 83/tran, P. ZZ). 
Although the analogy of temple was attributed to Nestorians as Ibn 
Kammdna40 mentioned, the Orthodox Fathers similarly describe the 
body of Christ in its relation to the incarnate Logos as a house and a 
tabernacle and a temple. A, J. Wolfson commented that this analogy 
was applied by Saint Paul and John of Damascus. 
41 
iii. The word inhere in him and word was covered by him and his 
body. (al-Mughni, P. 83/tran, P. 22). 
This doctrine has not been identified. 
iv. It is as a picture of human being appears in a polished mirror 
when he looks into it. (al-Mughni, P83/tran, P. ZZ). 
Al-Shahristini attributed this to the Jacobites. 
4Z A1-Shahristani's 
attribution seems correct, because Yahyä b. 4Adi has used this 
analogy in his affirmation the doctrine of Trinity to explain how God 
is one jawhar of three sifit. 
43 
v. It is in accordance with the appearance of the design of a seal 
in clay which has been stamped (by the seal) without the 
(actual) design being removed from the seal, and the inherence 
r 
(of the design) in the clay. (al-Mughni, P, 83/tran, PP. 22-23). 
Al-Shahristäni seems to attribute this analogy for the union to the 
Nestorians. 44 
12. lAbd al-Jabbär reported differences among the Christians about the 
union of Will. 
40. Ibn Kam mlina, Tang-ih, P. 53 
41. A. J. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, P. 368 
42. Al-Shahristäni, Milal, P. 177 
43. Yahyä b. 'Adi, Magälät, PP. 12-17 
44. Al-Shahristäni, Milal, P. M. 
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The general substance (i. e. nature) united with the totality of 
mankind - sometimes they considered that the Son united with 
the whole of humanity, so that he will cause the redemption of 
all. (al-Mughni, PP. 83-84/tran, P. 23). 
There is no doubt that it is a Melkite doctrine because we see that 
Melkites scholars supported this point of view. '(Afif b. Mulammil, 
while describing the Melkites point of view said that the Lord Jesus 
Christ united with the general nature (tabiýa) of mankind so that he 
may cause the redemption of the race of mankind from the slavery 
of Satan. If this union was possible with a personal nature, then he 
would be only able to save one person. 
45 In this suggesting,, that 
when the word took on human nature, it was the nature shared by all 
mankind. 
Eutychius of Alexandria also said, 
"The hypostasis of the word with the entire God head, assumed total 
humanity, the whole of one mingled with the whole of the other so 
that he might give salvation through the whole of the divinity, 
giving it to the whole of humanity. 
46 
ii. He united with part of mankind (i. e. Christ) so that he brings 
.. 
about the redemption for part of humanity. (al-Mughni, PP. 83- 
84/tran, P. 23). 
According to Al-Shahristani this is a Jacobites doctrine. 
47 In 
addition Abt %ä al-Warräq, a Muutazilite, while refuting the 
Nestorians and Jacobites referred to their doctrine that union with 
humanity was partial. 
48 
13. 'Abd al-Jabbär then deals with differences among the Christians 
about the nature of Christ. 
i. He points out that "Those who believe that in the union two 
substances (natures) become one and the created (muhdath) 
45. Cheikho, Trios Traites, P. 80 
46. Eutychius f Alexandria, Kitdb al-Burhän, val. I, P. 106 
47. A1-Shahristäni, Milal, P. 177 
48. Abü`Isä al-Warräg, Al-Radd, P. 6. 
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became eternal (The Jacobites, cf No 10. (iii)) maintained that 
Christ is eternal. " (al-Mughni, P. 84/tran, P. Z3). This is also a 
49 
Jacobites doctrine as Al-Warräq and al-Shahristäni claimed. 
ii. Whereas "those who explain union different by maintaining 
that Christ is divine and human". 
This is a Melkite doctrine. In 10(ii) he refers the Melkite belief that 
"Christ had two substances, one of which is eternal and the other 
created". 
Most of the Christian scholars also supported this point of view. 
50 
14. 'Abd al-Jabbär next turned to differences of opinion among the 
Christians concerning the crucifixion and death (gatl) of Christ. 
i. "The Nestorians maintained that the crucifixion took place 
with the human parts of Christ, not the divine parts". (al- 
Mughni, P. 84/tran, P23). 
A1-Shahristäni reported the same doctrine with regard to the 
Nestorians and added as a reason, "because pains do not inhere the 
G1 ý 
deity". J 1 In the same way we see that when Caliph Mahdi asked 
Timothy I, a Nestorian Father, can God Himself die? He replied, 
"The Son of God died in one nature (i. e. human) but not in his 
divinity". 5z 
ii. The majority of the Melkites believed that the crucifixion 
took place with the entire Christ (where) Christ is divine and 
i 
human at the same time. " (al-Mughni, P. 84/tran, P. Z3). 
The same doctrine is reported by al-Shahristäni. 
53 In addition to 
that we see that Paul of Sidon, a Melkite scholar, while explaining 
the Melkite point of view, said that although the divine nature could 
49. Ibid., P. 9, Al-Shahristäni, Milal, P. 177 
50. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, P. 28, Trois Traites, P. 79 
51. Al-Shahristäni, Milal, P. 176 
52. Cheikho, Trois Traites, P. 17 
53. Al-Shahristäni Milal, PP. 173-4 
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not be harmed in reality by pain, it participated with the human 
nature in it because of the fact that (pains) are (suffered) in by the 
body (of the human nature) which is in reality united with it (the 
divine nature) in the hypostasis. 
54 
Ill. "The majority of the Jacobites alleged that crucifixion and 
death took place for one substance (nature) that is formed of 
two substances (natures)". (al-Mughni, P, 84/trap, P. 23). 
Al-Shahristäni has given a similar report and added that, "the 
Jacobites say, that if it is for the substance (nature) which formed 
(the two natures) there would be no union. 
55 
iv. Some of the Jacobites believed that Christ is one substance, 
eternal in one aspect 'iha) and created (muhdath) in another 
aspect, born in one aspect 'iha) and unborn in another aspect. 
(al-Mughni, P. 84/tran, P. 23). 
This doctrine is also attributed by al-Shahristäni to some of the 
Jacobites. 
55 It seems to be an attempt to explain the substance 
(nature) of Christ after it had been formed from the divine and 
human substance (natures). 
v. Some of them said, that death and crucifixion and pain were in 
terms of phantasy not in reality. (al-Mughni, P. 84/tran, P. Z4). 
Al-Shahristäni attributed this doctrine to a sect called Ilyäniyya. 
56 
He clearly means the Julianists. 4Abd al-Jabbär's identification of 
them as a small group of the Jacobites is also correct. 
57 
15. OAbd a1-Jabbär described the doctrine of a sect called Maronites who 
maintained "that Christ is two substances (natures) and one hypostasis in the 
sense that he has one will. " (al-Mughni, P. 84/tran, P. 24) 
54. Cheikho, Vi nt Traites, P. 40 
55. A1-Shahristani, Milal, PP. 177-8 
56. Ibid., P. 178, we have introduced this sect in the footnote of the 
translation P. 89 and in the introduction, PP. 13-14. 
57. Ibid., P. 178. 
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This description is supported by 'Afif b. Muýammil, but he used the term tabila 
instead of 'aý whar. 
58 
16. With reference to the worship of Christ, 4Abd al-Jabbär mentioned a 
doctrine without naming the sect, which held it, "the word used to enter Christ 
during the time of performing the miracles and depart from him in the rest of 
his actions". (al-Mughni, P. 85/trap, P. Z4). 
tAp- 
Al-Shahristäni reported I same doctrine without naming any sect, but he 
described it in the context of the Jacobites, but it is not a Jacobite doctrine. 
17.4Abd a1-Jabbär mentioned another analogy concerning the union, 
"that the word at the time of union passed into the womb of Mary as the arrow 
crosses the air and water into the waterpipe". (al-Mughni, P. 85/tran, P. 24). 
A1_Shahristäni attributed this analogy to a group of the Jacobites. This 
reporting of Shahristäni seems to be incorrect, because al-Näshi al-Akbar 
described it as Maronite doctrine62 and CAbd al-Jabbär himself mentioned it in 
the context of Maronites. 
58. FAfif b. Muuammil mention an unknown person called, Awghäliy-us who also 
believed that the body of Christ was a phantasy (khayäl) not a reality. 
(Cheikho, Trois Traites, P. 88). 
59. Ibid., P. 87 
60. Al-Shahristani, Milal, P. 178. 
61. Ibid., P. 178. 
62. Al-Nashi al-Akbar, Kitäb al-Awsat, P. 81. 
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CHAPTER II 
Muslim and Christians views of the Meaning of 
Jawhar and Ag nim 
IAbd al-Jabbär declares that the Christians are agreed that "(God) the Creator 
is one substance 'awhar) in three hypostases (agänim). " In order to understand 
both the Christian doctrine and to explain 'Abd al-Jabbar? and other Muslims 
critique of this term, it is necessary to examine the use and meaning of the 
terms jawhar and agänim. 
Jawhar 
Jawhar has been translated "substance". Like the substantia, this represents a 
group of philosophical notions which have been repeatedly used by Christian 
thinkers to formulate their ideas of God and especially of the Trinity. 
Substantia translates the Greek word ousia, the abstract noun of the verb 'to be' 
and its technical use begins with Plato. 
1 According to Latz, substance means, 
that which stands of itself, the independent subject, the real being or that 
which is. It is contrasted with accident (Arabic 'ard) or appearance which 
essentially inheres in substance as its support and only occurs as a further 
attribute of the real being or as the channel through which something is or 
appears. 
2 
At Nicaea the divine word was declared to be 'of one substance with 
the Father, ' the true expression of His being involving no change or diminution. 
They explained the relationship of three persons to one substance on the 
analogy of three members of a single species, while also affirming that the God 
head is an indivisible unity. 
3 In short, the word is used to express the 
underlying being, by which all three persons are one. 
4 
For 4Abd al-Jabbir jawhar implies physical being, the substance which can 
receive accidents. This word as far as 'Abd al-Jabbar is concerned means that 
1. C. Stead, A New Dictionary of Christian Theology, P. 554 
2. J. B. Latz, Encyclopedia of Theology, P. 1649 
3. C. Stead, A New Dictionary of Christian Theology. P. 554 
4. Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, P. 1319 
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God is created and temporal. 
5 He states clearly "God is not substance nor 
physical body (innahü ta%lä laysa bi-jawhar wa lä jism. ) This understanding or 
misunderstanding of the Christian use of 'aý whar is repeated by Imäm al- 
Haramayn, where he attacks the Christian doctrine of the substance of God, 
arguing that substance in the language of theologians means that which has 
extension. Alternatively, substance is defined as that which receives accidents, 
but it has been explained before that, God cannot receive contaguents. 
6 
Elias of Nisibis, a Christian apologist, has tried to def end the Christian position. 
He explained that this difficulty is essentially a matter of confusion in 
translating from Syriac. The Syriac word for self-existent being kiyän was 
translated into Arabic as 'aý whar. Now this word carried in Arabic the meaning 
of that which carried an accident. If that is the interpretation of jawhar, then 
certainly God is not jawhar. If on the other hand, jawhar is used in the sense of 
"self-existent" (g ini bi-nafsihi) then no difficulty exists.? 
Paul of Sidon, further justified describing God as a jawhar and argued that 
whoever has studied philosophy and logic, will not deny calling Him 'awhar, 
because every existent would be either jawhar (substance) or hard (accident). If 
we consider anything, we shall see either it is self-existing, that is jawhar, on 
5. Peters while explaining the philosophy of tAbd al-Jabbär about the Jawhar 
(substance) said, 
"Because 'Abd al-Jabbär's philosophy is never purely metaphysical, but 
tends always to be the expression of a physical reality, this discussion 
coincides in his doctrine with a physical world view which sees the world 
as composed of separate atoms which are brought together in composites 
to constitute material bodies. " 
He further said, "A substance, by its being pure materiality, from itself 
has only a small number of qualities, all related to the concept of 
"materiality". Besides its being a substance, it can be existent. When it 
exists, it is spatial (mutahayyiz). This is the most characteristic quality 
of a substance, because this is the meaning of materiality being in space. " 
lAbd al-Jabbar used this phrase in most of his books that God is neither 
substance nor body. It does mean that God should in that case have the 
essential qualities of a body and bodies should have the essential qualities 
of God, for, if two things have one essential quality in common, they must 
have all essential qualities in common. 
Peters, God's Created Speech, PP. 119-120 
6. A1-Juwayni, A1-Irshäd, PP. 27-28 
7. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, P. 1Z7 
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depending for its existence on something else, that is 
4ard. 8 
However, 'Abd al-Jabbär maintains the argument that God is not a substance or 
an accident, maintaining that there can be an entity which he refers to as 
ma 1 im (this which is known) which is neither substance nor accident. 
9 
This argument is not acceptable to Paul of Sidon. He maintains that there are 
substances which do not carry accident and do not occupy space. These he calls 
al jawähir al-latif a and he gives example as the substance of spirit, intellect 
and light etc. Since these jawähir latifa which are created do not carry 
accidents or occupy the space, it is even more appropriate that the Creator of 
10 
these substances has no need of any accident or space. 
A Muslim who shows more understanding of the Christian understanding of 
jawhar is a1-Bägilläni, if the quotation given by Elias of Nisibis is correct. Al- 
Bägilläni says, "If we scrutinise the saying of the Christians that God is a single 
substance of three hypostases, we find no divergence (between us) except in 
name, because Christians assert that God is a substance which is unlike created 
substances in that it is self-existent being. Thus the meaning is correct, while 
the expression is wrong. " 
11 
r 
However in Kitäb al-Tamlild, al-Bägill-ani takes a different view. There he 
argues that, if we admit that God is a jawhar, so it must be like other 
intelligible (ma$qüla) substances and from their species and able to carry 
accidents. If they accept it, so they contradicted their own religion. If they 
disagree, we shall ask them, when you deny (our statement) that God is existing, 
but neither substance nor accident, and He is not like (other) existing things in 
this world, in this way, He is not like (other) substances. There is no difference 
in these two statements. He further argued, that when we see that every 
substance has a space and carried accidents, it does indicate that such a thing 
would be created and God cannot be created. 
12 
Elias observes that if jawhar is to continue to be used in the sense in which 
Muslims are currently employing this term, then there will be no Arabic term 
8. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, P. 25 
9. A1-Mughni, P. 99 
10. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, P. 25 
11. Ibid., P. 127 
_ 12. A1-Bägilläni, Kitäb al-Tamhid, PP. 77-78 
112 
for "self-existent". In that case it would be best to use the Syriac term for 
"self-existent" namely kiyän613 Elias in another epistle has argued, and insisted 
that if it is incorrect to call God as whar, because there is no such expression 
in Islamic traditions, Muslims should indicate a specific word that can replace 
"self-existing". Otherwise they have to allow them its usage. 
14 The problem is 
clearly a problem of terminology and 'Abd al-Jabbar seems to refuse to 
acknowledge its existence, insisting that jawhar as substance must carry 
accidents and therefore cannot be used of God. It may well be that the use of 
jawhar for substance is not a good translation. The Greek for substance ousia 
corresponds with the Syriac kiyän "existing". However, the Muslim theologians, 
including gAbd al-Jabbär, would still not have accepted any term which was used 
of God and anything which carries accidents. Muslim theologians do, in fact, 





Aq nim, singular ugnüm, is the Arabic transliteration of the Syriac words for 
the Greek hypostasis. The term that played an important role in the 
controversies out of which the doctrine of the Trinity emerged. Before its 
meaning became fixed, it seems to have been capable of three interpretations. 
1. That which defines something as belonging to a class, hence essential being 
(ousia). 
2. That which stands under a set of properties. 
3. A particular embodiment of certain qualities, hence individual being. 
16 
The ambiguity of meaning was not only a source of confusion to Greek speaking 
theologians, but raised further problems for the Latins, who could not be sure 
whether to translate the term as substantia or persona. 
17 
13. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, P. 128 
14. Ibid., PP. 30-31 
15. There are occasions when Christian theologians appear to adopt almost 
identical terminology. Thus Yahyä b. 4Adi uses dhät (subsisting entity) as 
a synonym for jawhar (substance). This brings to mind earlier Christian 
theological Christian discussions where hypostases had been used to mean 
the same as ousia (substance) 
See Yahyä b. 4Adi, Maqýlät, PP. 21-22, and Cheikho, Vingt Traites, P. 13. 
16. Harvey, A Handbook of Theological terms, P. 106 
17. Ibid., P. 106 
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Eventually, with the acceptance of the Nicene homoousion a clear distinction 
between ousia was established in the east, ousia expressing the common divine 
substance by individual hypostases. Thus the 'one substance three persons' 
formula of the Latin tradition has its Greek equivalent one ousia and three 
hypostases. 18 
It was mainly under the influence of the Cappadocian Fathers that the 
terminology was clarified and standardized and the theological ambiguities 
removed. From the Council of Constantinaple of 381 onwards the formula, 
"three hypostases in one ousia" came to be everywhere accepted on an epitome 
of the orthodox doctrine of the Trinity. 
19 
It must be noted that there are certain sects which were declared as heretic by 
the Church. They maintained that the term Father, Son and Holy Spirit by 
whichtGod... head is described are only names or predicates or attributes without 
any reality, as the heresy of Praxeas, Noetus and Sabellius. On the other hand 
the apologists maintained that three members of the Trinity are real beings not 
mere names and therefore the distinction between them is real and not 
nominal. 
zo 
18. Young, New Dictionary of Christian Theology, P. 237 
19. Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, P. 685 
20. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Father, P. 310 
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CHAPTER III 
The ýifät in Islamic and Christian Theology 
In order to study IAbd al-Jabbär's arguments against the hypostases, it is 
necessary to understand the background to his view of the attribute (sifät) of 
God and their relationship with the hypostases. 
The problem of the sifät deals with the question, whether the terms applied to 
God in the Qu? än, such as living, knowing and powerful, imply the independent 
existence of life, power, knowledge which although inseparable from the entity 
of God can be distinct from Him. 
The problem also involves the question of the meaning of the terms predicated 
of God in comparison with the meaning of same terms predicated of other 
things. 
The Orthodox Doctrines 
The orthodox theory of the divine attributes as expressed by Wensinck, is that 
the divine qualities are admitted to be eternal in the full sense of the term 
azaii (without beginning) and abadi (without end). 
1 Not only the qualities of 
God but also His names, - the living, the almighty etc are confessed to belong 
to Him from eternity. 
The Kulläbiyya and the Ashharites, as representatives of orthodox theology, 
presented different arguments to the problem of iý f ät. Al-JuwaynT has given 
special attention to Ibn Kullab by writing a special chapter about him and his 
school of thought. He said, that they took on the responsibility of refuting the 
Mu'tazilites concerning their denial of the attributes of God. With reference to 
Ibn Kullab and the Kullabiyya, al-Juwayni maintained that Ibn Kulläb had a 
proper school of thought and a group with its own doctrine. 
His followers later joined the Ash4arites. 
3 According to al-Juwayni Ibn Kullab's 
1. A. J. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed, P. 202 
2. Ibid., P. 206 
_ 3. Al-Juwayni, Al-Shämil fi-Usül al-Din, PP. 54-5 
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doctrines were very similar to the doctrines of Traditionlists and Sunni's. The 
credit for this goes to Ibn Kulläb who arranged them in a proper manner. 
4 Al- 
Juwayni has presented the doctrine of Ibn Kullab as it has been recorded by Al- 
Ashlari in many places. Ibn Kullab asserted that for each of 'powerful', 
'knowing', 'eternal', there was an attribute of power, knowledge and eternity. 
According to him, God is knowing means that knowledge belongs to Him (lahü 
41m... ) and is subsistent (äq ýhn. --) within Him 
i. e., knowledge by virtue of which 
He is said to be knowing. 
5 
Ibn Kullab justified his position and interpreted it by his famous phrase, that it 
is impossible that attribute will be God and will be other than God. (lä hiya 
huwa wa 19 hiya ghayruhü). This seems to mean that they are not entirely 
different from Him but also not completely identical with Him; they share 
common features but they are not interchangeable. Ibn Kullab and his 
6 
followers never said that the sifat were aq dim but they only said, they wera 
azali (without beginning).? Perhaps this is an attempt to distinguish them from 
God as gadim is the word, traditionally associated with God and is even used by 
theologians as a synonym for God. 
In an attempt to explain the relationship between the sif ät and God, the 
Kullabiyya and Ashýarites seem to have involved the doctrine of ma an-1. Ma a 
in this context seems to mean elements within the Divine Entity which carry 
the sifat. 
8 However, they also seem sometime to be used as sifät according to 
an argument presented by 'Abd al-Jabbär. 
9 They argue that these ma%i are 
characterised neither by existence nor non-existence and suggest that they 
were equivalent to the Mu'tazilite ahwäl. 
10 
This doctrine aroused the indignation of ýAbd al-Jabbär and he tried to show the 
contradictions in ' it and unsystematic way in which the Kulläbiyya and the 
Ash'arites presented it. eAbd al-Jabbär said, that at first they characterised 
sifät as maeäni, when they called them knowledge, power and life. Then at the 
same time, they characterised them as attributes. And finally they maintained 
4. Ibid., P. 55 
5. Ibid., P. 55, a1-Ashtfari magälät, PP. 169-170, P. 546 
6. Ibid., P. 546-7., E. I. (S), P. 391 
7. A. K. 4Uthmazi, Na: ýriyya al-Taklik, P. 176 
8. For details see, Peters, God's Created Speech, PP. 156-157 
9. 'Abd al-Jabbär, Sharh, PP. 183-4 
10. Ibid., P. 184 
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that they could not be characterised. All these be found to be totally 
contradictory and incomprehensible. 
ll 
He did concede that if they meant by these magi what the Mu'tazilite meant 
by a 4w-al, then he would accept that doctrine. 
12 
As far as al-Ashlari is concerned, he followed Ibn Kulläb in affirming the 
attributes of God, but he differentiated between positive and negative 
attributes. He is in agreement with the Mu'tazilites in the latter not the 
former. He also affirmed seven attributes in God's entity like Ibn Kulläb and he 
interpreted them in the same way as Ibn Kulläb did. It is to be noted that there 
is no difference of opinion between Mu'tazilites and Ashoarites about attributes 
pertaining to action (sif ät al-fi1), because they are extra from His entity and 
created. The difference is only about attributes pertaining to the subsisting 
entity. 
Finally, there is the question of the exact position of these attributes according 
to Ash'arites. 
Are they identical with_the entity or additional to it, or in a technical term, are 
- CAA 
they nafsi or mAnav . 
isiafsi means which describes the entity itself and not by 
a ma'nä (element which bears an attribute) existing in it additional to the 
entity. '/ manav means, what is attributed to the entity from a ma'nä subsisting 
in it. 
13 
The AsWarites and Kulläbiyya maintained, that these attributes are ma'nawJand 
additional to the entity. So they say, God is living by life which is additional to 
His entity, knowing by knowledge, which is additional to His entity. The same 
is the case in the phenomenal world. 
The Development of the Mu'tazilite Doctrines up to time of 'Abd al-Jabbär 
When the orthodox doctrine became exaggerated, it led to a form of 
anthropomorphism. This led to a reaction. Thus it has been suggested that 
Wäsil b. Atä' denied the existence of any attributes including knowledge, power 
11. Ibid., P. 184 
1 2. Ibid., P. 184 
13. Sweetman, Islam and Christian Theology, vol. II, Part Z, P. 110 
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and will on the grounds of their implying polythism, when he said, "Whoever 
affirmed matäni (elements which carry attributes) and an eternal attribute 
(sifa), has affirmed two deities. "14 - It is also possible to assume that it was in 
his subconscious that the Muslims should not get involved themselves in such a 
doctrine as the Christian had done before, by affirming three permanent 
attributes, i. e., existence, knowledge and life which they called hypostases. 
15 
The followers of Jahm b. Safwän, a contemporary of Wäsil maintained that God 
has neither knowledge nor power. They believed that He is neither knowing nor 
powerful because such attributes would belong to other than Him. 
16 Jahm was 
thus the first to introduce into Islamic theology the semantic aspect of the 
problem of attributes. 
17 
After the death of Jahm, his theory was modified by his two contemporaries, 
Al-Najjär and Dirär. As far as Najjär is concerned, one can conclude from his 
theory that he denied the existence of any real attributes in God. He 
interpreted all terms attributed to God as being predicated by virtue of Himself 
(li-nafsihi). He suggested that all affirmative propositions in which positive 
terms are predicated about God are to be taken as being negative in meaning. 
18 
On the other hand, Dirär maintained that the meaning of the statement that 
God is knowing or powerful is that He is not ignorant and powerless. He had a 
similar attitude towards the other attributes of the Creator as being predicated 
of Him by virtue of Himself (li-nafsihi). 
19 
Consequently, it seems that Najjar and Dirar were the first to introduce the 
negative interpretation of attributes into Islamic theology. 
The Mu'tazilites regarded the divine attributes as being an element of 
multiplicity in the unity of God's nature or essence (tabifa, dhat). They alleged 
that these attributes did not have any independent existence but were 
14. A. K. 'Uthmän pointed out this view, see his Qädi a1-Qu4ät, P. 153 
15. A1-Shahristäni, Milal, PP. 31-32 
16. A1-Ash'ari, A1-Ibäna, P. 54 
17. A. H. Wolfson, Philosophical implications of the Problem of Divine 
Attributes in the Kaläm, J. A. 0. S, vol. LXXIX, (1959) P. 75 
18. Al-Ash ari, Magälät, P. 284, Shahristani, Milal, P. 62 
19. A1-Ash'ari, Magälät, P. 281 
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merged in the Unity of God's being. 
Z° 
Among the Mu'tazila, al-Nazzäm (d. 845), denied knowledge, power, hearing, 
seeing and other essential attributes and maintain that God is continuously 
knowing, living by virtue of Himself (Ii-nafsihi) but not by virtue of knowledge, 
power, life etc and the same was the case with regard to the rest of the 
essential attributes. 
21 
With regard to the Mu'tazilite, Abd al-Hudhayl (d. 849), two views are 
attributed to hire. 
1. Glory, mighty, splendour and greatness and other attributes by which God is 
described are predicated of Him by virtue of Himself (li-nafsihi). 
ZZ 
2. God is knowing by virtue of a knowledge which is Himself (hü) and He is 
powerful by virtue of power which is Himself and He is living by virtue of a life 
which is Himself and the same with the rest of the attributes. 
23 When both al- 
Nazzäm and Abü al-Hudhayl described the divine attributes as terms predicated 
of God by virtue of Himself, they seem to mean thereby that each of these 
terms indicate a property of God. 
Abü al-Hudhayl is also reported as maintaining a doctrine which contradicted 
the earlier report, namely that God is knowing by virtue of Himself means that 
knowledge is other than God. On the other hand, al-Na; zäm affirmed that any 
property predicated of Him belongs to Him only. 
One has reason to believe, that according to these Mu'tazilite theologians, any 
attribute of God could not have a positive meaning but must be interpreted 
negatively. Al-Shahristani while reporting the details of Abu al-Hudhayl's 
formula, and another formula which he quoted anonymously (but one can 
recognise as al-Nazzäm's theory) is that the former is an affirmation of what 
later Abü Häshim called modes (ahwäl), or the same as the Christians 
20. Watt, Islamic Philosophy and theology, P. 49 
21. Al-Ash T, Maq lät, PP. 884-6 
22. Ibid., P. 177, see also R. M. Frank. The Divine Attributes according to the 
Teaching of Al;, a- A1-4A1llf, Le Museon, vol'. LXXXII, (1969), 
PP. 459-467 
23. Ibid., P. 165 
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claim as hypostases. Whereas the latter is a denial of the modes. 
24 Abu al- 
Hudhayl was also the first to divide the attributes of God into two categories. 
1. Sifät al-dhät, (essential attributes or attributes pertaining to the entity) 16- 
2. Sift al-M, (attributes pertaining to the action). 
The first category consists of knowledge, power, life, hearing and seeing. God 
cannot be characterised by their opposite functions, i. e., He would not be 
ignorant, powerless and so on. On the other hand, according to second category 
God can be Characterised by their opposite functions, as His being willing and 
unwilling etc. 
25 
Later Mu'tazilites and Ash'arites also divided the attributes into these 
categories, although they have differences about the number of attributes. 
Even oriental Christian scholars categorised the attributes of God and asserted 
dhät, nutq and hikma were in first category and others in the second 
26 
category. 
Because of this new theory, Abü al-Hudhayl, faced criticism from AslArites. 
Al-Baghdädi countered his theory with the following argument. "If Allah is 
knowledge and power, it is not that He should be knowing and powerful because 
knowledge cannot be knowing and power cannot be powerful. He should be 
forced to draw the same conclusion if he said that knowledge of Allah is Allah, 
and His power is Allah. This amounts to saying that His knowledge is power, 
and if Allah's knowledge is His power, Abi al-Hudhayl must conclude that what 
is known to Him is performed by His power. The being of God therefore would 
be something performed by His power because it is known by Him. This is a 
form of unbelief and what leads to it is like it. " 
Z7 
After Abü al-Hudhayl there were two other Mu'tazilite scholars who have 
somewhat different views. bbd b. sulaymän (d. about 250/864) maintained 
24. Al-Shahristäni, Milal, P. 34. 
Z5. Al-Khyyat, Al-Int-isär, P. 75, see also R. M. Frank, The Divine Attributes 
according to the Teaching of Abü al-Hudhayl AljAllaf, Le Museon, vol. 
LXXXII, (1969), PP. 469-473 
26. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, P. 57, PP. 126-7 
Z7. Al-Boghdädi, Muslim Schism and Sects, PP. 130-131 
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that God is knowing, living and powerful without affirming any knowledge, life 
and power. Consequently He is knowing without knowledge and powerful 
without power. -Mutammar (d. 850), on the other hand, introduced a new 
interpretation for this issue when he said, that every change that occurs in this 
universe, is through a maýnä (an element which bears an attribute) that He 
created. He further added that these ma'änf are continuous without any end. 
Thus God is knowing through a knowledge and His knowledge is due to a ma'nä, 
and this malnä to another without any end. 
28 
In the third phase of the debate the renowned Mu'tazilites Abi 'Ali and his son 
Abü Häshim al-Jubbäli introduced more developed arguments. However they 
had a difference of opinion in this matter. As reported by al-Shahristänf, 
although both scholars described the relation of attributes to God by the 
expression "by virtue of His entity" (li-dhätihi), they each interpreted that 
differently. 
Abi 4Ali al-Jubbä"i denies the attributes when he says that the fact that God is 
knowing or living by virtue of His entity indicates that His being knowing is not 
an attribute as knowledge or as a mode or state (4ä1) that requires His being 
knowing. Z9 There is another report by al-Ah'ari that Abu Ali al-Jubbä'i 
rejected the theory of Abü al-Hudhayl, i. e., God is knowing with a knowledge 
which is His entity. Al-Jubb .i maintained that there is no knowledge, no power 
by which He is knowing and having power in reality. He simply said God is 
knowing by His entity. 
30 But he approved the distinction between sifat al-dhät 
(attributes pertaining to the entity) and *ifät al-fi'l (attributes pertaining to the 
action). 
Al-Ashtari and al-Baghdädi have criticised al-Jubbä? i's claim, that the names of 
Allah are subject to the regular rules of grammar. Therefore it is possible to 
derive a name for Him from every deed which He performs. Consequently they 
are rational considerations. (iýibärät $agliyya). 
Al-Ash'ari argued in replying that, "There is nothing that we call it extra from 
His entity. This heresy of yours is worse than the heresy of the Christians in 
calling God the Father of Christ although they do not hold, that 
28. Al-Ash4ari, Magälät, P. 228 
Z9. A1-Shahristäni, Milal, PP. 55-56 
30. A1-Ashi ari, Magälät, P. 524 
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He produced pregnancy in Mary-" 
31 
On the other hand, Abu 'Ali's son, Abü Häshim maintained that the generic 
names were mere words to which the reality corresponded. Abü Hishim 
avoided the word quality or attributes that caused a bitter atmosphere between 
Mu'tazilites and orthodox Muslims. He suggested that the state "God knows" 
means that He is in a state of knowing and same is the case with regard to 
other attributes. States are neither known or unknown, neither existent nor 
non-existent, neither eternal nor temporal, neither God nor other than God. 
32 
There is another difference of opinion among the theologians on both sides 
about the nature (kaifiyya) of attributes and number of self-pertaining 
attributes (sifit al-dhät). 
According to al-Ash i, there are seven, i. e., knowledge, power, life, will, 
hearing, seeing and speech. Al-Jubbä'i only accepted two i. e., knowledge and 
power. While Abi ai-Husayn al-Basri denied all attributes except one, which he 
called al 'älamiyya (universility). The majority of the Mu'tazilites maintained 
at least five essential attributes, i. e., knowledge, power, life, will and 
hearing. 33 
4Abd al-Jabbär Doctrines of Sif at 
4Abd al-Jabbar's own views about the attributes of God were similar to his 
earlier teachers, although there were some differences and developments. 
Unfortunately, the first two volumes of al-Mughni are missing in which he had 
discussed the problem of attributes in detail, but in his two other works, i. e., al- 
Muhi and Sharh, he has provided a fairly clear picture. 
First of all Abd al-Jabbär has divided the attributes into two categories. 
1. God's essential attributes or attributes pertaining to subsisting entity. (sif it 
al-dhät). 
31. A1-Baghdädi, Muslim Schism and Sects, PP. 188-9 
32. Al-Shahristäni, Milal, P. 58. See also R. M. Frank, Abi Hishim's Theory 
of "States", Acts, Do IV Congress De Estudos Arabs E. Islamicos (1971), 
PP. 85-100 
33. Al-Räwi, 'Abd al-Sattär, Al-=Aql wa al-I urriya, PP. 254-5 
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2. His functional attributes or attributes pertaining to action. (sifät al-fi'l). 
'Abd al-Jabbär explained this division and said that some attributes follow the 
existence of an act from Him, whereas others do not. 
34 'Abd al-Jabbär in his 
'^PV works i. e., Sharh and al-Muhit declared that there are only four essential 
attributes. 
1. powerful (cädir) 
Z. knowing ('älim) 
3. living (h. yy) 
4. eternal (ac dim) 
He accepted them as essential attributes (attributes pertaining to the subsisting 
entity) in agreement with Abü 'Ali and other scholars. Such attributes as His 
being willing, non-willing and what follows the divine names and qualities on His 
being mighty, powerful and great refer to His attribute gädir. 
35 4Abd al-Jabbar 
made it clear that 1älim (knowing) and 4ilm (knowledge) are not two separate 
things. They are actually one thing. On this point he considered the dualists, 
the Christians and the attrib iu 
sts 
(including Kulläbiyya and AsWarites) in the 
same category. 
In his opposition to the Kulläbiyya and the Ash'arites 'Abd al-Jabbär argued that 
if we admit that God is knowing through a knowledge, it would be either known 
or unknown. In case of latter, its affirmation is impossible. If it is known, then 
it would be existing or non-existing. It cannot be non-existing. In case of 
existing, it would be eternal or created. According to 'Abd al-Jabbär all such 
categories are invalid. So there would be only one aspect that He is knowing 
because of His subsisting entity. 
36 
'Abd al-Jabbär further criticised those who maintained the doctrine of the 
attributes by arguing that if we admit that He is living through life, and as a 
matter of fact, life cannot be perceived except as a result of its application 
34. 'Abd al-Jabbär, Sharh, P. 130 
35. (Abd al-Jabbäx, al-Muhit, vol. I, P. 100 
36. Shard, P. 183 
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through location (mahall), then ultimately God would be a body 'ism). In the 
same way, power cannot be applied except as a result of its application through 
a location. In this case, God would be a body and a location of the accidents. 
37 
'Abd al-Jabbär gave two explanations of his opponents and then refuted them. 
The first was that they affirmed the fact that He is knowing, required that He 
would be knowing through knowledge, because a knowing person is one who has 
knowledge. They supported their argument that we see through evidence that 
every knowing person has a knowledge. Therefore, the same is the case for that 
which is invisible. 
The second was that knowledge is a cause for being a subsisting entity which is 
knowing, and a cause must be studied through all its aspects. Therefore it 
requires that every knowing would be knowing through a knowledge. 
These arguments were attacked by 
CAbd al-Jabbär when he maintained that 
there was no evidence that everyone of us was knowing through a knowledge. 
Thus their analogy was invalid. He further remarked that if everyone who is 
present (shähid), who is knowing has a knowledge, then, is the case of one 
who is absent. According to 'Abd al-Jabbär they relied upon mere existence. In 
this way, if there is anybody who is present, who has a heart, then they have to 
make the same decision on the one who is absent. 
If they maintained that knowledge was a cause for a knowing person, they would 
have to maintain that movement is cause of body. According to tAbd al-Jabbär 
this analogy was unacceptable because movement could only exist when the 
body was moving. Whereas a body can be movable and unmovable. 
38 
tAbd a1-Jabbär has mentioned the Kulläbiyya sect, during the discussion against 
the Christians at least seven times in his al-Mughni and there is also a 
39 
separate section in al-Mughni vol. VII, for the refutation of Kulläbiyya with 
regard to eternal speech. 
40 In the same way he criticised the Kulläbiyya during 
the discussion about the Christians three times in his Sharb41 and once in his al- 
37. Ibid., PP. 200-201 
38. Ibid., PP. 205-6 
39. Al-Mughni, vol. V, PP. 86,87,88,93,95,97,142 
40. Al-Mughni, vol. VII, PP. 95-179 




Mishit. '" In all these twelve attacks against Kullabiyya, it is evident that they 
concerned with the attributes. More than once 'Abd al-Jabbir declared that 
Kulläbiyya are more perverted and worse than the Christians because they have 
increased the number of the eternal. During his criticism, he has declared that 
the Kulläbiyya and the Christians are in the same category. There is no 
difference between them except their way of expression. 
43 
The Sif t and Hypostases: 
It has become clear that there is great similarity at one level in the Islamic 
doctrines of sif ät, the doctrine of attributes, and the Christian doctrine of 
hypostases. Even the majority of the Mu'tazilites, including IAbd al-Jabbär, 
conceded the possibility of a limited number of sifat, the essential attributes or 
rather to be more precise, the attributes pertaining to the subsisting entity 
ý (sifät li.. dhätihi). 
It is noticeable that these attributes are very similar to the attributes used by 
Christians to describe the hypostases, e. g. knowledge, power and life. Yet it 
seems that this is, in fact not so much a result of Muslim borrowing from 
Christians as Christians using the Muslim attributes to define the hypostases of 
the Trinity. 45 
It has already been observed that Christians did occasionally use the word 
42. Al-Muhit, vol. I, P. 222 
_ 43. Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, vol. V, P. 88 
44. Wolfson has remarked, "that Muslims began to discuss the divine 
attributes under the influence of a discussion about the Trinity". He 
pointed out that the Mu'tazilites especially chose such attributes, as he 
suggested were already used by the Christians as knowledge, power, life 
etc. Consequently one can say that the Muslims borrowed this idea and 
applied it in elaborating their own doctrine of God. 
Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Kalam, PP. 126-127 
45. Wolfson's theory has been criticised by S. H. Griffith, who pointed out 
that his mistaken initial assumption is that the Muslims have borrowed 
these lists from Christians. 
He also remarked against the theory of Wolfson, that he is missing the 
point that the Christian apologists were taking their cue from the Muslim 
mutakallimun and not vice versa. 
Sidney H. Griffith, Habib ibn Hidmah Abi Rä'itah, Oriens Christians, vol. 
LXIV, (1980), P. 188 
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dhät46 as a synonym for jawhar, probably under the influence of Muslim 
theologians. Where this does happen that they also describe the hypostases as 
sif ät. 
The Nestorian Christian apologist 4Ammär al Basri comes close to the Islamic 
doctrine of sif at when he describes living (h" ayy) and speaking (nätiq) as 
referring to the ma'ani, life and etc, (This use of the word seems to involve the 
Kulläbiyya usage when it is equivalent to sifät47) because of the dhat. 
However, he then adds, because of the constitution (binyya) of the 'awha_r. As 
has already been pointed out the use of jawhar was unacceptable to Muslim 
theologians. 
The Christian doctrine appears in its fullest form in the writings of Elias, the 
bishop of Nisibis (d. 1049). He says: 
"The names of God belong to two categories that which refer to His being and 
essence i. e., the essential attributes or attributes pertaining to the entity 
(dhätiyya) as we say self-existing, wise and living, and those which refer to His 
actions (filliyya), which are derived from such things as Him being Creator, 
generous, providing, merciful etc .... and what is similar to that. Thus to say 
that God is living and wise is the equivalent of saying that He is self-existent 
(gä im bi_nafsihi). When we say that God is living and wise, it is as affirmation 
of Him as dää. The point is that life and wisdom in the Godhead are not 
additional composite powers, as they are in men's wisdom and life. Rather life 
and wisdom are part of God's essence (being) and very nature, and inseparable 
from His being. On the other hand, the attributes like creation, generosity, will 
and mercy are gifät fi'liyya (attributes pertaining to action) and are related to 
the actions of God. For example, khalaga is derived from khalaga yakhluqu ..... 
and etc. All these sifät fi'liyya are derived from verbs and they are related to 
both the Creator and the creature. Thus the epithet "generous" is concerned 
with Him and to those to whom He showed generosity and the same is the case 
with regard to other attributes. 
(Finally, he concluded) that the same would be applied in all such names that 
are derived from dhät (essence) i. e. being, wisdom and life. Since dhät 
46. Thänawý, Dictionary of Technical Terms, vol. I, P. 519 
47. Sidney H. Griffith, "Ammar al Basri's Kitäb al-Burhän, Le Museon, vol. 
IVC, (1983), P. 170 
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(essence) wisdom and life are self pertaining characteristics and will, 
generosity, mercy and the like are attributes pertaining to actions. So they 
called dhät (essence) wisdom and life as characteristics (khawäss) and 
hypostases and will, generosity and mercy and what is similar like that would be 
named as attributes. "48 
From this quotation, we can see that Elias has practically adopted the Muslim 
classification of sifät. It also appears that he has used dhät as an equivalent of 
jawhar and khawäss and sift as equivalent of hypostases. However the 
quotation also shows that he used dhät as equivalent to hypostasis. Thus, 
although heavily influenced by Muslim theology, we are left with the 
unsatisfactory definition of dhät as both hypostasis and substance. 
However it is the case that traditional Christian theology would have applied all 
the sifät li-dhätihi to each of the hypostases. As a result of using Muslim ideas 
about the sifät to explain the Trinity, they have opened themselves to 
arguments about the need for each hypostasis to be living and knowing etc, 
arguments which 4Abd al-Jabbär ruthlessly presses home. 
49 
48. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, PP. 126-7 
49. A1-Mughni, P. 91, see also Chapter II, PP. 110-114. 
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CHAPTER W 
A Comparative Analysis of 'Abd al-Jabbar 
critique of Trinitarian Doctrines 
In his study of Christian doctrines in al-Mughni, 'Abd a1-Jabbär concentrates 
almost exclusively on two areas, i. e., Trinitarian and Christological doctrines. 
It has been necessary to categorise 4Abd al-Jabbär's criticism of Trinitarian 
doctrines because his own presentation lacks rigorous systemisation and as a 
result it is difficult to differentiate between his arguments. Whenever possible 
there has been an attempt to substantiate the statement he attributes to 
Christians in the light of Christian scholars writing in Arabic and other more 
general works. 
ýAbd al-Jabbär first objects to the generally accepted Christian doctrine of the 
Trinity, that "God is one substance 'awhar) of three hypostases (agänim)". He 
maintains that this will destroy the unity of God or absolute oneness of God. 
4Abd al-Jabbär is prepared to concede some of their argument as being merely 
terminological if they do not mean by "hypostases" independently subsisting 
entities (dhawit) which can be associated with attributes (sifät). Thus they can 
describe God as knowing without predicating an independent subsisting entity, 
knowledge. He is therefore demanding a definition of hypostasis which would 
exclude from it any idea of an independently subsisting entity. 
l This was a 
problem that has concerned Christian theologians right up to the time of the 
general acceptance of this doctrine. However, 'Abd al-Jabbär himself is guilty 
of some exaggerated terminology. The meaning of dhawät as independently 
self-subsisting entities was a meaning that had been possible for hypostases in 
the early days of the Christian discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity. It was 
no longer really a possible translation. As far as `Abd al-Jabbär is concerned he 
argued that, if they do insist that the hypostases are independently subsisting 
entities associated with attributes, they are guilty of polytheism. He uses this 
opportunity to compare the Christian doctrine with that of the Kulläbiyya who 
maintained that attributes such as power, knowledge and eternity were not God 
and not other than God. Thus by implication accusing the Kulläbiyya of making 
1.4Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, vol. V. P. 86 
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the attributes (sifät) of God equivalent to the Christian hypostases. 
2 By using 
the word dhawät, he seems to be deliberately distorting the Kulläbiyya doctrine 
of ma'äni elements within the deity which carry attributes. He seems to 
describe the Kulläbiyya view by indicating that the ma'äni and the sifät, 
attributes, are according to them the equivalent to dhawät. 
'Abd al-Jabbär then goes on to argue that since the hypostases are, according to 
the Christians, eternal they cannot be characterised by anything which would 
distinguish the one from the other. 
3 Although the argument is not effectively 
presented, it seems to involve the implication that the eternal substance of God 
in the three hypostases would necessitate that they were identical, inseparable 
and undifferentiated. Thus there is little point in speaking of them as three. 
He then argues that if the Son is identical and shares the eternity of His Father, 
he would be similar in His self-subsisting entity (essence). This means that as 
the Father has a Son who is called His knowledge and Word (Kalima), the Son in 
the same way would require also another Son that would be called his knowledge 
and word (kalima) in an infinite series. 
4 The same is the case with the Spirit. 
This argument is one of logical casuistry and really adds nothing to the 
discussion, except for scoring neat points of argument. 
He follows this with an argument of a similar kind. He points out the fact that 
the hypostases are of one substance 'awhar) requires that, as in the previous 
argument, they must each be the same. Therefore Fatherhood and Sonship 
refer inevitably to the subsistent being of God. Nor can the terminology of 
knowledge and the Word, when used of the Son, exclude from God the Father 
(i. e. the one God), these attributes. 
5 This again brings him back to a 
comparison with the doctrine of the Kullabiyya on God's attributes. 
A second difficulty raised by the earlier theologians is that each hypostasis 
must be a separate deity since they are identical through being eternal. Thus 
the Father is a deity, then like Him the other hypostases must have their own 
hypostases and another infinite series is established. 
6 
Z. Ibid., P. 86 
3. Ibid., P. 87 
4. Ibid., P. 86-87 
5. Ibid., P. 86-87 
6. Ibid., P. 87 
129 
Again he accuses the Kulläbiyya of tendencies which are to him as logically 
erroneous as the Christians. At this point in his discussion, he becomes so 
involved in the inter-Islamic dispute about the attribute (sif ät) that he accuses 
the Kulläbiyya of being worse than the Christians. 
7 
'Abd al-Jabbar then presents the Christian defence of their position that God is 
one by declaring that there are three hypostases and one substance with the 
stress for unity of God on one substance. He proceeds to take on this argument 
in terms of meaning and use of language with the implication that the three 
hypostases cannot be one when it has been demonstrated that they are three 
subsisting entities. He goes on to show that the Christians who maintain that 
the hypostases are different but not different in substance are just like the 
Kulllbiyya. 8 
He then pursues the argument by maintaining that to say that three is one and 
one is three (in reality) is irrational. To him the doctrine of Trinity is illogical 
and inconceivable. Even though a single man may be part of a set of ten and 
one man may be identified with the total in general speech, in reality he is 
separate from the total, since he is characterised by his own attributes. If 
Christians refer to their doctrine in this way, they must admit that the distinct 
hypostases are characterised by separate attributes. 
9 
'Abd al-Jabbär removed the objection that Arabs can speak of one thing as 
identical to the set to which it belongs, or of a man being composed of many 
parts because these are mode of expression. According to him, the Christian 
cannot escape the contradiction in their doctrine. 
10 
He has repeated the same argument in his Sharh, in which he argued that the 
intention behind our statement that someone is one man is that he is a member 
of the group of the people. Similarly, when we say one house or one group, it is 
in contrast to what they are saying about God. They are making Him one thing 
in reality of three things in reality. Therefore the contradiction is 
confirmed. 
11 
7. Ibid., P. 88 
8. Ibid., PP. 88-89 
9. Al-Mughni, vol. V, P. 89 
10. Ibid., P. 89-90 
11. Shan , P. 293 
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He goes on to declare that the doctrine is as contradictory as saying that a 
thing is existing and non-existent at the same time, or claiming that a 
substance is white or black at the same time. According to 4Abd al-Jabär this is 
so unreasonable that there is no need to refute it. 
12 
He argues that they cannot say that the hypostases are the same in their 
subsisting entities but different in attributes which do not refer, -- to the 
subsisting entities but to elements which entitle them to attributes. 
13 What 
4Abd al-Jabbär intends by this argument is that when Christians define each 
hypostasis as a dhät to which a particular attribute (sifa) applies, e. g. the Son is 
knowledge and therefore "Knowing" applies specially to him, at the same time 
they have to apply other sifät to the hypostases which are not their specific 
attributes. In this way they would be involved in the contradiction of all such 
attributes which are specific to each hypostases being applied to all three 
hypostases. Thus they have to admit in their own doctrine that the Father is a 
living knowing Father. Similarly, they would have to admit that the Son is a 
living knowing Son and the Spirit is a living knowing spirit. Therefore what they 
are in fact saying, according to Abd al-Jabbär is that the hypostases are the 
same and different. 
In another argument 4Abd al-Jabbar made a similar objection by maintaining 
that if the substance of three hypostases is one substance, it means that each 
hypostasis is entitled to the same attributes, because they have the same 
substance. 
14 
In his Shard he argued in another way, that in this case they must confine 
themselves to one hypostasis, because where these hypostases share in eternity, 
they must resemble one another and in terms of what refers to their entities 
one of them could be the other. This would require that one of them could 
dispense with the rest. So that it could be said that God is one substance and 
one hypostasis. 
is 
He suggests that to say the Father and the Son are different but of one 
substance is to say that each could sometimes be one substance and other times 
12. A1-Mughni, P. 90 
13. Ibid., P. 91 
14. Ibid., P. 95 
15. Shark, P. 295 
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not be of it. To 'Abd al-Jabbir this is nonsense. Consequently he argues that 
they would have to admit that the hypostases were different for the same 
reason as they were the same. Again to ýAbd al-Jabbär this is logically 
irrational. 16 
He further explained that if they argue that the hypostases are different 
because of their entities and substances, then, if their substance is the same, 
their entities must be the same. Otherwise the hypostases would be different 
also in substantiality as they are different in hypostasy and it is totally against 
the doctrine of Melkites and Jacobites. 
17 
Here 'Abd al-Jabbär seems to be deliberately distorting the doctrine of aspect 
as put forward by Yahyä b. 'Adi when he maintained that they were the same 
from one aspect and different from another . 
18 1Abd al-Jabbär chooses to 
understand "aspect" here and referring to either substantiality or hypostasy. He 
further argued, that, when the substance of the Son is same as the Father, so 
the Son can become a Father. So they must affirm the Son as a Father because 
the substance is common. He further extended his charge, that such an 
affirmation is necessary because according to them the Fatherhood is an 
attribute of God and one of the things which must be without imperfection. 
Consequently, the Son must be called as Father, otherwise the Son who is God 
would be incomplete. 
19 
Here (Abd al-Jabbar has again misrepresented 
Christian doctrine. The doctrine is that, the Father is perfect God, the Son is 
perfect God and the Holy Spirit is perfect reference, but they are not three 
Gods but one. 
20 
However 1Abd al-Jabbar interprets this as the statement that, 
"Fatherhood is one of the things which must be without imperfection. " He is 
perhaps anticipating an argument that he will present about the idea of 
Fatherhood requiring a Son to complete its meaning. 
tAbd al-Jabbär then turns to the Melkites doctrine that the hypostases are the 
substance yet the substance is different from the hypostases. 
Zl 
To him again 
this is a series of total contradictions. In putting forward this Melkite doctrine 
at the beginning of the section, LAbd al-Jabbär stated that they claimed there 
16. A1-Mughni, PP. 95-96 
17. Ibid., P. 96 
18. Yahyä b. ýAdi, Magälät, P. 28 
19. Ibid., P. 96 
Z0. Cheikho, Vingt Traites P. 56 
21. See translation, cf. P. 21. 
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was no fourth (entity) involved. He now proceeds to demonstrate that when 
they say that the substance is different from the hypostases, they are 
automatically involving four (entities). 
22 
If they tried to argue, contrary to their own belief, that the substance was one 
of the three hypostases, then they would be guilty of declaring that one thing 
was different from itself by virtue of their doctrine that the substance was 
different from the hypostases. 
23 This argument has been constructed by CAbd 
al-Jabbär and is not held by the Christians. It is a good example of tAbd al- 
Jabbär's polemical style of setting up arguments in order to rebut them. It in 
fact adds nothing to the discussions. 
'Abd al-Jabbär presents Christianity with three options, each of which 
undermine the basis of the doctrine of the Trinity. 
Elaborating this argument, he goes on to declare that if God is a substance 
which has three hypostases, then these would be things added to God which 
were not God. 
24 He does not present this argument clearly but it seems that he 
is trying to make Christians admit that the hypostases are eternal 
manifestations of attributes, for he goes on to suggest that this would be like 
the Kulläbiyya who hold this view. 
25 
He further argued, that for the Melkites, the true deity is either substance or 
the hypostases, that three plus one cannot make four. There must be a 
substance for the hypostases since they are identical with the substance and a 
separate substance since it is distinct from them making two substances. 4Abd 
al-Jabbär switches his attack to numbers and presents us with the same 
arguments presented in the logic of arithmetic. 
Z6 
Using an argument which he repeats later, 
27 he demands that if they maintain 
that God is one substance in three hypostases, the reverse is possible that He is 
three substances of one hypostasis. Especially as they maintain that nothing 
which is not a substance can exist by itself. Therefore if the hypostases are 
22. Ibid., P. 96-97 
23. Ibid., P. 96 
24. Ibid., P. 97 
25. A1-Mughni, P. 97 
26. A1-Mughni, P. 97 
V. A1-Mughni, P. 104, tran, P. 47 
0 
133 
independently existing entities, they must have their own substance. Thus if 
there is an eternal substance for the hypostases and one for the substance, a 
kind of dualism emerges. This argument does not seem really effective. 
Perhaps the reason is that 'Abd al-Jabbär totally rejects the Christian concept 
of God being a substance, and therefore does not give proper understanding to 
the Christian view. 
28 
In an argument either directly taken from, or at least based upon, Abü All al- 
Jubbä i, he argues against the hypostases in terms of being attributes. He is 
using a rigidly Mu'tazilite framework and is attacking the Kulläbiyya, whom he 
mentions specifically as much as the Christians. By describing the Son as 
Knowledge and the Spirit as Life, they would have to affirm many hypostases 
for each of the attributes that they associate with God, e. g. Power, hearing, 
seeing etc. If they deny these attributes to God, why should they associate 
Living and Knowing with Him? On the other hand, if they maintain that God 
has Power and the other attributes as an integral part of His subsisting entity, 
why should the same not apply to Life and Knowledge? If they try and limit the 
attributes by saying that Life is Power, hearing, seeing etc, then why not say 




The Christian identification of the Son as the eternal Word of God immediately 
bears on the inter Islamic debate of whether the Word of God is eternal and 
uncreated. Therefore, in arguing against the Christian doctrine, 'Abd al-Jabbar 
is also to some extent attacking Muslim theologians who maintained the 
doctrine of the eternal uncreated Word of God. In his view speech belongs to 
the genus of accident i. e. sound (sawt) is an accident and consequently cannot 
be a substance. So God cannot be called speaking from eternity, because 
speech is created. 
When Christians identify the Son, who is according to them God, as the Word 
and Speech, they are in effect, identifying Him with something which is 
created, namely speech. If God the Father is the Speaker, then God the Son 
must be created speech. However paradoxically if the Son is God, He must also 
be a Speaker, which must involve him also in having another who is speech. 
30 
28. A1-Mughni, P. 104 
29. A1-Mughni, PP. 91-92 
30. A1-Mughni, P. 98 
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In stating that Christians are forced to admit that God is subject to division 
into three because they maintain that He is body subject to change and is 
created, ýAbd al-Jabbar is bringing together two of his arguments against 
Christianity in a rather confused way. It has already been pointed out, that 
'Abd al-Jabbär refused to understand substance as being anything but body 
'ism) using this, he refers to concept of the Trinity as implying discussion of 
the substance and then proceeds to add the argument that the Father must 
logically cause the Son to exist. Thus for him, a doctrine emerges which not 
only denies the Unity of God, by virtue of Him being subject to division, but 
also denies the eternity of God. 
31 
In his hostility to the Kulläbiyya, he proceeds to attack the Christians for a 
doctrine that is, in fact, a doctrine of the Kulläbiyya. He accuses the 
Christians of maintaining that "the Eternal is knowing and living because of an 
element which requires an attribute (ma'nä)". We know that this is a Kulläbiyya 
doctrine and not a Christian. However, what 'Abd al-Jabbär seems to be 
suggesting is that in identifying the Son as Knowledge by which the three 
hypostases know and the Spirit as life by which the three hypostases live, the 
Christians have in fact identified the Son and the Spirit as almost equivalent to 
ma ini and the sif ät of the Kulläbiyya. In doing this they cannot then claim 
that there is no cause for God's existence, there must also be a cause or ma'nä 
for that. If they refuse to accept that then why do they need the Son and the 
Spirit for God to be knowing and living. 
3Z 
In the last part of his discussion of the Trinity, 4Abd al-Jabbär turns to the 
concept of Son of God. Surprisingly as he is discussing the Trinity, he does not 
discuss God the Son as second person or hypostasis of the Trinity. He allows 
himself to be diverted for his Trinitarion refutation. Although there are 
allusion to that kind of sonship and brief allusions to the Holy Ghost, he is not 
really dealing with matters related to the Trinity. This becomes clear when we 
see that he begins his argument against sonship in terms of the adoptionist 
theory, il. theory that one would have expated him to have some sympathy 
for. However, so involved has he became in his polemic against Christianity 
that he also attempts to sweep their arguments away as linguistically unsound. 
He argued that adoption is possible for those who must be from the same 
31. Ibid., P. 95 
32. Ibid., P. 95 
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species and Christ is not from the species of God. Otherwise every prophet 
could have the same status and since there is no difference between calling 
someone son and calling him brother in this sense, then both are theoretically 
possible for God. But since it is inconceivable that He should make anyone His 
equal, then both brotherhood and sonship are not to be used of him. 
33 His 
teachers agree that the relationship between son and father is only possible 
between beings who can be related naturally in this way. Since God is 
essentially different from His creature, so the relationship is impossible in any 
sense. 
Through reference to the New Testament, where Christ is called Son of God, 
CAbd al-Jabbär like his early scholars34 argued that the literal interpretation of 
such verse is not permitted, since scriptural passages must be taken in 
accordance with rational principles. In classical Arabic, according to CAbd al- 
Jabbär it is not acceptable to attribute a son to god, even though it may be 
possible in another language in which metaphers have different meaning. 
Therefore the work of translation must be carried out with great sensitivity and 
by experts in language. 
35 gAbd al-Jabbär also argued against the idea of Christ 
as Son of God through the reference to the Gospel, "I am ascending to my 
Father and Your Father" (John 20: 17), and Christ saying to his desciples "You 
are my brother" (Matt 12: 49) . In this way God would be Father or uncle of 
dcSciples. 36 A similar argument is used by Ibn Hazm about the verse of John, 
that all Christians are therefore Children of God, then he asked what 




In his Tathbit, he further pointed out, that in Hebrew, which was the language 
of Christ (in fact it was Aramaic), son is applied for a noble and obedient 
servant or a sincere friend (al-wall al-mukhlis). In the same way the word 
t 
father is used as lord, master and organiser (mudabir). By referring to Paul's 
Epistle to the Romans, where there is the statement, "For all who are led by 
33.4Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, vol. V, PP. 105-6 
34. 'Abd al-Jabbär meant his Mu"tazilite scholars especially al-Jähiz and Abü 
'Ali 
35. Al-Mughni, vol. V, P. 111 
36. Ibid., P. 110 
37. Ibn Hazm, a1-Fisal, vol. II, P. 67 
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the Spirit of God are Sons of God. " 
38 He accused the Christians of believing 
that God is a man, human being and person when they attributed a Son to Him 
in reality through birth and sexual reproduction. He pointed out that among the 
three sects (Melkites, Nestorians and Jacobites) there is no one who believed 
that Christ is Son of God in terms of respect or metaphor. 
39 
Thus he is confusing the adoptionist theory with the more orthodox Christian 
view of Christ as the Son of God and attacking both ideas at the same time. If 
he had been a little bit more systematic, his arguments would have been clearer 
and had more force. 
In addition to, he in his al-Majmii fi al-Muhit, criticised this doctrine again, by 
saying that to describe the Eternal as Father and attribute to Him a Son, is a 
mistake in expression. In classical Arabic father as eternal and the son in terms 
of Word is irrational. The real meaning of the father is that which gives birth 
to a child and he is product of his sperm. 
40 So Christ cannot be Son of God in 
any sense. 
Here we are getting closer to some kind of Trinitarian discussion. What he 
should really be concerned with is discussing the relationship of the Hypostasis 
of God the Father with God the Son who is also termed Word of God. 
He further pointed out in his Tathbit, that as the Christians praise God through 
birth or generation, on the other hand the Muslims eliminate such 
anthropomorphic elements as generation from the concept of deity. 
41 However 
this is not a view shared by all Muslims. Some of them are prepared to accept 
the term Father and Son as applied to God and Christ in a metaphorical sense as 
al-Ghazäli has done. 
42 
************ 
As has already been pointed out Christian theologians divide all existence into 
substance and accidents. On the other hand neither of these terms is 
acceptable to Muslim theologians to use of God. For the Muslim theologians 
38. (Rom 8: 14) In fact 'Abd al-Jabbär slightly misquotes Paul as he says, "The 
Holy Spirit itself witnessed to our spirits that we are Sons of God". 
39. 'Abd al-Jabbär, Tathbit, PP. 120-1 
40. Al-Majmü' fi al-Mubit, vol. I, P. 222 
41. Tathbit, vol. I, P. 96 
_ 42. A ä1i, al-Radd al-Jamil, PP. 242-3,287 
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substance 'awhar) implies body 'ism) and body cannot be used of God. The 
Christians understood the meaning of the term differently. 
'Abd al-Jabbär 
takes up the Christians division of things into substance and accidents and their 
claim that God is a substance which is not a body, a substance which is living 
and speaking. Using his own definition of substance, he then argues that if that 
is the case, then all substances must be living and speaking. He wants the 
Christians to admit that God is neither substance or accident, as the Muslim 
maintains, for without the concept of one substance, the Christians would be 
left with three Gods. 
He then shifts his argument back to the attributes maintaining that if substance 
is characterised by life and speech only, because it is a substance, then every 
substance must be something like that. Consequently they have to admit that 
life and speech have become characteristic for a third characteristic. Then he 
argues that if God would be incomplete without these characteristics, they 
must add further attributes as moving, eating and drinking etc, otherwise He 
would be incomplete, like a living body who has not such qualities. He further 
argued that, according to their argument, He became God because He is living 
and speaking, it does indicate that every living and speaking person must be 
God. Then the angels and human being would be God, because they can speak. 
'Abd al-Jabbär then turns to a Christian argument which is presented also by 
the Christian writer al-Kindi. 
43 The argument is that the number (3) consists 
of both even and odd. So whatever includes both these categories would be a 
perfect number. gAbd al-Jabbär argued that that is wrong because this would 
have to be applied to the Father who if He was perfect, would have to 
encompass both categories of number (i. e. 3). The same would apply to the 
hypostases of the Son and Spirit individually. Then the number of hypostases 
would be nine because everyone of them is entitled to three. 
Along with that he charged that according to them, God is not three in its 
substantiality, but only in His hypostasy. So according to this argument, He 
must be incomplete, because it could not include the two categories of 
numbers. He criticised that in this way God would be created and not as an 
Eternal because He is incomplete. 
43. A1-Kindi, RisWa (Abd a1-Masiti al-Kindi, P. 30 
44. A1-Mughni, PP. 98-103 
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tAbd 
al-Jabbär turns to the well known Christian analogies used to demonstrate 
the oneness of God while there still being three hypostases. The comparison is 
given in its most complete form by Paul of Sidon who say: "When we say the 
reason of man, the speech of man and the spirit of man,, we do not have to 
admit that there are three men. (Similarly) when we say, "the flame of the 
fire, the light of the fire and heat of the fire, " we do not have to admit that 
there are three fires. (Similarly) when we say "the orb of the sun, the light of 
the sun and the heat of the sun, " we do not have to admit there are three 
45 
suns. This analogy is also used by Christians to describe the generation of the 
Son from the Father. Where they describe speech being produced by reason and 
the light of sun coming from the orb of the sun and the heat of the fire from 
the fire. 
46 
(Abd al-Jabbär answers the Christian comparison of the relationship of the 
Father and the Son being like reason producing words, by a series of neat 
derating points. First he shows that this statement is not true because ignorant 
can produce words without any reasoning being involved. When the defence is 
made that by word is meant knowledge, he brings up the two kinds of 
knowledge, necessary knowledge ((ilm darüri) and acquired knowledge (film 
muktasab). Necessary knowledge is knowledge which is established in the mind 
through no effort by the subject. tAbd al-Jabbär argues that if the Christians 
mean that kind of knowledge, it is the same as reason and what they are saying 
is reason that is produced by reason, which is nonsense. However, when he 
comes to acquired knowledge, which is generally defined as knowledge produced 
by reason, tAbd al-Jabbär contradicts this and at this point is clearly 
inconsistent. 
As far as the heat and fire analogy are concerned, he points out that they are of 
the same substance, then heat is produced from its own substance, which is 
nonsense. 
His rejection of the light and sun comparison is based on his understanding of 
physics. He seems to regard light as being a body that is independent of theSun 
but is reflected by the surface of the sun. 
47 
45. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, PP. 21-22 
46. Ibid., PP. 2,5,14 
47. A1-Mughni, PP. 102-103 
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He made it clear that he was fully aware that Christians always avoid Using 
Father in terms of offspring, because in this way He would be created. 
According to 'Abd al-Jabbär, if they affirm Him Father as the production of the 
word from reason, it is also confirm Him as created, because such things occur 
only in created bodies and God is beyond that. 
48 
************ 
In objecting to the Christian description of Christ as Word of God, OAbd al- 
Jabbär has to insist that this description can only be used metaphorically 
because Christ is also called Word of God (Kalimat -Allah) in the Qu? än. 
49 
This argument is also used by Ibn Hazm. However he believes non-Mu'tazilite 
"Word of God" i. e. the Quroän, to be eternal and uncreated. 
50 
It is interesting to note that some Christian apologists such as John of 
Damascus assert that Christ is Word of God and Word of God, according to 
Muslims, is uncreated and this is exactly the same as the Christian faith in 
Christ. 
However, the Mu'tazilite (Abd al-Jabbär accept neither Ibn Hazm's version of 
the uncreated "Word of God", nor that of John of Damascus. 
c 
48.4Abd al-Jabbär, A1-Mughni, vol. V, PP. 98-103 
49. Ibid., PP. 11 Z-113 
50. Ibn Hazm, al-Fisal, vol. II, P. 9 
140 
CHAPTER V 
The Theology of the Incarnation 
The second main controversial problem between Islam and Christianity is the 
issue of incarnation and it covers such issues as the hypostatic Union and the 
problem of two natures and two wills in Christ. It is mainly concerned with the 
person and status of Christ in Christianity. In the introduction to this thesis, a 
general survey of the sects 'Abd al-Jabbär dealt with was given. However, in 
order to give a clear picture of his understanding or misunderstanding of the 
Christian doctrine of incarnation, it is necessary, at this point, to examine 
much more closely that Christian doctrine. This will inevitably involve some 
repetition but in the main, it is hoped that this section will make the views with 
regard to incarnation or inherence clearer. 
Christianity is often described as an incarnational faith, 
1 for, according to 
some, Christianity has no meaning without the incarnation. If the Christian 
faith is to be true, the key to the salvation is only the relation of God to man, 
and it is to be found in the union of the Godhead and manhood in Christ. 
The term 'incarnation' is applied to the act of a divine or supernatural being in 
assuming the form of a man or animal and continuing to live in the form upon 
the earth. 
The Christian doctrine of the incarnation affirms that the eternal Son of God 
took human flesh from his human mother and historical Christ is at once fully 
God and fully man. 
4 In other words, God, in one of the modes of His triune 
being and without in any way ceasing to be God, has revealed Himself to 
mankind for their salvation by coming amongst them as a man. The man Christ 
is held to be the incarnate word or Son of God. 
5 
1. M. Wiles, "Christianity without incarnation", in John Hick (ed), The Myth 
of God Incarnat¢ P. 1. 
2. L. Hodgson, "The Incarnation", in A. F. J. Rawlinson (ed), Essays on the 
Trinity and the Incarnation, P. 363. 
3. E. R. E., Vol. VII, P. 183. 
4. Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, P. 696. 
S. B. Hebblethwaite, N. D. C. T., P. 289. 
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It seems that the Christian doctrine of incarnation is a result of a process of 
gradual revelation and thought. It is not easy to say that God incarnated in 
human being and that is all. There is a long series of debates and discussion 
within Christianity among the early Church Fathers, and everyone of them has 
tried to interpret this mystery according to his point of view. 
Bef ore going to describe the whole controversy and argumentation, it seems 
better to present the orthodox doctrine of the incarnation, which will make it 
easier to understand the entire dilemma. 
Orthodox theologians held that the duality of natures entailed a duality of wills. 
They also emphasised that incarnation was an act of the whole Godhead, not of 
one person acting independently. 
6 
According to Wolfson, the early Fathers were not conscious of the problem 
before the time of Appollinarius (d. 390). They mentioned the soul of Christ, as 
consisting of both an irrational and rational soul. But when Appollinarius denied 
the existence of a rational soul in Christ, the Orthodox Fathers came out openly 
against him, maintaining that there was in Christ a rational soul in addition to 
an irrational soul. 
7 However there were some other sects who held that Christ 
was a mere man. 
8 They represented him as the son of Joseph and Mary 
according to the ordinary course of human generation. But any opinion which 
held that Christ was a mere man, was always condemned by the Church. 
9 
This study is concerned with the doctrine of incarnation as it was understood 
and interpreted by the Church Fathers and apologists and latter on the eastern 
sects of the Church such as Nestorians and Monophysites (Jacobites), because 
this discussion has direct relation to know about CAbd al-Jabbär's criticism of 
the Christological doctrines. 
The critical theological question is, how could the eternal Son, who is equally 
God with the Father, so partake of our flesh as to become man as we are man, 
because the nature of God was something entirely alien to and remote from the 
nature of man? In trying to answer this question two different forms of 
6. Oxford Dictionary of Christian Church, P. 696. 
7. A. H. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Father, P. 365. 
8. A. C. Headlam, Christian Theology, P. 341. 
9. Ibid., P. 343. 
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unorthodox teaching arose. One was the denial of the divinity of Christ and the 
other, denial of humanity of Christ. 
Augustine (354-430) has expressed his views on the incarnation in the following 
words: 
"Just as soul is united to the body in uniting of person so as to constitute man, 
in the same way, God united to man in unity of person so as to constitute 
Christ. In the former person there is a mixture of soul and body, in the latter 
there is a mixture of God and man. " 
10 
Regarding the duality of nature and unity of person, the Creed of Chalcedon 
explains that one and the same Christ is in "two natures", and that these two 
natures have been joined to one another in one person and one hypostasis that is 
"God the Logos". 
11 
Christian theology was influenced by Greek philosophy and logic as it affected 
every phase of knowledge. It became necessary for the theologians and 
apologists to express their theological views in a philosophical manner. The 
same is the case with Islamic theology. The Church Fathers and apologists 
searched for an analogy from the various kinds of physical union discussed by 
Aristotle and other Greek philosophers. In the philosophy of Aristotle there are 
at least three kinds of physical union by which different individual objects may 
become united so as to form one individual object. 
1. - Union of two things which are not reciprocally active and passive. In such a 
union the two constituent elements remain unchanged. Their unity being only 
an aggregate of two things as the wheat and the barley are called in mixture of 
the two. In fact each grain of the one is juxtdposed to a grain of the other. In 
such a union two original individual and their respective species or natures 
remain unchanged. That kind of union is called "composition". 
12 
2. - Union of reciprocally active and passive bodies which are easily divisible. 
In this union each of the constituents changes from its own nature towards the 
10. H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Father, P. M. 
11. Ibid., P. 3 7 2. 
12. H. A. Wolfson, Philosophy of Church Fathers, P. 374. 
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other. Both became intermediate and common, while the nature of each of the 
constituent changes, without being destroyed. This union is called mixture. 
There are two examples for this union. 
i. As the bodies are formed out of the four elements, insofar as these have 
been mixed. The qualities of the mixed elements 'corrupt' the essence of each 
other. 
ii. Honey and water are such a mixture. 
3. 
Third kind of union, which Aristotle treats as a subdivision of the second 
one, is that of reciprocally active and passive bodies, which are easily divisible, 
but are of unequal power of action and passion. 
There are four examples for this kind. 
i. A drop of wine thrown into ten thousand gallons of water. It is not a 
mixture. 
ii. Union of two solid bodies such as 'tin' and 'bronze' of which one is 
exclusively or superlatively passive, but the other is passive in a very slight 
degree. 
iii. Mixture of wine with a little water. 
iv. As fire and wood, if one adds wood to fire already burning, the wood will be 
changed into fire. No special name is given by Aristotle to this kind. He speaks 
of it as a mixture or a mixture in a very slight degree. For the sake of clarity, 
it can be called "predominance". 
13 
There is another kind of union, which the Stoics call "confusion" which is 
brought about by the corruption of all the original distinctive qualities 
penetrating one another at every point. 
14 
The Orthodox Fathers examined all these categories for their analogies in their 
13. H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, P. 377. 
14. Ibid., P. 384. 
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discussion of the union of incarnation. According to Wolfson, they could use an 
analogy, of the union of composion or mixture and less useful to them was an 
analogy based on the union of confusion. However, the one that was most 
suitable for their purpose seemed to be the union of predominance. Wolfson 
further suggested that there was no special term for the union for which he 
gave the term predominance, it was loosely described as a mixture or as 
15 
composition.. So all these terms are used in the sense of predominance. 
Orthodox theologians and Fathers 
Before any examination of the Christological doctrines of the sects discussed by 
'Abd al-Jabbär can take place, it would appear appropriate to give a brief 
outline of the major theological contribution of the early Fathers to the 
Orthodox position. 
1. Tertullian, the earliest of the Latin Fathers. His writings were produced 
between the years 190 and 225. He developed the idea of the two natures in 
Christ. According to him, there are two substances in one person. The divine 
nature is real, the human nature is real, and the conjunction of the two in one 
person is real. 
16 
He means by two substances, flesh and spirit, as a kind of 
mixture. He further explained it and said that, "We see plainly the twofold 
IVI- 
state not confounded but coloined in one person - Jesus God and man. " In other 
words this analogy is called conjunction. 
17 (muw ara in Arabic). 
In another place, he referred to such a kind of union by the term 'association'. 
With regard to the question whether the flesh was a person before union? he 
answered, 'This Ray of God, as was always foretold in the past, came down into 
a certain virgin and being formed into flesh in her womb, is born man mixed 
with the Father. Answering another question, whether the flesh was considered 
a person after the union, X. A replied insnegative. Wolfson has suggested that 
the term mixture could have been used by him literally in an Aristotelian sense. 
According to him, he uses the term "conjunction" and "mixture" loosely in the 
sense of "predominance". So that after the union, the Logos is both a nature 
15. H. A. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Father, P. 385-6. 
16. Headlam, Christian theology, P. 354-5. 
17. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Father, P. 388-9. 
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and a person, whereas the flesh is only a nature. 
'8 
Z. Origen, the great Alexandrian theologian who lived from A. D. 185 to 254. In 
an answer to a question, he was asked how the union of incarnation could be 
applied to the Godhead? The Son of God must be in his essence God, but if so 
he must be eternal, since the very essence of the Godhead is to be eternal. 
How then can he be a son, since a son is necessarily derived from and comes 
later in time than the Father. 
He answered that the idea of Sonship implies fundamentally a relationship and 
not succession in time. This is the doctrine of the eternal generation. His 
generation is as eternal and everlasting as the brilliance which is produced from 
the sun. It is not possible to predicate a time of relationship to it. There was 
no time when the Son was not. The Son is co-eternal with the Father. It is not 
possible to think of God without His wisdom or assume a beginning of His 
begetting since that is a process lasting from eternity, 
19 
He further explained the union, with regard to Christ's mortal body and human 
soul by asserting that not only by their communion merely with Him, but by 
their union and mixing up, they receive the highest powers, and after 
participating in His divinity, were changed into God. The soul of Christ already 
united, of course, with the Logos, was united to a body which was superior to all 
other bodies and invested with all excellent qualities. 
According to Wolfson, the term mixture used by origen is in the sense of 
predominance. He gave an example from origen where if a mass of iron was 
kept constantly in the fire, it would become wholly converted into fire, and 
incapable of admitting cold. In other words, the union of fire and iron is not a 
'mixture' but rather a predominance. Origen also used the term compounded, 
but it is also seen to be in the sense of predominance. 
20 
3. - Gregory of Nazianzus (329-389). When dealing with the unity of persön 
despite the duality of natures, he draws in several places upon the analogy of 
18. H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, PP. 387-392. 
19. Headlam, Christian Theology, P. 353. 
20. H. A. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Father, P. 392-6. 
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"commixture" or "mixture". He explained it as the man below became God 
after he had become commixed with God and by the victory of that which were 
more potent he became one, 
21 
4. - Gregory of Nyssa. (330-395). He explained the union and said that "we 
assert that even the body in which he underwent the passion, by being mixed 
with the divine nature, was made by that "permixtion" to be that which the 
assuming nature is .... being transformed into what is divine and incorruptible. " 
Here the term mixture is used in the sense of a union of two elements of 
unequal power of which the weaker is said to have changed into the stronger, 
whereas the stronger remained unchanged. It would also seem to come under 
the term "predominance". 
zz 
S. - Cyril, (315-386). Like other orthodox Fathers, he believed in what is 
generally spoken as "one person" and "two natures", though sometimes he used 
the term "nature" for person and the expressions like "natural property" and 
"natural quality" and "the quality of existence" for nature. He maintained that 
the union of Logos and the man in Jesus is "without confusion". Contrary to the 
other Fathers he explained the union without "commixture" and he said that he 
who used the term "mixture" merely meant by it that the union was of the 
highest kind. 
He illustrated it by an example, in which he explained that we are composed of 
soul and body, which we consider as two natures, the one that of the body and 
the other that of the soul. Yet man is one according to union or composition. 
Regarding the union after the incarnation he said that the use of the word "one" 
is correct, when used not with reference to those things only which are simple 
according to nature but also with reference to those things which are conjoined 
according to composition, after which manner, man consists of soul and body. 
According to Wolfson, he used the term "composition" in the sense of 
"predominance", because he explained the union of incarnation by the analogies 
of fire and wood, fire and iron. So all these examples show that he used the 
term "composition" in the sense of predominance. 
23 
21. Ibid., PP. 376-7. 
22. Ibid., P. 397. 
23. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Father, P. 409. 
147 
6. - Leontius of Byzantium (6th cent). According to him, union and division are 
of a twofold meaning. Some things are united in species and divided in 
hypostases, other things are divided in species and united in hypostases. 
Regarding the latter kind of union he proceeds to say that a union can be either 
of four simple elements or of things already composed of these four simple 
elements. When it is a union of things already composed of the four simple 
elements it is to be called as "interwining" or mixture, or whatever it pleases 
one to call essential cohesions of hetergeneous things. 
The other kind of union is described by Leontius as that in which the constituent 
part even when united preserve their proper principle of subsistence. It is 
illustrated by him by the examples of the union of soul and body in man, of 
"flame" and "wick" in a lamp, of "fire" and "wood" in a torch. No special name 
is given by him to this kind of union. 
According to the Leontius, the union of confusion cannot serve as an analogy 
for the explanation of the union of the incarnation. The proper analogy for it is 
to be found in that kind of union which he illustrates by the example of the 
union of soul and body. Accordingly, just as the union of soul and body is 
described by him as "mixture", so also the union of the Logos and the flesh is 
sometimes described by him as "pre-mixture". 
24 
7. - John of Damascus (675-740). Concerning the union, John of Damascus used 
a term enhypostatos. 
25 
He has explained it as that which is compounded with 
another thing different from it in substance in order to produce something 
whole and to make a complete and composite hypostasis. Thus man is composed 
of soul and body. Neither soul alone nor body alone is called hypostasis. They 
are enhypostatos, but that which results from the two is a hypostasis of the 
two. 
He further says that enhypostatos could be said to be a nature which is assumed 
24. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Father, P. 409-415. 
25. Enhypostasis is a technical term for a theory concerning the relation 
between the divine and human natures in Christ. They maintained that 
there is no independent human personality of Christ but that he became 
fully personal with the incarnation. 
V. A. Harvey, A Handbook of theological terms, P. 68. 
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by another hypostasis and which has its existence in that hypostasis. Whence 
the flesh of the Lord, never having subsisted by itself even for a moment, is not 
a hypostasis but rather an enhypostatos. It has subsisted indeed, in the 
hypostasis of God the word, by which it has been assumed, and it is this 
hypostasis of God the word that it had and still has as its hypostasis. 
26 The 
WV" 
union of the Logos and the flesh in Christ( described by John of Damascus as a 
union in which only the Logos is a hypostasis, whereas the flesh is only an 
enhypostatos. 
Finally, according to the Orthodox Father, though the two natures in Christ, the 
divine and human, are held to be distinct from each other, each of them having 
its own properties,, Still these properties are said to interchange; so that when 
Christ is spoken of as a divine being, he can still be described by his human 
properties; and conversely when he is spoken of as/human being, he can still be 
described by his divine properties. 
This interchangeability of the properties, despite their being properties of two 
distinct natures, is explained by the Fathers in two ways. 
1. - That the natures underlying the properties, though distinct from each other, 
are still one in person. 
Z. - That between the two distinct sets of properties as well as between the two 
distinct natures underlying them there is what they call a pericharesis27 into 
the other. The accurate translation of pericharesis is "a penetration at all 
points" or a "total penetration" or a "thorough penetration". It means/the union 
of the divine nature and human nature in Christ, the two natures may be said to 
form a "mixture" as it were, and to penetrate into one another, so that, if you 
refer to Christ "the son of man" you may still attribute to him the properties of 
the divine nature in him and describe him as sitting in judgement over the 
nations; and similarly, if you refer to him as "the lord of Glory" you may still 
attribute to him the properties of the human nature in him and describe him as 
26. Ibid., P. 415-16. 
27. Pericharesis, is the term used in the doctrine of the Trinity to refer to the 
mutual interpenetration of the persons of the Godhead, so that although 
each person is distinct in relation to the others, nevertheless, each 
participates fully in the Being of the other. The being of the Godhead is 
thus one and indivisible. 




All Fathers warned that such analogies should not be taken too literally. There 
is no exact example each one contains some inappropriate expression. The 
incarnation always would be something unique and a mystery. 
The Christological controversies that are regarded as heretical by the Orthodox 
The two great Christological controversies of the fifth century, i. e., 
Nestorianism and Monophysitism have established permanent places for 
themselves in the history of the Church. 
Before dealing with them, it is necessary to understand that the great school of 
thought placed different emphasis on their undertaking of the doctrine of 
incarnation. The school of Antionch which traced its beginning to Lucian laid 
greater stress on the human nature of Christ. On the other hand, the school of 
Alexandria tended to stress the divinity of Christ. Out these tendencies to 
emphasise particular aspects of the nature of Christ, these two heresies 
emerged. 
1. - Nestorianism: As it has been said, that Nestorius is said to be the founder 
of Nestorianism, because of his condemning the title Theotokos. 
On the other hand the orthodox argued that as Christ who was born of the virgin 
Mary was truly the Son of God, therefore it was correct to say that she was the 
Mother of God. Nestorius maintained that it was true to say that God came 
forth from the virgin, but not that he was born of her. She brought forth a man 
who was accompanied by the divine Logos. This led to a controversy on the 
whole question of the two natures in Christ. Nestorius further argued that 
Christ was a man who grew up as other men. He asked: could you really believe 
that a child three months old was God? Could you believe that the man who 
lived on the earth as a child, a growing body, with human limitation of 
knowledge is God? Could you believe in a God who was dead and buried? So he 
drew a distinction between the divine logos and the man Christ. 
Z8. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, P. 418-421. 
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Nestorius taught that there was a dual personality in Christ. 
The divine Logos dwelt in the man Christ and therefore the man Christ was not 
God, but God bearing. 29 Unlike the orthodox Fathers, to whom, after the 
union, while the Logos is both person and nature, the flesh is only a nature, 
Nestorius maintained that even the flesh is a person after the union. Still, 
though there are two persons and two natures, there is a difference between the 
union of the persons and the union of the natures. The union of two persons 
results in a new person, namely, the person of Christ of which the original two 
persons are merged whereas the union of the two natures does not result in a 
new nature. Accordingly to Nestorius Christ is one person made up of two 
other persons, the Logos and the man in him. 
There is another point of difference between Nestorius and Orthodox Fathers. 
According to them, there can be a nature without a person and the humanity in 
Christ is only a nature, the humanity in Christ can be said to exist in the person 
of the divinity in him. On the other hand Nestorius maintained that every 
nature exists together with a person so that the humanity and the divinity in 
Christ are two natures as well as two persons. He further argued that these 
two persons in their union result in the one person of Christ. The humanity in 
Christ may be said to exist together not only with its own person but also with 
the person of the divinity in him. Similarly the divinity in him may be said to 
exist together not only with its own person but also with the person of the 
humanity in him. 30 
Finally, according to Nestorius, there were two persons with their respective 
natures before the union and these two persons with their respective natures 
continued to exist after the union, with the only difference being that while the 
two persons were united in one person, of which the two persons were 
component parts, the two natures remained distinct from one another in that 
31 
one person. 
Since five kinds of physical union were known to the Fathers, four are rejected 
29. Headlam, Christian Theology, PP. 370-71. 
30. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Father, P. 457. 
31. Ibid., P. 461. 
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by Nestorius, as unsuitable for his purpose of providing an analogy of the union 
of incarnation. He rejected all other terms and preferred the term, 
conjunction. 
Monaphysites (Jacobites) 
This sect was later than the Nestorians. Perhaps its doctrine should be seemed 
against the background of an earlier heresy. Its beginning can be traced by the 
heresy of Appollinarius, who believed that flesh or the body was not a complete 
man. 
He maintained that it lacked a rational soul possessing only an irrational soul, 
which was conceived together with the body and was inseparable from it. 
Because of that denial of the rational soul, he not only denied the existence of 
two persons in Christ, but also two natures. He said that there was in him only 
one nature or ousia (substance) and that Christ was one incarnate nature of God 
the Logos. 
3Z 
Appollinarius has described the union of incarnation by the term "mixture" or 
"commixture" or as a "composite nature". 
In the face of this heresy, the orthodox fathers tried to prove that in the union 
of Logos and the man, man as the weaker member is a nature without a person. 
On the other hand Appollinarius maintained that in the union of Logos and the 
irrationally animated body, body as the weaker member, is only a property 
without its being either a person or a nature. 
One has reason to believe that Monophysite tendencies are already found in 
Alexandrian theology and certainly in Appollinarius` theology. 
According to Wolfson, the monophysitism of Appollinarius and his followers 
arose in the fourth century and flourished, only to decline and disappear during 
the same century. However a new kind of Monophysitism made its appearance 
in the fifth century under Entyches (d. 454) and Severus (early fifth century). 
The new kind of Monophysitism differed from Appollinarius and accepted the 
32. Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers, P. 433-4. 
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orthodox point of view that Christ had a rational soul i. e., that the union in 
Christ was between the Logos and complete man. However, they departed from 
the Orthodox Fathers on the question of whether in a union of "predominance" 
the weaker member was a nature or a property. Adopting Appollinarius' view 
that in such a union the weaker member was only a property, they argued that 
the man in Christ was only a property and not a nature. 
33 
So like Appollinarius they spoke of only one nature in Christ. There is an 
interesting dialogue between the orthodox and the Monophysites. The orthodox 
questioned them, 
"Explain to us, however in what sense do you assert one nature after the union. 
Do you mean one nature derived from both, or that one nature remains after 
the destruction of the other? " 
The Monophysites answered: 
"We maintained that the Godhead remains and the manhood was absorbed by it. " 
In other words they accepted the analogy of "predominance" which they 
described as "absorption". 
The orthodox find it difficult to understand and asked again. How could a 
nature absolute and uncompounded, comprehending the universe; 
unapproachable and uncircumscribable, have absorbed the nature which it 
assumed? 
The Monaphysites illustrated their point by a concrete example, like the sea 
receiving a drop of honey for straight way the drop as it mixes with the sea's 
water vanishes. 
34 
The orthodox refused to accept this analogy, while absorption is possible 
between two corporeal substances, such as honey and water, it is not possible 
between the incorporeal divinity and corporeal humanity. They illustrated it by 
examples that there are several instances of substances which are mixed 
without being confounded and remain unimpaired. 
33. Ibid., P. 444-5. 
34. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, PP. 445-6. 
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The orthodox produced two analogies. 
1. - At the rising of the sun, all the light seems to penetrate through all the air. 
This penetration of all the light through all the air is, therefore, to be called 
mixture, for the mixture penetrates through all that is mixed. Now, the 
"illuminated air" is seen as light and is called light. And yet when the light is 
present in the air, the air still retains its nature, as is evidenced by the fact 
that it can be moist or dry, hot or cold. Similarly, after the departure of the 
light the air afterwards remains alone by itself. 
2. - When iron is brought in contact with fire, it is fired, and the fire penetrates 
through its whole substance. And yet, though it is a "mixture totally 
penetrating" and the iron has the active power of fire, still the iron continues to 
be called iron and is put on the anvil and is smitten with a hammer and the 
nature of the iron was not damaged by its contact with the fire. 
35 
I 
Christological Doctrines argued by Christian Scholars during the Isa-mic period 
There were three main Christian theological trends during the early Islamic 
a 
period. The Melkites represented the orthodox but the Nestorians and the 
Jacobites also had prominent scholars in the Islamic world during this period. 
Eutychius of Alexandria (877-940) who himself was a Melkite pateriarch 
presented his viewpoint in his Kitäb al Burhän, which is devoted to exposition of 
the orthodox faith with refutations of the Nestorians, Jacobites and more 
guardedly of the Muslims. Its first part deals with Christian doctrine of the 
incarnation. 
He started his argument as he said, 
"Then came down the creative word of God with His abiding, eternal and 
immovable hypostasis, who has never ceased nor will cease to be. He became 
incarnate from Mary the virgin - so that (the Holy Spirit) made her worthy of 
the indwelling of the consubstantial word of God within her. "36 
35. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, PP. 446-7. 
36. Eutychius of Alexandria, Kit-ab al-Burhän, Vol. I, P. 68. 
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He goes on to argue, 
"The creative word of God became one with a created man who He created for 
Himself with the concurrence of God the Father and the Holy Spirit as a new 
creation without human seed. - He was perfect man in his body, his animal soul 
and his rational, logical spirit which is the image and likeness of God in man. 
The spirit was the most worthy of God's creation for God's taking up His abode 
in it, His indwelling and His veiling Himself. - Therefore it was the worthiest of 
God's creation for veiling God. It acted as a veil for him, the animal soul acted 
as a veil for it, and the solid body was a veil for what was more tenuous (alt of ) 
than itself. "37 
He further explained the mystery of union. 
According to him, the creative word of God mingled with the substance of the 
man complete with its body and blood, and rational, logical spirit. The word of 
God with His hypostasis became a hypostasis of that humanity whose substance 
became complete by the hypostasis of the word of God constituting it. The 
humanity was not created nor was anything except by the hypostasis of the 
word of God who created it and constituted it out of no previously existing 
thing in the womb of Mary, and not out of a cause through which it had a 
beginning seed from anything else, except the hypostasis of the creative word 
which is one of the divine Trinity. 
38 
He carries on to express his views, 
"That hypostasis is a hypostasis enumerated and known among men through the 
substance of man which (God) joined to (Christ) and created for Him and made 
one with Him (Christ) by the unity of that single hypostasis, the hypostasis of 
the creative word of God, which is one in the Trinity by the substance of His 
divinity and one in mankind by the substance of his humanity. He is not two but 
one with the Father and Spirit - He is likewise begotten of Mary the virgin at a 
later time without separation from the Father or from the Holy Spirit. " 
39 
He then illustrated it by two examples to try to explain the problems of the 
37. Ibid., PP-68-69- 
38. Ibid., P. 69. 
39. Ibid., P. 69-70. 
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incarnation, specially to none Christians. He says "just as the sun which is 
generated from the sun's disc whose illumination fills what is between heaven 
and earth, enters same house and become truly there by light and warmth, 
without however separating from the sun's disc whence it really originated, 
because it has not been cut off from the sun's disc or from the illumination; so 
likewise the son of God dwells in humanity without separating from the Father. 
He was truly in humanity and truly with the Father and Holy Spirit. For 
example a man's word generated from his intellect, is written on a sheet of 
paper, so that all of it is really on the paper, yet it is not separated from the 
intellect from which it was generated nor is the intellect separated from it; the 
intellect is known by the word, because (the intellect) is in it and all the word is 
in the intellect which has generated it, and all of it is within itself and all of it 
is on the paper with which it is united. "40 
In order to try to remove any doubt about incarnation, he said, 
"The indwelling of the creative word of God and His union with the substance of 
humanity does not come about by transference or change or transformation of 
one of the two substances from what it is; the divine substance is not 
transformed from being divine and creative, nor the human from being human 
and created. "41 
He categorised the mixture into three kinds (as it has been mentioned before 
different types of physical union) and then he criticised and accused Nestorians 
and Jacobites of not understanding fully the nature of the union of incarnation. 
According to Eytychius of Alexandria, mixture comes about only in three ways. 
1. - Amixture (may be produced) by the mingling of two different elements and 
their transformation and corruption, for example, the mixture of wine and 
water, of vinegar and honey, of gold and silver, of silver and copper. All this 
and like is a transformation and corruption. The mixture of wine and water is 
neither wine nor water, each of them is transformed from its nature, their 
mingling is accompanied by corruption, and they have been changed from their 
original state. 
40. Kitäb a1-Burhän, Vol. I, P. 70. 
41. Ibid., P. 71. 
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2. - It is a mixture where two different natures and their hypostases remain 
separate so that the two natures, each distinct from the other by its hypostasis 
and appearance, can be recognised in that mixture, for example, oil and water 
in a single lamp, and linen and silk in a single garment woven from linen, ribbed 
with silk and an idol of copper whose head is gold. 
Such things ought not to be called mixtures, because of the separateness of the 
two natures and hypostases. Likewise, with regard to the water and oil there is 
no mixture together of two. According to Eutychius these two kinds of mixture 
are never found except in the case of corporeal, solid, material things. 
4Z 
In respect of these two kinds (of mixture) Nestorius and his associates and 
Jacob (Baradaeus) and his partisans fell (into error). Jacob adhered to (the idea 
of) the mixture of transformation and corruption, and asserted that the divine 
nature and the human nature became mingled in one Christ, so that he had one 
hypostasis and one mingled nature (composed), of two different natures, the 
divine and the human. Through their union they had been transformed, and 
transformation is corruption. According to his blashemous doctrine, they made 
the nature of God subject to accidents and death, and made Christ neither a 
true God nor a true man, just like the ingot of gold and copper. 
Nestorius, on the other hand, adhered to (the idea of) the mixture of 
separateness and severance, and asserted that the one Christ had two different 
natures, a divine and a human and two known hypostases, a divine and a human. 
Hence he made the mixture (one of) separateness, because the necklace made 
of two intertwined strands, one gold and the other copper, or the garment with 
a lining whose outside is silk and its inside is cotton, involve no mixture of the 
two in nature or hypostasis. According to this belief, necessity compels them 
not to believe in one Christ, because the intertwined necklaces is two 
necklaces, and the garment with a lining is two garments, and Christ likewise is 
two Christs, are divine by his nature and hypostasis like the golden strand in the 
intertwined necklace and like the silken outside of the lined garment, and the 
other human like the copper strand in the necklace and the cotton inside of the 
garment. 
42. Kitäb al-Burhän, Vol. I, P. 73. 
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Eutychius accused these sects of not being able to understand the nature of 
both these mixtures and then he mentioned another kind of mixture which is 
suitable for this analogy. 
43 
He argued, 
This is the third kind of mixture that is the true one, without the mixings of 
transformation and corruption or of separation and severance, it is a mixture in 
which the immaterial and spiritual nature penetrates into the material and 
corporeal nature so that it becomes spread out through the whole and mingles 
with all of it. 
Yet there is no transformation of the spiritual from its immaterial and spiritual 
nature, nor any transformation of the material and corporeal from its solid and 
material nature, nor any change or corruption in either of them. Examples are 
the mingling of soul and body, and the mingling of the fire and the piece of iron 
into the hypostasis of a single glowing mass, it is a glowing mass, one in the 
hypostasis (consisting) of the nature of fire united with and pervading the 
nature of the piece of iron, without the separation of severance and without the 
mingling (or confusion) of transformation and corruption. The fire has spread 
itself all through the iron and invested it all, and has conveyed to the iron some 
of its strength and brilliancy, and has heated it until the iron has glowed and 
become red-hot with the heat yet because of the iron's feebleness, it has 
conveyed nothing of its blackness and coldness to the fire. " 
44 
Then he concluded his theory by saying that, 
"According to this kind of mixture that the creative word of God has arranged 
His mixture with human nature. He is one Christ, the son of God. He, it is who 
is the son of Mary the virgin, begotten of her at a later time, with one 
hypostasis, the hypostasis of the unique Son of God, combining both natures, 
divine and human. He is one Christ by one pre-eternal hypostasis with two 
natures, a divine, which is always God and a human which He created for him 
and with which He became united through Mary the virgin with that hypostasis 
of the divine and the human nature, combining them both without any mixing as 
43. Ibid., PP. 74-75. 
44. Kitäb al-Burhän, Vol. I. PP. 75-76. 
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transformation or corruption or separation of severance. "45 
He explained that, 
"If the two natures had been mixed together in a confused mixture till they had 
become one nature, Christ would not have been part of the substance of the 
Father and the Holy Spirit after His incarnation, because the substance of the 
Father and the Holy Spirit is an immaterial simple substance, a creative light in 
which no compounding appears. How would it be right for the incarnate son to 
be counted with the Father and Holy Spirit after He had left their substance, 
seeing He was invalid in the confusion of compoundness; or how would it be said 
for him to be one God with the Father and Holy Spirit seeing that confusion has 
come upon His substance? " 
46 
Concerning the will, he argued, "that the will belongs to the genus not to the 
particular. Everything the Father wills, the Son and Holy Spirit will, and 
everything the Son wills the Father and the Holy Spirit will, and everything the 
Holy Spirit wills the Father and the Son will. There is no difference or division 
between them. " 
47 
From all this.. argumentation and discussion he finally concluded that, Christ 
(in this way he used the Qu? änic expression) is perfect God by His performing 
the acts of divinity. He is Creator of what He wills (khäliq lima yashä)u) for 
examples He created from clay two eyes for a blind man. He is falläm al 
hg uyüb (Knower of things hidden) and ghffär li_dhrdhunüb (forgiver of sins). 
Christ will raise to life through His own power all those in the tomb on the day 
of Resurrection. He is Malik yawmidýdin (Lord of the Day of Judgement). "48 
Then he made another analogy concerning the death and pain of Christ, "that 
his suffering, crucifixion and death were by his humanity, because suffering and 
death belong to the human essence, not to the divine essence. He illustrated it 
by an example, as the suffering of being cut with the axe does not affect 
sunlight, because being cut down doe's not belong to the sunlight's essence. 
Therefore the tree may be cut down by the axe, whilst the sunlight is resting 
45. Ibid., P. 77. 
46. Kitäb al-Burhän, Vol. I, P. 86. 
47. Ibid., P. 89. 
48. Ibid., P. 91. 
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upon it, but the sunlight is not cut down with the tree, because the iron's 
cutting affects wood but does not affect sunlight. "49 
Z. - Yahyä ibn 'Adi, a tenth century Jacobite scholar has lived in Baghdad and 
had a close relation with Muslim friends. 
In Ibn 'Adi's tract on the incarnation, he seems to be dedicated to the defence 
of the basic doctrine of the Jacobites with regard to the mode of incarnation. 
The fact of the incarnation, the relation of two natures, and certain 
metaphysical considerations distinguish the Jacobites from the Melkites. 
According to Ibn 'Adi none of three Christian sects believed that the divine 
nature of Christ was subjected to his birth, suffering, crucifixion, death and 
atonement. They rather believe that the union occurred before birth and Mary 
bore the babe possessing the two natures. 
50 
Ibn 'Adi in discussing the Monophysite thesis is judged by Perir to be 
maintaining a single nature. Yet Ibn 'Adi and Monaphysites of his day say that 
the word is eternal in his divinity and created in his humanity. Ya yya maintains 
that the Jacobites do not deny the doctrine of a single nature, when they affirm 
that the word is of composite nature, divine and human. 
51 Ibn 'Adi maintained 
that the Jacobites understand by that conception that the human nature arrived 
at the moment, it is united to the word. The Jacobites affirm that Mary cannot 
beget God, the substance of the creator. However when they refer to Mary as 
mother of God, they do not mean by this that she has begotten the substance of 
the Creator, but rather that Mary is the mother of Christ who is God. This 
nature is one of the two constitutive nature of Christ. Ibn 4Adi contends that 
the divine nature though united to the embryo, does not have to go through 
successive increases like the human nature. Physical growth does not 
necessarily mean divine growth. Pain and privation in the body may not be 
experiences of the Word. Yet Ibn 4Adi wishes to attribute all actions, even 
being born, to Christ who is God. He insisted on the credal statement "He 
49. Ibid., P. 101. 
50. Yaiyä b. IAdi, Magalät, PP. 96-97. 
51. Perier, YahYä, PP. 192-193, cited by Robert Henry de Vale, The 
Apologatic writings of Yahyä b. 4Adi, PP. 78-79. 
(unpublished Ph. D. thesis submitted to the faculty of Hertford Seminary 
foundation, 1973). 
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died". He accused other two sects for omitting the phrase "He died". He 
alleged that since Christ is divine, he cannot die. Therefore, he lives. Yet it is 
true that Ibn'Adi wishes to affirm that he was crucified and he died. 
52 
Fakhry, while discussing the philosophical differences in tenth century, has 
evaluated Ibn LAdi's polemical views. He quoted from his treatise, that 
according to him, "God in His infinite goodness was driven to communicate his 
essence, just as fire and the other active elements communicate their essences 
to other things, or just as the mind, in apprehending an entity, assumes the form 
of that entity or appropriates it and in so doing becomes identified with it. 
Thus God has assumed the human form in Christ, without thereby forsaking his 
identity or his Godhead, and Christ, as the son of man has become identified 
with God without destroying his unity. "53 
Yet Ibn 'Adi is reluctant to say that the divine nature suffers or dies. The two 
natures concur in making a single nature in which the union is substantial 
similar to that between soul and body. 
In this respect, I would like to mention Ibn 4Adi's famous pupil Ibn Zur4a (tenth 
century Jacobite Christian), whose approach toward union of incarnation is 
totally different from his teacher. Like his teacher he was a Jacobite and 
wrote four treatises to affirm the Christian doctrines against the Jews and 
Muslims. 
According to Ibn Zur'a, the unity of the divine essence with the human essence 
is like an intermediate nature, which is neither purely divine or purely human. 
He described three members of the trinity as intellect (aql) the act of 
intelligence (lägil) and the object of the act of intellect (ma'qül), as they are 
symbolic expressions of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit. According to 
him, the original substance become united to man, because the hypostasis is the 
substance with an attribute. 
54 
52. Ibid., P. 92. 
53. Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, P. 225. _ 
54. H. Fergus Thomson, Jr, Four Treaties of qsä ibn Zur'a, PP. 123-4. 
(Unpublished Phi, thesis submitted to Columbia University, 1952). 
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3. - Timothy I, he was a Nestorian patriarch in the time of Mahdi 
(775-785). 
There was a debate between Mahdi and Timothy I which took place for two 
days, later on discussion was written down in its present form by the Christian 
protagonist. 
In discussing the nature of Christ, he argued that Christ is not two beings - nor 
two sons, but Son and Christ are one; there are in him two natures, one of which 
belongs to the word and the other one which is from Mary, clothed itself with 
the Word God. 
55 
The expression "clothed itself" is pointed out by the translator as a semi 
Nestorian expression. 
56 
The patriarch goes on to argue, "we do not deny the duality of natures nor their 
mutual relations, but we profess that both of them constitute one Christ and 
Son. He illustrated it by an example, a man is one, while in reality he is two: 
one in his composition and individuality, and two in the distinction found 
between his soul and his body; the former is invisible and spiritual, and the 
latter visible and corporeal. In the same way the word of God, together with 
the clothings of humanity which he put on from Mary, is one and the same 
Christ, and not two, although there is in him the natural difference between the 
word God and his humanity; and the f act that he is one does not preclude the 
fact that he is also two. The very same Christ and Son is indeed known and 
confessed as one, and the fact that he is also two does not imply confusion or 
mixture because the known attributes of his natures are kept in one person of 
the Christ. "57 
Then he explained this mystery by another example, "as the tongue and the 
word are one with the voice with which they are clothed, in a way that the two 
are not two words nor two tongues, but one word, together with the tongue and 
the voice, and in them one does not expel two. This is also the case with the 
word God. He is one with his humanity while preserving the distinction between 
his invisibility and his visibility and between his divinity and his humanity. 
55. A. Mingana, Wood Brook Study, B. J. R. L., Vol. XI (19Z8), P. 155. 
56. Ibid., P. 155. Footnote 1. 
57. Ibid., P. 155. 
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Christ is one in his sonship and two in the attributes of his natures. "58 
Timothy used the illustration of man as body and soul. Man is living and 
rational only by the nature of his soul which has indeed been received from God, 
but he is said to be living and rational in his body, through its association with 
this . 
living and rational soul. In spite of all this, however, he is called one living 
and rational man and not two. In the same way God is called, and is, Christ's 
Father by the nature of the union of word God with our human nature, and on 
the other hand He is called His God by the nature of his humanity that he took 
from us in union with the word God. 
59 
When Timothy considered the death of Christ, he said, "the Son of God died in 
our nature, but not in his divinity. Refuting the Jacobites and Melkites, he 
argued that the Jacobites and Melkites say that God suffered and died in the 
flesh, but the Nestorians not only do not assert that God suffered and died in 
our nature, but that He even removed the possibility of our human nature, and 
its mortality and His immortality, and He made it to resemble divinity that a 
created being is capable of resembling his Creator. "60 
58. Ibid., P. 156. 
59. Ibid., P. 156. 
60. Ibid., P. M. 
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CHAPTER VI 
A Comparative Analysis of "ýkbd a1-Jabb7ar 
Critique of Christological Doctrines 
4Abd al-Jabbär has devoted about eight sections to discussing and criticising the 
doctrine of union of incarnation. 
He first outlines the different aspects of the Christological doctrines that come 
within his assessment of being rational and therefore capable of rational 
refutation. He sets out these doctrines as a prelude to his attempt to refute 
them. However, even in setting them out he is guilty of confusion. In 
particular he seems to suggest that the term la, (inherence or incarnation) 
excludes the doctrine of conjunction (mujäwara). This is clearly incorrect as it 
was in fact a term used to try to explain inherence or incarnation. Also at this 
point, it seems appropriate to draw attention to the fact that, while in the 
section on the Trinity he did not use dhät as in any way synonymous with 'aý whar 
and thereby forced one to translate dhät in rather strained English terminology, 
he now uses dhät to mean "essence" and takes it as about a synonym for jawhar 
"substance". 1 
His next section takes up the argument about/which/mentioned in the outline. 
It is taken out of place and this may indicate 'Abd al-Jabbär's desire to deal 
with this problem. The one will theory had been put forward by Heraclius to try 
to solve the dispute in his empire. It had not, however, gained much support 
because although the one will was acceptable to the Monophysites, it still did 
not alter the fact that the Melkites still held the doctrine of two natures. 
If the wills are separate, they would have to concur according to 'Abd al- 
Jabbär. He finds this to be totally unacceptable, though his argument against it 
is on the basis of rational probability which completely ignores the nature of 
the topic he is dealing with. He develops his argument by using the argument 
about the attribute of knowledge. If they are separate, then their attributes of 
knowledge will be separate. If man can never have God's attribute of 
knowledge, then how can he have His attribute of will. In this argument 'Abd 
1. tAbd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, Vol. V, PP. 114-116. 
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al-Jabbär completely ignores the Mu'tazilite theology of attributes which he has 
so strenuously advocated elsewhere. He should know, as he has said it 
r 
frequently enough in al-Mughni, that knowledge is a sifa li-dhätihi whereas will 
is a sifat al-M. Thus will is secondary to knowledge and a created attribute. 
His whole Mu'tazilite structure has come crumbling down because of his over- 
enthusiasm to attack the doctrine of union through will. 
However, he does present a reasonable argument that if will is to the basis of 
this union, then there seems no need to exclude such a union from all the 
prophets. 
Z 
He carries on his discussion of union through will by claiming that the will of 
God could not be the will of mankind. He does not indicate the sect, but in his 
Sharh3 he mentioned that the Nestorians believed in the union through the 
aspect of will (mashila). A Father R. Shadyaq, in his preface to al-Radd 
al-Jamil by al-Ghazäli, alleged that the union of will which is often attributed 
to the Nestorians, is in fact a false interpretation of their doctrine. He also 
admitted that they used to say that in the beginning. 
4 
He first argued that God does not need any location for his will whereas man 
does. However, such a union of wills occurred, the will of God would become an 
accident by being located in Christ. 
j 
He then suggests that /that doctrine could be applied of Christ, it could be 
applied to all creatures. As a result all mankind could not will evil and differ in 
wills from God and from one another. Consequently, there would be no 
distinction between Christ and the rest of mankind concerning the union. 
5 
This 
argument is a rather ineffective debating argument and contributes little of 
value to the discussion. 
6 
He further contradicted the union of wills by three more arguments. He 
2. Ibid., PP. 117-118. 
3. 'Abd al-Jabbär, Sharh, P. 296. 
4. R. Shadyaq, preface of al-Radd al-Jamil, P. 217. 
5. Idem, al-Mughni, Vol. V, PP. 119-120. 
6. Here Abd al-Jabbär has repeated the same argument,. as he has applied 
before in section 4. See al-Mughni, Vol. V, PP. 117-18. 
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suggests that a union of wills implies locating God in Christ, as of course does 
any facet of the doctrine of incarnation. To ýAbd al-Jabbär this would involve 
all the attributes of Christ becoming God's. For him this is simply impossible. 
A more critical and crucial argument based on will is that, God is willing from 
eternity by an unlocated act of will. In the same way He will continue to do so, 
because there is no change in his nature. 
7 How then can God's will be located 
in Christ's? While criticising the union of incarnation, tAbd al-Jabbir's three 
arguments with the reference of the union of will are very similar to Abu ¶isä in 
the second part of his al-Radd8 and contain a number of arguments which were 
applied in the earlier works. But there is a difference between tAbd al-Jabbär 
and Abi qsä. Abü tsä tries to find out contradiction in his opponent's 
arguments, while CAbd al-Jabbar depends mostly upon pre-established principles 
laid down by his predecessors. 
************ 
By referring to the Nestorian doctrine of conjunction (mujäwara) with its 
illustrative example of Christ's body being a temple, fAbd al-Jabb. r seems 
aware of the theological basis of this argument. 
Wolfson has suggested9 that such language is found in the writings of St. Paul 
and was generally accepted by most of the Orthodox and particularly the 
Nestorians. 
For 4Abd al-Jabbär this is impossible as he maintained that God was not 
substance (jawhar) or body. 
10 We have already noticed that, at times, he 
relaxes this Mu'tazilite doctrine by admitting that "aý whar can be equivalent to 
dhät. However, here he emphasises his understanding of jawhar as in some 
sense corporeal and therefore impossible to be applied to God. To accept this 
doctrine would mean that God should have the essential qualities of a body and 
bodies should have the essential qualities of God. Because if two things have 
one essential quality in common, they must have all essential qualities in 
common. According to (Abd al-Jabbar both conjunction and also mixture are 
7. Al-Mughni, Vol. V, PP. 121-ZZ. 
8. Abii sa al-warraq. al-Radd'alä al-Firaq alThaläth, PP. 43-48. 
9. H. A. Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers, P. 367. 
10. 'Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, Vol. V, P. M. 
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ll 
only possible among substances "awähir not presumably dhat) and bodies. 
************ 
He rejects any attempt to exploit the Muslim creed that God is everywhere. 
According to Abd al-Jabbär it is a metaphorical phrase, but the Christian 
formula must be taken literally. Any argument for inherence based on divine 
miracles is unacceptable to IAbd al-Jabbar, because the other prophets also 
performed such kinds of miracles. 
l2 
He further argued, that the performance of miracles by Christ does not affirm 
that these occurred through conjunction because God is able to do that without 
any location. 
13 
He again criticised that, if the appearance of Christ's miracles such as raising 
dead body, or healing blind person, could be affected by other without uniting 
with God, then the same can apply to Christ. 
14 
He then asked whether during the union God has conjoined him in all his atoms or 
only one of them. The former was unacceptable, because it would require that 
God consisted of many parts. To Abd al-Jabbär that was obviously impossible. 
If it was only some atoms, it would indicate that such atoms which took part in 
union would be characterised as Christ and Son of God. 
is The nature of union 
discussed by CAbd al-Jabbär, is based on the materialistic explanation of the act 
of union, and has similarities with Abu ý s7a's al-Radd. 
lb Such analogies 
concerning the union of incarnation can also be seen in al-Tamhid17 by Abü 
Bakr a1-Bägillani. Al-Bagilläni's argumentation is not extensive but it is clearer 
and more comprehensive than Abd al-Jabbär's criticism. 
************ 
11. Ibid., P. 123- 
12. Ibid., PP. 123-24. 
13. Ibid., P. 124. 
14. McDermoft confirms that tAbd al-Jabbär does believe in miracles, subject 
to certain conditions. They must be professed by the prophets. 
For detail, see M. J. McDermoft, The Theology of al-Shaik al-Mufid, 
PP-84-86- 
15. Al-Mughni, Vol. V, PP. 124-5. 
16. Abu qsä al-Warräq, al-Radd 4alä al-Firaq a1Thaläth, P. 6., Para 10, P. 30., 
Para 6. 
17. Al-Bägill-ani, al-Tamhid, PP. 87-88. 
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In a long discussion, 'Abd al-Jabbär examines the implications of the meaning of 
the verb 'haha' i. e., God's coming in Christ to inhere in him. According to the 
Jacobites, union is through the essence (ittihid al-dhät) as tAbd al-Jabbär 
described it in his Sharh. 18 Ordinarily in Arabic, 'Abd al-Jabbar alleges that 
the word ýalla indicates materialistic qualities of a thing. On the basis of that 
he argued that it can be applied to describe how accidents and substances can 
combine. If one admits that God can inhere in Christ, it will demand the 
createdness of the divinity. So 'Abd al-Jabbar devoted a long polemic to 
disprove this theory that God cannot inhere in physical body in any 
circumstances. 
19 
He maintained that halla (that one thing is said to inhere in the other) in first 
instance applies spatial limitation upon Him and He would be like a substance or 
it would make Him a created being. In this argument 4Abd al-Jabbär has 
interpreted the verb 1 alla in its literal sense and is not ready to accept any 
other explanation or interpretation. 
20 
4Abd al-Jabbär puts in the mouth of opponent an argument that according to 
Abü 'Ali speech (kaläm) comes to exist on a writing tablet, sound or tongue 
without moving from one place to another for its existence. 
21 In order to 
understand this argument, it is necessary to examine the meaning of sound 
(sawt) and its relation to speech. Sound is the last of the five "act of the 
limbs". Sounds are not direct acts, but they are produced by means of a cause 
which generates the sound. - Sound is an accident that does not remain. If it 
remains, it would cause great difficulties for the hearing subject. Sound is a 
perceptable subject. Human beings and other living beings need the instrument 
of the ear to perceive it. - Like the other "act of the limbs" sound in order to 
exist only needs a location (ur all) to inhere in. 
22 
Abii 'Ali held that sound could exist in every location, but always needed 
movement. To explain the latter half of this statement, he gave the illustration 
that if we knock on a brass basin, it gives a- sound, if we stop its movement, 
18. tAbd a1-Jabbär, Sharh, P. 296. 
19. Idem, al-Mughni, P. 126. 
20. Al-Mughni, P. 126. 
21. Ibid., PP. 126-7. 
22. Peaters, God's Created Speech, P. 139. 
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sound ceases also. 
No one can say that as according to Abt 'Ali sound can exist in every location in 
the same way God is existing and inhering in Christ as sound. 
Although gAbd al-Jabbär himself does not agree with Abü 'All's viewpoint, he 
said that such analogy cannot apply here, because it requires a location in which 
it inheres. Consequently to use the verb balla (inheres in a non-materialistic 
thing)is inconceivable. 
Z3 
The Christian scholars had supported their viewpoint with two famous analogies 
as it is described by their apologists, but 4Abd al-Jabbär attempted to refute 
these by his own logical argumentation. The first analogy for inherence was 
that of man's reflection in mirror and the second was the engraving of the seal 
in clay or wax. 
24 
(Abd al-Jabbär asserted that since reflection is not a physical entity and not 
actually produced by the man, looking to it, there is no connection between 
him and the mirror. On the other hand, such reflection changes and is affected 
by the light of the sun. He insisted that the mirror is an instrument like an eye 
to recognise different things. This explanation seems to be concerned with gAbd 
al-Jabbär's views of the physical world. 
As far as the engraving of the seal was concerned, 'Abd al-Jabbar alleged that 
such an analogy indicated accidental impression. If it is so, then God would be 
an inhering accident. 
Z5 
To the argument that if we admit that God is existing without any location, we 
must assume His existence in Christ without any inherence and conjunction, 
'Abd al-Jabbär replied that even though we admit that God is not like physical 
substances, He would have to obey the natural laws if he was going to inhere or 
occupy a place in Christ. 
23. 'Abd a1-Jabbär, al-Mughni, P. 127. 
24. Ibid., P. 129. 
25. Ibid., P. 132. 
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He again repeated his previous argument that Christ would have to follow a new 
characteristic after the union has occurred, and ultimately God would be 
affected through the qualities of contagents such as death and so on. 
26 
Repeating arguments about God's inherence in one atom or many atoms, and the 
argument about miracles, he then goes on to suggest in polemical style that if 
inherence in Christ was possible, so would this inherence in any inorganic being 
be possible. 
27 
The two analogies mentioned by tAbd al-Jabbär, are criticised by early Muslim 
polemicists, for example by Abü ýsä in his al-Radd. 
28 They are also discussed 
by al-Bägilläni in his al-Tamhid. 
29 
From Christian side, Elias of Nisibis tried to explain how the incarnation could 
take place, by arguing that this inherence was neither like the inherence of an 
accident in the substance, nor the inherence of the body in another body, nor 
was it completely nor partial. His inherence in Christ is like the inherence of 
dignity, conciliation and will, not the inherence of essence and substance 
because His essence and substance are everywhere equal. He can inhere in one 
place not the other, in one person, not the other. For example His inherence in 
the heaven not the earth, or His inherence in the places of worship, in the 
prophets and chosen people. 
30 
In order to explain the difference between Christ and the prophets, Elias of 
Nisibis claimed that the noun of inherence is a common noun that can be 
applied to everywhere, just as the noun of existence is applicable to God, human 
beings, even to the earth, soul, fire etc. As a human being cannot approach God 
even though the noun of existence is applicable for him,, in the same way, other 
prophets cannot achieve the position of Christ through Mary, through such an 
application of inherence in them. But the difference is that the inherence in 
Christ was through union. On the other hand, in the prophets, there was no 
26. Ibid., P. 132. 
27. Ibid., 135. «Abd al-Jabbär has repeated this argument in section 7, P. 124. 
28. Abü Sit al-Radd, PP-R-35, Para 10. 
29. Al-Bigilläniý, al-Tamhid, PP-87-88- 
30. Cheikho, Trois Traites, P. 37. 
170 
union of incarnation or complete union. If we concede that, then Christ's 
disciples would be able to participate in his prophethood, because they are 
entitled to be called prophets. 
31 
Elias differentiated Christ's union for certain reasons. 
1. - The eternal Son that is the Word of God, united with Him. So he is one 
Messiah. We call him the Messiah and you call him Word of God. There is no 
other prophet that can be called Word of God. It was only because of his union. 
Z. - He was born without sexual relation, and he himself never had intercourse. 
3. - He had signs and miracles which the other prophets did not have. 
4. - God has raised him to heaven and he is living there. 
5. - He was unfamiliar with any kind of sin. 
32 
(Abd al-Jabbär repeats the same heading as he had used for the previous 
section. However in this section there is a more wide-ranging discussion. He 
based his critical position on the principle that he had maintained in earlier 
ý 
volume of al-Mughni where he argued that two distinct entities cannot become 
one and in the same way one cannot become two. 
33 
He went on that if we admit the doctrine of the Jacobites, it will entail two 
substances become one, or substance may have more than one accident inhering 
in it (resulting in possibility of many accidental forms). All these options are to- 
a 
for gAbd al-Jabbär to accept as this would change the physical nature of the 
world as CAbd al-Jabbar understands it. 
34 
In his discussion he repeats the arguments which have already been analysed and 
introduced as being material. All these arguments refer not only to the 
Jacobites but to the Christian teaching in general, although he himself put this 
31. Ibid., P. 37. 
32. Ibid., PP. 38-39" 
33.4Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, P. 137. 
34. Ibid., 137. 
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under the heading of a discussion of the Jacobites issues implicit in the 
Trinitarian conception of the deity. If only one hypostasis united with Christ, 
then the other two would appear to be independent and this would seem to 
entail three independent Gods. 
35 
In this discussion 4Abd al-Jabbär seems to be relying on statements had been 
made earlier by Abii 'Ali al-Jubba i. 
a 
From Christian side Timothy I explained to al-Mahdi, the caliph, as the word of 
the king clothes itself with the papyrus on which it is written, while his soul and 
his mind cannot be said to do the same, and as his soul and his mind while not 
separated from his word, it cannot nevertheless be said that they clothe 
themselves with the papyrus. So also is the case with the Word of God, because 
although He put on our human body without having been separated from the 
Father and the Spirit, yet the Father and the Spirit cannot be said to have put 
on our human body. 
36 
He moves on to discuss the nature of deity when Christ died. He points out that 
God either ceased to be united with man or suffered death. 
37 
This was indeed a 
problem which was discussed by Christians. The Nestorians maintained that 
only the humanity of Christ suffered and died while the divinity of Christ was 
unaffected. The Melkites on the other hand, while saying that God died, they in 
fact limit death only to the humanity of Christ. Thus there seems some 
contradiction in their doctrine. The Monophysites were also troubled by this 
problem and an extremist sect of them, the Julianists, went so far as to 
maintain that all the suffering- and death of Christ were only apparent and not 
real. 





5Abd al-Jabbär then turns his attention to the sources of Christianity i. e., the 
Gospels and their procedure of transmission. He attempts to subject this to an 
35. Ibid., P. 140. 
36. Cheikho, Trois Traites. P. 7, A. Mingana, Wood Brooke studies B. J. R. L, 
Vol. XII (1928) PP. 162-163. 
37.4Abd a1-J abbär, a1-Mughni, P-139. 
38. Abü isä, al-Radd, PP. 1-9, Paras I-VI and XXVI. 
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analysis on the basis of reason ('aql) which is a distinctive feature of the 
Mu'tazilites. 
4Abd al-Jabbär argued that revelation (same) is not a source of knowledge for 
the attributes of God unless it is capable of being interpreted in accordance 
with the requirements of reason. 
39 
What 4Abd al-Jabbär is saying here is that it is impossible for true revelation to 
say anything about God which cannot be supported by reason. Therefore if any 
so called revelation does say anything about God, which contradict reason, that 
revelation must be rejected. This opens the way for an attack on the Gospels, 
who according to CAbd al-Jabbär, have been responsible for putting forward the 
irrational doctrines that Christians accept. He argued that their books could 
not be established as authentic because of the limited number of them and 
because of the clear indications that they altered and forged facts. 
40 
On the other hand, Muslim revelation was transmitted by a large majority and 
did not contradict the sense or reason. 
On the basis of above mentioned argument, he further attacked the Christian 
concept of crucifixion of Christ. He sought to demonstrate that they could 
have been confused in their understanding of event. He argued that crucifixion 
after the killing distorts the features of the victim, and it caused a confusion 
between him and the other person. He claimed that is surely possible, because 
such incident occurred in the time of a prophet (i. e. Christ) and the substitute 
took Christ's resemblance as a miracle of the prophet. He supported his 
position about such possibility by the Qu? 5n. 
41 
This interpretation of the verse 
is one that was (4: 157) well-established by most of the commentators in such a 
way. 
However, 4Abd al-Jabbär fails to investigate why the substitute of Christ was 
crucified. The crucifixion of Christ is a central and perminent feature of the 
Christian faith and connected with the doctrine of Redemption. However, it 
had not been universally recognised and it may well be that the Muslim 
39. 'Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, PP. 14Z-143. 
40. Ibid., P. 143 
41. Ibid., P. 143. 
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understanding of it was influenced by Docetis-w,. 
'Abd al-Jabbär accused the Christians of following their religious leaders blindly 
as Nestorius and Jacob and so on. While their original sources such as the 
Gospels are far away from such doctrines as the Trinity and incarnation. Along 
with that their doctrines do not fulfil the requirements of a rational thinking. 
4Z 
In this way he quoted a dialogue that one of his companions asked a Christian, 
"Why do you explain Film (knowledge) as Son not the life (h" ayät) ". The Christian 
answered, "That knowledge is masculine in gender. " His follower argued that 
now he must of firm about life that it is a daughter of God, because 1}ayät (life) 
is feminine in gender. 
He also reported an explanation of Theodore Abü Qurra (d. 8Z0) the Melkites, 
who claimed that God must have an eternal Son on the basis that God must have 
mastery. So this quality must be eternal and have an object. This object 
cannot be inferior to God. Since He has to express His mastery, so it could not 
be superior or inferior, it must be the same nature as Him, since the mastery 
could not be a form of subjugation, so it must be like the father's authority over 
the son. Consequently He must have a Son, that would be like Him. 
I Abd al-Jabbär mocked such an argument and argued that in this way God must 
have a wife, because there would be complete and effective mastery. 
43 
Theodore Abü Qurra in his Arabic work that was edited and published by 
Cheikho, seems to be involved in applying the mastery (ra äsa) in the reference 
of God's mastery over Christ. He argued that Adam and God seem to be equal 
in some qualities, but there is no comparison between them. In the same way 
there are some excellent qualities by which Adam resembles God, i. e., 
generation, procession and mastery. As Adam was born and proceeded from 
42. Ibid., P. 144 
43. Ibid., PP. 144-145 
The full version of the argument in Abü Qurra's own words is given in G. 
Graf, ed., Die Arabischen Schriften des Theodore Abu Qurra, Poderborn, 
1910, Mimar VII, PP. 184-188. CF. PG, Vol. 97, Col 1557D -1561D. 
Cited by S. H. Griffith, The Controversial theology of Abü Qurra, PP. 17Z- 
176. (Unpublished Ph. D thesis, submitted to the Catholic University of 
America, 1978). 
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Him, He too became a Father and Master of those who were born from Him. 
44 
'Abd al-Jabbär's criticism of the evangelists and his argument that Christians 
are involved in blind initiation of their early leaders, is taken from al-J 1 iz in 
a. Al-Jähiz criticised the four evangelists and asserted that the his Ris i 
45 
reason behind their faith is incritical acceptance of the doctrines of their 
leaders and consequently belief in anthropomorphism. 
************ 
1Abd al-Jabbär then turns to criticism the possibility of the adoration and 
worship of Christ. He maintained that Christ is not entitled to become God and 
worshipped. 4Abd al-Jabbär tried to show the inconsistency which existed 
among the different Christian sects. He asked what parts of Christ are divine 
and therefore be worshipped? 
46 We have already seen other such trivial 
debating points being used. More systematically, he goes on to argue that 
Christ as a corporeal body cannot perform any divine action that entitles him to 
be worshipped. Only God is entitled to that. Again he seems to be using the 
point that the Christians regard Christ as God. Julianists who maintained that 
Christ in his human nature was God. He argues that then Eternal God would be 
something like human being. 
47 
He goes on to point out that Christ himself worshipped God and called others to 
do so. He died and suffered pain. Such a person cannot be an adored one as it 
would lead to an anthropomorphism and contradiction. 
Those sects who maintained two natures in Christ according to 
CAbd al-Jabbär, 
must restrict themselves only to worshipping the divine subject. They cannot 
say that they worship Christ as he is in both natures. 4Abd al-Jabbär criticised 
those who alleged that Christ should be worshipped, by arguing that other 
prophets and all who had done good for human beings would be entitled to 
worship and adoration. 
48 
44. Cheikho, (ed) Mayrnar li-Tadärus Abü Qurra, Al-Machriq, Vol. XV (1912) 
PP. 825-26. 
45. Al-Jähiz, Risäla, PP. 24-25. 
46. 'Abd al-Jabbär, al-Mughni, P. 146. 
47. Ibid., P. 146. 
48. Ibid., PP. 146-47. 
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This is not a new criticism and has already been applied earlier (on the grounds 
of humanity), as Imäm Qäsim b. Ibrahim argued that the Christians alleged that 
His Son praised Him and worshipped Him while the Son is equal in divinity and 
eternity like God. In this way they made the adored like the worshipping 
person. That was regarded as an impossible to be used about the Eternal God. 
49 
This problem is discussed by Timothy I. He answers similar argument to 4Abd 
al-Jabbär's in the following way. 
"Christ did not pray and worship as God, because as such he is the receiver of 
the worship and prayer of both the celestial and terrestrial being, in conjunction 
with the Father and the Spirit, but he worshipped and prayed as a man, son of 
our human kind. - He further worshipped and prayed for our sake, because he 
himself was in no need of worship and prayer. , 
50 
************ 
4Abd al-Jabbär's critique of the incarnation (or inherence) is totally influenced 
by his Mu'tazilite background. As he regards the doctrine as ridiculous, he is 
quite prepared to use trivial arguments to ridicule it. 
However, it is clear that 4Abd al-Jabbär as Mu'tazilite was unable to understand 
the philosophy behind the doctrine of the union of incarnation. It is obvious 
that oriental Christian apologists did not use the arguments which 4Abd al- 
Jabbär put into their mouth to defend the union of incarnation. But one must 
realise that according to Muslim polemists in general and to (Abd al-Jabbär in 
particular, Christian formula of incarnation is self contradictory. It 
characterises Him both mortal and immortal, possible and impossible. 
However, L. E. Brown, who especially discussed the presetation of the oriental 
Christian scholars of their doctrines, has accused them /not understancL the 
real union between God and man. 
51 He also pointed out the reason and said, 
"There was in Asia an old myth of the divine soul coming down to earth, and 
49. Qäsim b. Ibrähim, al-Radd 'alä al-Nasärä, in R. D. Studi Orientali, Vol. IX, 
(1921-3), P. 312. 
50. A. Mingana, Wood Brake Studies, B. J. R. L, Vol. XII, (1928), P. 167., 
Cheikho, Trois Traites, P. 9. 
51. L. E. Brown, The Eclipse of Christianity in Asia, P. 72. 
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being clothed with the garment of humanity, and eventually freeing itself from 
this encumberance and finding its way back again to its heavenly home. - 
52 
He further said, 
"With this sort of idea in the air, and also the belief in the absolute gap between 
the Creator and creature, it was very difficult for oriental writers to believe in 
a real union between God and man. "53 
In the same way, John of Damascus criticised the Nestorians for failing to 
believe in the unity of Christ, when he said, 
"They (the Nestorians) attribute the humbler things wrought by the Lord in the 
days of His sojourn with us solely to His manhood; while the loftier and divine 
actions they attribute to God the Word, and they do not attribute both together 
to one and the same person. "54 
L. E. Brown concludes his criticism by saying, 
"We find in many of these oriental writers that, however much they tried to 
express the perfect union between the divine and the human in Christ, they 
could scarcely get away from the idea that there were two sets of actions in 
Christ, some of which could be attributed to Him as divine, and some to Him as 
human. " 55 
One has reasons to believe that it is true that oriental Christian scholars 
writing in Arabic were facing difficulties to present their ideas to their fellow 
Christians who were brought up under the Muslim rule. One of the reasons for 
this may have been that they had to discuss their doctrines with Muslim 
scholars who believed in pure unity of God without attributing anything to God 
that may make Him something like His creatures. 
In order to understand ýAbd al-Jabbär's critique and understanding of the 
incarnation, it might be useful to look at the some of the Christian 
presentations of that doctrine which gAbd al-Jabbär may have been familiar 
52. Ibid., P. 70. 
53. Ibid., P. 70- 
54. "De Haeresibus", Migne, P. G. XCN, Col. 740, cited by Brown in his 
Eclipse of Christianity in Asia, P. 72. 
55. Ibid., P. 72. 
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with. It is noticeable that compared with the Trinity, oriental scholars 
discussed the union of incarnation with less detail. 
It would seem appropriate to examine the philosophy behind the union of 
incarnation as it is described by oriental scholars. It is surprising that 'Abd 
al-Jabbär while criticising this doctrine did not refer to its philosophy. 
Christians held the doctrine of incarnation because they believed that it was 
necessary for their salvation. According to them there are few reasons to 
believe in the union of incarnation. 
Abü Qurra, a Melkite scholar maintained that the philosophy behind the 
incarnation is that it is will of God to honour us through the person in which He 
inhered. He illustrated it by an example, that suppose a king made an 
engagement for marriage for his son to one of the families of his kingdom, and 
wished that this family would be moved to his house and finally he mixed them 
with his family. In the same way, the Creator honoured us through the 
incarnation and mingled with us, lived within us in a way that was suitable for 
us. He came down from heaven and manifested Himself in our substance and 
called us as brothers, sons and friends, and lived within us for many years and 
demonstrated from Himself the laws of goodness. Then He raised His humanity 
towards the heaven and He will come again with His blessing. 
56 
Abü Qurra further explained, "that God incarnated Himself, so that we may be 
able to know His Trinity and His love and affection. He illustrated it by an 
example of a rational person willing to serve a person who was deaf and dumb. 
So he gave him a signal through his hands. In this way he benefited the 
handicapped and he himself was not losing anything. 
In the same way, God Almighty who is well organised, manifested Himself in 
the image of a man like one of us and He did what we used to do and struggled 
like us and addressed us through our speech and showed a signal, as a rational 
man does for the deaf. So He characterised Himself with what was not in His 
nature. "57 
56. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, PP. 110-111. 
57. Ibid., P. 113. 
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Abi Qurra further said, "that the philosophy behind the incarnation is to free 
the human being from slavery and keep away from the curse in which they were 
living. He expressed it by an illustration, that a man hired out himself from the 
end of the day up to the night. The person could work only during the day, then 
he would become tired. When his master saw that he was unable to work, he 
worked instead of him for the rest of the time and gave him full wages. 
In the same way, our Lord Christ who is very compassionate with his servants 
worked instead of them and freed them from slavery and curse by his 
crucifixion which was without any sin. "58 
Abix Qurra maintained, "that His incarnation creates in our heart absolute 
knowledge about life after death and saves us from Satan who gained power 
over adam. He described the conquest of Satan, and the delivery of His people 
from him as being, like a man who had some sheep and there was near to them a 
wolf, an enemy, who continually tore them and seized the sheep. The man took 
a sheep's fleece from his flock and put it on, and then stood in the midst of the 
sheep as one of them, indistinguishable from them, till the wolf came, 
according to its custom. The disguised sheep jumped on the wolf and drove him 
a long way, separating him from the flock. When the wolf saw what the 
strength sheep showed, the wolf supposed that the sheep had changed their 
nature and became powerful like wolves. Therefore the wolf turned to flight. " 
Such is the wisdom and craft of the creature and God is wiser and craftier. Abü 
Qurra pointed out the philosophy "that Satan used to regard the people without 
stability and determination. Because of that our Lord did not come through a 
great birth or by an extraordinary birth. It was through a pregnancy and then 
born through Mary the virgin and brought up as a man and participated among 
them in eating and drinking, sleeping for the rest of the world life. " 
Abi Qurra concluded, "that it is the Christian faith that since divinity united 
with humanity, it never vanished and disappeared. In the same way, it was in 
the womb, the crucifixion and in the grave up to the time with end. "59 
58. Ibid., P. 114. 
59. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, PP. 116-117. 
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Yahyä b. IcAdi was not only a theologian and Christian polemist, but also a 
philosopher and disciple of famous philosopher al-Färäbi. While arguing about 
ta'anns (incarnation) he explained that it means to become a man. Like CAbd 
al-Jabbär he presented a long argument to establish his point of view, in which 
he said, "that there is a possibility of one being able to conceive of God through 
human image and His union with it. One can know God Almighty and 
comprehend Him through his reason. When that is affirmed, one can say that 
his reason (while knowing Him) can illustrate His image. As a matter of fact, 
God is without primordial matter (ha " ä), so His image would be His essence. 
Consequently, His essence would be in our reason. That requires that when our 
reason comprehends His essence, it must be united with Him. "60 
Finally, he concluded that there is a possibility of union between human nature 
and God's essence through reason. It is not impossible and a discordant 
theory. 
61 
While describing the distinction of Christ, he said, "that there is no other 
except Christ who was characterised from his early existence with the divine 
actions and clear signs and miracles. In the same way, nobody was conceived 
without sexual relation. So we distinguish Him through the characteristic of 
complete union. When there is a union, there would be two combined things as 
one thing, and one thing when it is continuously one, cannot leave its parts or 
separate from the other one. When they are not one, they will not be united. "62 
Again contrary to 4Abd al-Jabbär Ibn 4Adi seeks to prove that infinite can unite 
with the finite. 
63 
There is another expression and explanation by Paul of Sidon, a famous Melkite 
scholar He maintained that, "the Eternal Son that is the Word has 
become incarnate as a complete human being through the Holy Spirit and Mary, 
without transferring from divinity and separating from His essence, as the 
word 
60. Yahyä b. 4Adi, Mag .1t, ed A. Perier, PP. 74-75. 
61. Ibid., P-75. 
_ 
6Z. Ibid., PP. 84-85. 
63. Robert Henry, The Apologatic writings of Yahyä b. 'Adi, P. 90. 
(Unpublished Ph. D. thesis of Hertford Seminary Foundation, 1973). 
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or speech of a human being is produced from his intellect and becomes a letter, 
which then is taken to another city. In terms of paper and ink, it can be torn, 
or burnt, but in terms of word or speech, there is no interence of accidents. It 
is intellect which is the source of production without there being any separation 
from it. 
In this way, we can say that the Lord Jesus Christ in terms of the Word of God 
is Eternal, and in terms of son of Mary, is created and temporal. So He 
performed miracles through His divine nature and showed his weakness through 
his human nature. Both acts are by one Christ. Similarly a piece of iron when 
it becomes hot through fire, in terms of fire, it can burn and light, and in terms 
of iron, it can be broken, fold up and cut. Nothing can enter the nature of fire. 
C, 
So such/piece is one that consists of two natures, i. e. simple nature, where is no 
interence of any accident and the other is physical nature which is able to carry 
the accidents. 
ý Our doctrine, that the Lord Jesus is God, comes into being when divine (latif) 
substance unites with physical nature. 
It dominates the physical as fire dominates wood. Nobody says fire and wood, 
but only fire. Since this is applicable to the union of the created things, the 
Creator is more appropriate to be called something like that. 
64 
64. Cheikho, Vingt Traites, P. 14. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has been concerned with two of the major Christian doctrines which 
were unacceptable to the 
Muslims, namely the doctrine of the three hypostases of 
the Trinity and the incarnation of Christ. In his polemical treatise on these two 
aspects of Christianity, 
(Abd al-Jabbär has been able to rely on a considerable 
number of earlier works in Arabic mostly written by Muslim scholars. The authors 
of such works were influenced by the gradual development of Muslim theology. 
Such scholars naturally addressed these subjects in terms of their own theological 
school of thought. However, it seems clear from their approach that every Muslim 
polemicist was fully aware of such Christian doctrines that may contradict his 
basic belief. 
This attitude towards Christian theology was reinforced by the general Muslim 
belief that Christian scriptures had been corrupted and no longer reflected the true 
teaching of Christ. 
In the late third century/ninth century and early fourth century/tenth century 
writers of anti-Christian literature developed their approach in a more systematic 
manner. They usually began their works with a summary of Christian doctrines and 
differences among Christian sects. `Abd al-Jabbär has also followed their method. 
However, the attitude and approach of Mu'tazilites towards Christian doctrines is 
even less sympathetic than others because they were even more rigid in their 
doctrine of Unity of God. Thus for them the doctrine of the Trinity is an even 
more central issue between Islam and Christianity. They give it first priority in 
their criticism. 
They saw the doctrine as totally contrary to the Unity of God. In their attack upon 
it they also attacked other Muslim theologians like the Kulläbiyya and 
Ash'arites, 
who in their views, had also compromised the Unity of God. 
Both in criticising Trinitarian doctrines and in attacking the 
Kulläbiyya they used 
arguments about the attributes of God. This can be seen 
in ': bbd al-Jabbär's 
presentation of Abi `A1i's arguments and also even morn precisely }- 
in `. bbd al- 
Jabbär's further discussion. Abu 1Ali and `: \bd al-Jabbar described) tho Trinity in 
terms of similar arguments used by 
Kulläbiyya in t xplainin-_ the doctrine of divine 
attributes. The Kullabivva's doctrine of attributes influenced Abü 
rAli and 1Abd al- 
Jabbär's understanding of the Trinity. 
The study of 4Abd al-Jabbär about these two doctrines seems to 
indicate that his 
knowledge of these doctrines was not first hand. In his reFutation of 
Christian 
doctrines, he depended on his early teachers from Mu'tazla, such as Abü 
'Ali al- 
Jubbäi, Abü '1sä al-Warräq and al-Jähi;; z. During his discussion he often referred to 
them. It seems that the intention behind his study of Christian doctrines was not 
an independent and impartial analysis of such doctrine. In other words his main 
purpose was only to affirm the first principle of the Mu'tazilites, ie tawhid. 
Evidently he was unable to investigate the real points of differences, but continued 
to rely on his own teachers for information. 
IAbd al-Jabbär discussed Christian doctrines within a Mu'tazilite framework. There 
were some scholars before him, such as Abü 'Isa al-Warräq who tried to concen- 
trate on the internal contradiction in Christian doctrines. In the later period Ibn 
Hazm not only concentrated on the doctrinal issues as a traditional way of 
criticism, but also he extended his study to the textual criticism of the Gospels. 
However, one can say that upto the time of 'Abd al-Jabbär, there had not been a 
single scholar who had investigated the historical origins of the Christianity. This 
credit goes to rAbd al-Jabbär only, inspite of the fact that its authentication is not 
fully confirmed. In his Tathbit, he put forward a detail discussion of how the 
Christians have diverted from the pure and true teaching of Christ that was 
originally imported to them. 
Clearly 'Abd al-Jabbär cannot conceive of the doctrine of the Trinity and 
incarnation as anything but polytheism and for this reason, he included his 
discussion of Christianity in volume five of al-Mughni, devoted specially to 
polytheistic religionsand in shark al-usül-al-Khamsa under the chapter of tawhid. 
Inspite of that there are some inadequacies in 
'Abd al-Jabbär's arguments while 
presenting his criticism. He was in the habit of establishing a principle and then he 
himself did not apply the principle he established as one can see in the case of 
jawhar and dhät. In the same way he has applied such arguments which were only 
applicable to the Kullabiyya sect, especially 
in the case of the word ma`nä. He 
sometimes attributed to Christians doctrines which they never 
held. He was also in 
the habit of reed-ting the same arguments again and again, and sometimes 
he 
seems to be inconsistent about arguments as 
he leaves the basic discussion and 
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jumps to another one as he has done particularly in the section on the incarnation. 
In the case of the sects and their doctrines, 
1Abd 
al-Jabbär sometimes is quite right 
and sometimes he is unable to differentiate the doctrines of these sects. 
'Abd 
al-Jabbär's critique of the incarnation is made easier for him by the Christian 
disputes on the person and nature of Christ. The fact that Christian was arguing 
with Christian on this subject, may have led 
'Abd 
al-Jabbär to be less systematic in 
his polemic. For in the main his argument rejects the doctrine of incarnation as 
illogical, irrational and impossible. He fails to discuss the Christian reason for the 
incarnation and their belief that the crucifixion were necessary for the salvation of 
man. This omission puts the Christian doctrine in an unjustifiably ridiculous 
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